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xFOREWORD
one of the central questions of our age is how our society, the 
economy and the state cope with the changes brought about by 
technological progress and disruptive new companies. While 
firms such as Uber, Amazon and Airbnb have radically changed 
how their industries operate – generally in favour of the con-
sumer and to the detriment of existing, often heavily regulated, 
producers – the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) con-
tinues to use a funding model first devised in the 1920s to compel 
– through threat of arrest and criminal conviction – the payment 
of a hypothecated tax to fund its activities. 
Although the BBC funding model has remained largely un-
changed, the white heat of technology has seen the rest of the 
industry move on. Content – whether live, recorded or streamed 
through the Internet – can now be accessed on a variety of de-
vices at almost any time. It is now accessed at a time and in a 
method convenient to the viewer, not to the television network 
or the advertiser.
In the light of these changes the question of the future viability 
of the BBC is of major concern to both economists and politicians.
The authors in this monograph make a persuasive argument 
that the licence fee is no longer the right way to raise revenue for 
the BBC. While there was a case for this model when the only way 
to watch the BBC was through the ownership of a television, and 
there was no way to prevent anyone who owned a television from 
watching the BBC, technological developments have demolished 
this argument. Millennials consume more and more of their 
broadcast media through a tablet, computer or phone. 
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Yet, non-payment of the licence fee now accounts for 10 per 
cent of all criminal convictions in the UK, so we may soon be in 
the invidious position where a majority of young people watch 
BBC programmes through devices that are not taxed, while older 
people who own a television but watch only ITV or Sky Sports are 
taxed and, in the case of non-compliance, subject to arrest.
Those who support the continuation of the licence fee often do 
so using two arguments: that the BBC is vital for producing what 
has become known as ‘public service broadcasting’, and that the 
BBC produces news that is non-partisan together with unbiased 
coverage of current affairs.
Cento Veljanovski, in his chapter, directly engages with the 
argument that public service broadcasting requires state input, 
arguing first that the sheer amount of content now available – 
from the Discovery Channel to religious channels – means that 
there is vanishingly little broadcasting that the state needs to 
support and, at the very least, there should be radical changes to 
how it is supported. Indeed, Veljanovski finds most of the mod-
ern justifications for public service broadcasting wanting. 
The other authors echo this view and go as far as saying that 
the whole case for public sector broadcasting has disappeared. 
With the declining credibility of public good or merit good argu-
ments, more tenuous arguments have been made by supporters 
of the BBC – mostly based around market failure. But these argu-
ments are largely spurious, the authors claim.
Meanwhile, the monograph also looks at the claim that the 
BBC is unbiased. Considering that the BBC is responsible for 
more than 75 per cent of news content in Britain, any question 
over the impartiality of a state organisation which is such a dom-
inant player should be a major cause for concern. 
Considering the constant march of technology, the model of 
the BBC will need to change – whether politicians wish it to or 
not. The final chapter comes out in favour of full privatisation 
so that the BBC will have the freedom to use its undoubted 
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excellence to open a new chapter in its history in which it will be 
able to take advantage of all the changes in technology as well as 
the globalisation of the industry.
This monograph – by authors who are experts in their fields - 
provides a timely and relevant discussion of public service broad-
casting and the future of the BBC. It is a blueprint for how the 
BBC could be freed from the shackles of the state to become a 
major player on the world media stage. It deserves close attention 
from those with an interest in the BBC and broadcasting. 
M a r k Littlewood
Director General and Ralph Harris Fellow
Institute of Economic Affairs
March 2016
The views expressed in this monograph are, as in all IEA publi-
cations, those of the author and not those of the Institute (which 
has no corporate view), its managing trustees, Academic Advis-
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as with the publication of lectures, all IEA monographs are blind 
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SUMMARY
• In the past, the use of a compulsory levy on television sets (a 
licence fee) to finance the BBC could be justified given the 
problem of spectrum scarcity and the fact that television 
signals were a public good (i.e. there was effectively a zero 
marginal cost of an additional user receiving the signal and no 
effective mechanism of exclusion). Furthermore, the fact that 
television sets were bulky, and had no practical use other than 
watching television programmes, made the collection and 
enforcement of the licence fee practically viable.
• In recent years, these justifications for the licence fee have 
evaporated. It is technically straightforward to exclude 
non-payers from receiving television signals and spectrum 
scarcity is no longer a practical problem. Furthermore, there 
is no clear relationship between owning a television set 
and watching ‘television’ programmes. Programmes can be 
watched on computers, phones and tablets; and televisions 
are used for activities other than watching programmes. 
The BBC – and to a more limited extent other independent 
groups and economists – have tried, increasingly desperately, 
to find other justifications for retaining the licence fee. 
• other models of state funding for so-called public service 
broadcasting can be justified. For example, there could be a 
household levy (as in Germany), which could finance a state 
broadcaster. In a pluralistic society, an alternative would 
be to have state funding available on a competitive basis 
to a range of broadcasters and programme producers. This 
latter proposal has been described as ‘an Arts Council for the 
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air’. However, all such mechanisms are prone to capture by 
interest groups.
• A further problematic feature of the BBC is bias. All 
institutions exhibit bias – whether consciously or 
unconsciously. However, the BBC has a worldwide reputation, 
is funded on a compulsory basis and provides 75 per cent 
of all televised news. When an institution with such power 
exhibits bias, this is a far more serious problem.
• There are different types of bias. For example, ‘bias by 
presentation’ is illustrated by the description of the 2014 
Budget by a BBC journalist as ‘back to the land of Road 
to Wigan Pier’. ‘Bias by selection’ is illustrated by negative 
portrayals of business outnumbering positive portrayals by a 
factor of more than eight to one on Radio 4’s Thought for the 
Day.
• There are no feasible reforms that can eliminate bias. Instead, 
the state should uncouple itself from the BBC and remove 
compulsory sources of funding. Commercial and non-
commercial news media can then compete together as they 
do in print and online media: for example, the Guardian is 
one of the most successful online journalism sources while 
being supported by a charitable trust.
• There are various ways in which the BBC could be made 
independent of the state and/or of compulsory funding. 
Models that have been proposed involve the use of 
subscription (with the BBC remaining state owned) or 
allowing the BBC to become a membership organisation 
(like the National Trust). 
• However, there are strong arguments for privatisation on a 
commercial basis. In the era of The Sopranos and The Man 
in the High Castle it can no longer be convincingly argued 
that commercialisation necessarily leads to dumbing down. 
Furthermore, membership organisations and mutuals have 
notoriously poor corporate governance outcomes. 
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• A further reason for this model of privatisation is that the 
BBC will struggle to thrive without commercial freedoms. 
Already only 20 per cent of UK broadcasting revenue 
comes from public funds and the BBC is, in fact, small 
compared with international commercial broadcasters. The 
international potential of a commercialised BBC is such 
that, one day, its worldwide audiences might be a hundred 
times as large as its UK audiences. Tying an organisation 
with such international reach to the UK government and to a 
compulsory licence fee would stifle it.
• The BBC is not the only broadcaster with a strong 
relationship with the state. Channel 4 is state owned, though 
financed by advertising. This is an anachronism and it 
should be privatised.
xvii
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11 INTRODUCTION: BROADCASTING IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Philip Booth and Stephen Davies
For the past few decades, the British public has been regaled at 
regular intervals by a pantomime that returns to the stage of 
public debate when the time for renewal of the BBC’s charter 
comes around. We are told by one side that the licence fee should 
be abolished, and by the other side that to do so would destroy 
a great national institution. Meanwhile, the government of the 
day invariably uses the opportunity this presents to apply not-
so-gentle pressure on the BBC’s senior management, while the 
BBC itself tacks and trims to ensure that it gets the best deal 
possible. All this may soon be a thing of the past. This is not be-
cause of a decisive victory for one side or the other in the debate, 
or because of a popular resistance to payment (although there is 
such resistance, and it is widespread). Rather, it is because of a 
technological transformation that is rapidly making the entire 
debate moot: technology is changing the way that television in 
particular is made and above all consumed. This means that the 
licence fee is doomed and will have to be replaced, regardless of 
what people say or want. 
The origins of the licence fee
The question of how to fund television and radio broadcasts 
arose almost as soon as the technology to make them became 
INTRODUCTION
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
2
available. From an economist’s point of view, broadcast radio 
and television programmes fall into the category of collective 
goods because they have the quality of non-rivalrous consump-
tion. Having an additional person watch or listen to a broadcast 
does not impair the initial viewer or listener’s consumption of 
the good. In theory, broadcasting also had the quality of exclud-
ability, and so could have been provided as a club good, whereby 
the service was provided to people in return for a subscription. 
The problem was that the technology to realise this kind of model 
was not originally available. This meant that broadcasting fell 
into the category of a public good, one that is both non-rivalrous 
in consumption and has non-excludability. In most countries, 
one of two solutions was adopted. The first solution was to pro-
vide radio and later television broadcasting as a pure public good, 
funded out of general taxation. The problem, of course, was that 
this had the potential to make broadcasting into an instrument 
of state propaganda. The second solution was to tie the public 
goods of radio and television broadcasting to the private good of 
advertising.
In Britain, however, a third route was adopted. Defenders of 
the licence fee sometimes present this as a matter of farsighted 
design, but, in fact, it happened by accident. When radio re-
ceivers first became available after Marconi’s pioneering experi-
ments, the Post office was given a power to issue and charge for 
licences for radio receivers. This was partly a measure intended 
to control and regulate access, but it was also seen from the start 
as a revenue-raising device (at that time, the Post office was one 
of the principal sources of government revenue). In 1922, manu-
facturers of radio receivers, along with the Post office, created 
the British Broadcasting Company. This was initially funded by 
the sale of receivers but, as these became more common, the 
problems of non-rivalrous and non-excludable consumption also 
emerged – once a certain number of people had a receiver, there 
was much less incentive for others to also buy one, as they could 
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listen to a broadcast on someone else’s set without paying. The 
Post office continued to charge for radio licences, and in 1927 the 
British Broadcasting Company became the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), with the Post office handing over almost all 
the licence fee income to it. So, the funding of broadcasting by a 
system of licensing was stumbled upon through the hypotheca-
tion of what had been originally just another source of govern-
ment revenue. 
The evolution to a hypothecated television tax
This system, created in the 1920s, made the reception of broad-
casts into a kind of club good, which combined a club system 
of payment by subscription with a monopoly single charge that 
went to one provider, even when (as after 1955) there were other 
providers. The system became consolidated and took on its pres-
ent format in 1946 with the introduction of combined television 
and radio licences (separate radio-only licences continued to be 
sold until 1971). The crucial fact that made this feasible was that 
television broadcasts could only be received via a specific piece 
of equipment, the television set. That meant that excludability 
could be created by tying the ownership of the set to a charge 
that was then used to fund the broadcasts of the BBC (Briggs 
1985). However, importantly, though it would have been techni-
cally feasible, it was not permitted to buy a piece of equipment 
that only received ITV programmes (not funded by the licence) 
and not pay a licence fee. If any television signals were received, 
the licence had to be bought. This meant that the licence fee was 
effectively a hypothecated tax (though it was not paid by people 
who wished to receive no television services whatsoever).
An enforcement mechanism was, of course, required, but this 
was feasible. The fact that a household is receiving signals can be 
detected. Furthermore, until recently, television sets were bulky 
and not easily portable, which meant that the charge for having 
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a set could easily be linked to a specific address. The advent of 
portable televisions did not really affect this because their re-
ception quality was often so poor that they never caught on as a 
common platform for watching programming. This meant that 
the fee became a tax on any household that had the means to 
receive television broadcasts.
The final piece of the technological jigsaw was that tele-
vision receivers only had one use – that of receiving television 
and (sometimes) radio broadcasts. Consequently, anyone who 
owned one could be assumed to be using it to watch broadcast 
programming, and this prevented ambiguity. In later years, it 
became possible to claim that a set was only being used to watch 
purchased video recordings, but this was uncommon. 
There was, of course, a problem of non-compliance. This was 
dealt with by making failure to pay the fee a criminal rather than 
a civil offence, and then prosecuting and heavily fining enough 
evaders to create a deterrent effect. over time, the number of 
non-payers increased and reached the point where 10 per cent of 
all criminal prosecutions were for non-payment of the licence fee 
(Pirie 2015; Gentleman 2014).
The collapse of the justification for licence fee 
funding
All this has changed, and the combination of technological facts 
that made the licensing of receivers a practical way to fund 
broadcasting no longer exists. The first and fundamental change 
is that there is now a multiplicity of platforms or devices on 
which anyone can watch television programmes. You can watch 
them on laptops, tablets, e-readers and mobile phones. Accord-
ing to a recently released survey in the United States (US) by the 
Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), these are rapidly be-
coming the main platforms for television viewers among the so-
called millennials (13- to 34-year-olds). Among this group, only 
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55 per cent reported using conventional televisions as their pri-
mary platform for watching television broadcasts, and the trend 
is clearly for this to become a minority pursuit (CEA 08/01/2015; 
see also Plunkett 2014).
The response of many at the BBC and elsewhere has been to 
argue that the majority of television viewing is still done in the 
traditional way by watching broadcast programmes on conven-
tional television sets. However, the crucial fact is the trend iden-
tified in the CEA report and elsewhere. For example, the number 
of US households that receive television programming only via 
aerial (6 per cent) will soon be overtaken by those that receive it 
only via the Internet (currently 5 per cent). In other findings, in 
2014, 46 per cent of US television-user households watched video 
on either a laptop, notebook or netbook (up from 38 per  cent 
in 2013); 43 per  cent watched video on a smartphone (up from 
33 per cent in 2013); 35 per cent watched video on a tablet (up 
from 26 per  cent in 2013); and 34 per  cent watched video on a 
desktop computer (up from 30 per cent in 2013) (CEA 2014).
A very important point is that these devices are multifunc-
tional – watching television streaming is only one of the many 
functions they can perform. Consequently, you can reasonably 
own one for many reasons other than receiving television pro-
grammes. In addition, they are typically highly portable; the sur-
vey showed that, for consumers, this is their most valuable qual-
ity when it comes to watching and listening to media of various 
kinds. Portability is the way of the future, it would seem. Just as 
the advent of the small and portable transistor radio destroyed 
the original radio licence, so portable devices such as mobile tele-
phones, tablets and laptops look set to fatally undermine the tele-
vision licence. on the one hand, it is extremely difficult to charge 
something akin to a television licence fee for a mobile phone (and 
also unjust if it is not used to watch television content). on the 
other hand, the charging of a licence fee for televisions (assuming 
it remains possible to define what a television is) might prevent 
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
6
that technology from evolving – there is, essentially, a tax incen-
tive to use phones to watch television rather than use televisions 
to make phone calls.
What this means, of course, is that people can now watch 
television anywhere and, crucially, without having to buy a 
television receiver. This drastically weakens or even breaks the 
link between having a particular kind of device (which could be 
linked to an address) and watching television, which was the key 
to funding the broadcasts through a licence fee for the owner-
ship of the device. Legally, people still need a television licence 
to watch programmes if they are watched as they are broadcast, 
regardless of the device used. The problem, of course, is that this 
is almost impossible to enforce, precisely because the devices in 
question are used for so many other purposes. 
It might be possible to extend the principle of the licence fee 
and have a ‘viewing charge’ built in to the cost of every mobile 
phone, laptop, computer, e-reader and tablet. However, this does 
not seem likely simply because it would be extremely unpopular, 
and because it would be very difficult to assign such a charge to 
the BBC without expensive and complex administration. Any 
attempt to do this would also lead to many devices being pur-
chased elsewhere in the European Union (EU), and this could not 
be stopped without breaching EU rules.
Television broadcasts are not a public good
Moreover, ever-larger amounts of television are being either 
recorded and watched later or viewed through streaming chan-
nels such as Netflix. According to very recent surveys, a majority 
of television content is now watched done on Netflix and other 
streaming sites (XStream 2015). Most watchers no longer watch 
shows as they come out; instead, they wait until the shows are 
available on Netflix or its rivals, and then watch them in large, 
advertisement-free chunks (Hearn 2015). A report from Nomura 
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revealed that in the US year-on-year viewing figures over the 
three major networks declined by 12.7 per cent (Roetgers 2015). 
This is a catastrophic drop and reveals a fundamental shift in 
the way that television programming is being consumed. Among 
other things, this is leading, in turn, to profound changes in 
both viewing habits and the nature and content of programmes 
(Rainey 2015). 
This has devastating implications for the commercial- adver-
tising-funded model of television, as is now being widely pointed 
out (Wolk 2015). However, it also means that the fallback  response 
to the growth in the range of platforms described above does 
not work. If people claim (probably truthfully) that they only 
watch television on their tablet or mobile device via their Netflix 
subscription, then, even according to the letter of the law, they 
cannot be charged the licence fee for use of the device in this way. 
The combination of the two developments of portable, multi-use 
platforms and delayed consumption of programmes via stream-
ing sites means that the established model is simply blown out of 
the water.
of course, the streaming services, together with satellite 
broadcasters such as Sky, demonstrate a further point. Broad-
casting services are now ‘excludable’. Compulsory finance for a 
product can be justified for a ‘public’ good where it is not possible 
to exclude non-payers. It is far more difficult to justify compul-
sory finance for ‘club’ goods where it is possible to exclude from 
consumption those who do not pay. Subscription is a more justi-
fiable model for club goods. 
Indeed, Netflix is now moving into the production side of the 
business. This will inevitably crowd out traditional production 
processes, whether funded by advertising or the licence fee. In-
stead, the funding will come primarily from a subscription charge. 
This is part of a wider revolution in the production of television, 
driven by the sharp decline in production costs and the appear-
ance of dedicated channels and platforms such as YouTube and 
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specialist niche channels based on that model. Much of the con-
tent that viewers consume will no longer be produced or (more 
importantly) delivered by large integrated networks such as the 
BBC (or, for that matter, ITV or Channel 4). So, the argument that 
some kind of secured income such as the licence fee is necessary to 
produce what consumers would like to have loses much of its force.
The licence fee debate should be dead – at least 
among economists
What all this means is that the whole repetitious argument about 
whether the television licence fee should be replaced is moot. 
While academics, politicians and journalists have debated these 
issues, a technological revolution has completely changed the 
landscape. In the future, it seems almost certain that the tele-
vision set will cease to exist as a distinct kind of device, as it will 
come to be combined with other kinds of devices and platforms 
such as home computers. Many people will simply not have a 
conventional television set and will watch television shows on 
their mobile phone or laptop. They will not watch programmes 
in the way we have become used to, and the content will increas-
ingly be produced and delivered by organisations very different 
from the networks and stations of the past, including the BBC. 
Indeed, it may no longer be meaningful to talk about ‘television’. 
This diverse range of broadcasting provision needs a diverse 
range of funding sources, with some providers relying on differ-
ent sources from others.
What might replace the licence fee model of funding 
the BBC?
The current line of defence is to say that, although the govern-
ment has not stipulated that households must purchase a TV 
licence if they have any device capable of being used to watch 
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television, people must still pay the fee if they use such a device 
to watch a programme at the time it is broadcast, even if they do 
not own a television set. This leads to situations such as students 
who are away from home at a student residence being asked to 
pay a licence fee if they have a laptop. This is both very difficult 
to enforce and, more importantly, impossible to enforce with any 
kind of consistency. This will undermine the legitimacy of the 
entire charge (to the extent that it still has any for many people). 
Imposing a charge on every single device at the point of sale 
would be subject to legal challenge from those claiming that they 
had no intention of using their device to watch television, and it 
would be highly unpopular.
one solution, which has been floated by the Select Com-
mittee on Culture, Media and Sport, is to move to the German 
model of a flat-rate charge levied on every single household and 
used only to fund a public broadcaster (Parliamentary Papers 
2015). The Director General of the BBC, Tony Hall, has already 
supported this idea. However, there are serious and principled 
objections to this. It would effectively be a hypothecated house-
hold poll tax and, undoubtedly, would be extremely unpopular 
politically. Given that, the temptation for one party to pledge its 
abolition would be ultimately irresistible. This approach would 
also bring government even closer to the BBC and make the 
Corporation even more susceptible to political pressure than 
it is already.
The idea that was popular for many years on the free-mar-
ket side – that is, switching the BBC to an advertising funded 
model – is also past its use-by date. The changes described above 
will radically undermine the entire advertising-based model of 
broadcasting, which will go the way of advertising-funded print 
media (rapidly downhill). It is possible that advertising-funded 
programming may survive in one form or another. However, it is 
not a viable, stable, long-term model to provide all the funding 
for a broadcasting organisation. 
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The solution that economic analysis should now lead us to is 
as follows. We should recognise that, with changes in technology, 
television broadcasting has clearly and definitively moved into 
the club good sector. Both individual programmes and channels 
can be encrypted and made excludable. This means that the 
appropriate, and sustainable way of funding it is by a club type 
subscription method or simple pay-per-view. one or the other of 
these will be more appropriate for particular kinds of program-
ming. For example, sports broadcasting would rely on a mixture 
of the two, while serials would rely almost entirely on subscrip-
tions. It is worth pointing out that radio is much less affected and 
can easily continue to be funded primarily by advertising.
However, this does not really resolve the policy issues – except 
that it can be concluded that there is no place for the licence fee 
in the financing of broadcasting: technology has put paid to that. 
The more general question is what should be the role of govern-
ment in broadcasting? How should we deal with the ownership of 
the BBC and Channel 4? And how should so-called public service 
broadcasting (PSB) be financed? These are the topics that the 
other authors cover in this book.
Public service broadcasting
In the next chapter, Cento Veljanovski specifically examines 
PSB. He looks at a number of options for financing it. The first 
is government subsidy of PSB, available to all broadcasters on 
a competitive basis. As noted above, this is often known as the 
‘arts council for the air’ option. This has some merit. It would 
allow, for example, Sky Sports to receive grants for covering 
minority sports or para-athletics, if they were not commer-
cially viable; Classic FM could apply for grants to broadcast a 
broader range of classical music that might not have wide au-
dience appeal; Channel 5 might apply for a grant to run a series 
of science documentaries; and so on. There would be diversity, 
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competition and, hopefully, efficiency in the way resources 
were used. 
If this approach were taken, it would expose the BBC to the 
full rigours of competition. It would have to find its financing 
from a mix of grants, subscriptions, commercial rights sales and 
advertising. If others achieved the objectives of PSB more effec-
tively, they would get the government money.
The view of the authors of this introduction is that this is 
not the way to go. There is a danger of political capture of the 
grant-giving body; and the lines of accountability of the quango 
would not be clear.
But Veljanovski raises a more fundamental question. How 
do we define ‘PSB’ in anything like an objective way? The old 
public good argument for state-financed broadcasting is dead. 
Those who support some form of compulsory funding for the 
BBC hold on to more and more tenuous arguments based around 
what economists term ‘market failure’. It is argued that in a free 
market certain types of content will not be provided that may 
have benefits to wider society – for example, help create social 
cohesion or promote education. In other words, they may give 
rise to externalities. of course, this is true with a wide range of 
activities (reading, for example). 
Yet the reality of today’s multimedia world is an extraordinary 
multiplicity of channels, programming and other content. It does 
not appear that there are large unserved markets. It may be the 
case that people do not watch as much educational content as 
others think desirable, but this cannot be solved by simply subsi-
dising the creation of more such content. The Discovery Channel, 
Quest, Yesterday and EWTN, amongst many other conventional 
channels (some free-to-air, others available cheaply by subscrip-
tion) and a whole host of on-demand video platforms, show 
the kind of material that most people would classify as PSB in 
the sense of having ‘positive externalities’ or some kind of edu-
cational value. If people ‘under-consume’ such programming, 
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in the current technological age, it is difficult to see how their 
consumption patterns can be ‘corrected’. There is no lack of pro-
duction of programmes with what might be described as public 
service characteristics.
Furthermore, broadcasting is just one of many ways in which 
people try to educate themselves. Perhaps a better model would 
be for existing private and public funding bodies and other or-
ganisations to pursue their missions through broadcasting. This 
happens to some extent already: the BBC partnered with the open 
University to produce the series fronted by Stephanie Flanders on 
the economists Keynes, Marx and Hayek, for example. The Royal 
Society, the Arts Council, the Royal Society of Arts (or even the IEA, 
the Templeton Foundation or the Fabian Society) could commis-
sion programming where it is thought that their mission could be 
promoted in such a way. Perhaps the existence of the BBC crowds 
out such initiatives and prevents such lateral thinking. 
It seems likely that the whole notion of PSB has died in the 
multichannel world. The arguments for it are tenuous and they 
do not, anymore, specifically relate to broadcasting. 
This takes us on to the institutions. In a world where it has 
no ring-fenced guaranteed funding and there is no special place 
for PSB, what should be the future of the BBC as an institution? 
Before answering that question, we need to consider one of the 
problems of the BBC that perhaps should make the reform of its 
ownership a higher priority than it is currently.
Bias and the BBC
Ryan Bourne looks at the empirical evidence on BBC bias. He 
notes that the BBC is a highly trusted source of news and other in-
formation. However, he provides compelling evidence that there 
is bias in the presentation of news. It is impossible to analyse bias 
objectively – indeed, Bourne argues that all organisations are 
subject to biases, and that, of course, includes organisations that 
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assess the bias of other organisations. It is also very difficult to go 
beyond a case study approach to bias, and such an approach has 
obvious limitations.
Despite those limitations, there is a very strong case for the 
BBC to answer. For example, there is considerable evidence of 
‘bias by omission’, which relates to the choice of people who com-
ment on particular news stories and how particular stories are 
framed and presented. one example of this was on 19 Septem-
ber 2013. The BBC website ran a ‘Viewpoints’ piece highlighting 
different opinions on the new policy of taxpayer-funded school 
meals for all five-to-seven year olds. The government’s own pilot 
study found no health benefits for the policy and did not assess 
the opportunity cost of the spending. Yet the views promoted on 
the BBC website included only those who were happy with the 
policy, together with those who felt that it did not go far enough. 
It was only when this was pointed out to the BBC that they added 
alternative views. This is quite different from the coverage of the 
story in the print media: both the Guardian and the Daily Mail 
had balanced accounts. It clearly did not occur to the BBC, until 
it was pointed out, that it was possible to object to the policy 
except on the grounds that the government was not spending 
enough on the initiative.
In addition, there is ‘bias by selection’ – both of topics and 
people who present topics. Ryan Bourne comments that there 
have been many more TV and radio shows dedicated to the sub-
ject of inequality on the BBC than, for example, the promotion 
of economic growth. This is despite the fact that inequality does 
not rank as a greater concern among the public, and despite the 
recent fall in conventional measures of inequality. Within some 
of these inequality shows, there was a clear bias in the selection 
of guests towards those who considered income and wealth in-
equality an extremely important and worrying topic. In a similar 
vein, the BBC Radio 4 Today programme has a regular slot called 
Thought for the Day, in which prominent individuals are selected 
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to comment on issues in the news from a religious perspective. 
Analysis of the content of Thought for the Day is striking. In the 
167 editions analysed in new research commissioned for Ryan 
Bourne’s chapter, negative comments on business within the slot 
outweighed positive commentary on business by a factor of more 
than eight to one. 
And, finally, there is ‘bias by presentation’, which relates to 
how journalists present stories. one example of this is the way in 
which BBC journalist Norman Smith covered the 2014 Autumn 
Statement, reporting that the office for Budget Responsibility 
(oBR) had forecast that spending levels as a proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) would be likely to fall to levels last seen 
in the late 1930s. Rather than just outlining this fact (though that, 
in itself, would have been a misrepresentation for the reasons 
mentioned below), the presentation of the story by Smith entailed 
substantial value judgements about what this would mean:
when you sit down and read the office for Budget Responsibility 
report it reads like a book of doom. It is utterly terrifying, sug-
gesting that spending will have to be hacked back to the levels 
of the 1930s as a proportion of GDP. That is an extraordinary 
concept, you’re back to the land of Road to Wigan Pier.
The journalist could have said that spending as a proportion of 
national income would be reduced to Australian or Swiss levels. 
He could have commented on the large differences between 
the national income definitions used and the different types of 
spending in the 1930s, which would have shown the projections 
in a completely different light. He could also have mentioned 
that spending as a proportion of national income would be very 
close to 2002 levels. Instead, the journalist chose to represent the 
budget projections in a particular way. 
The BBC’s presentation of tax avoidance is also interesting. 
There has been a proliferation of stories about avoidance, often 
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involving large companies such as Amazon, Starbucks and Google. 
In 24 of the 78 stories on the BBC website between 2012 and 2015 
that mentioned ‘Amazon’ and ‘tax avoidance’, corporation tax paid 
by companies was misleadingly compared with sales revenues. 
Corporation tax is paid on profits and not on sales – which have 
nothing to do with the tax base for corporation tax. Indeed, it is 
worth noting that the tax as a proportion of turnover that the BBC 
pays on its commercial revenues is not very different from that of 
the companies that the BBC was criticising. Again, the Guardian 
reported this issue in a much more balanced way. 
As noted above, bias exists in all organisations. Commercial 
news providers and those providing news funded by charitable 
trusts or other private forms of funding also exhibit biases. The 
question that needs to be addressed from a public policy point of 
view is why the position of the BBC is problematic. 
The first problem is that the BBC has a huge share of the news 
and comment market, the size of which would lead to serious 
competition concerns if the BBC were a private organisation. Ap-
proximately 75 per cent of television news watched in the United 
Kingdom is provided by the BBC, for example. 
Furthermore, those who fund the BBC have no choice in the 
matter. And the BBC is trusted, so its bias is more influential. Fi-
nally, the BBC has an interest in the political process and uses 
licence-payer funds to promote its view on the matter of how 
broadcasting should be funded.
While privatisation of the BBC would not guarantee the elimi-
nation of biases, it could lead the viewing public to be more appro-
priately sceptical. Privatisation (or, at least, a voluntary funding 
model) would also give the right of exit to those who do not wish 
to listen to the programmes broadcast by the BBC. Moreover, a 
privatised BBC would bear a considerable commercial cost if its 
reputation were impaired; thus, there would be an incentive to 
maintain it. This is especially true given the worldwide reach of 
the BBC. 
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The view is taken by many that reform of the BBC is the key to 
removing bias – perhaps through better oversight or regulation, 
for example. This overestimates the ability of politicians to de-
sign organisations from the outside to achieve the objectives they 
regard as desirable. Moreover, the following chapter by Stephen 
Davies suggests that reform is simply not possible. Institutional 
biases – which, in the case of the BBC, are not simple left versus 
right or socialist versus liberal biases – are deeply engrained 
within structures (such problems are not unique to the BBC, of 
course). Davies’ chapter comes to the conclusion that competi-
tion and voluntary funding are the two essential reforms. 
It is not bias as such that is the overriding problem. The main 
concerns should be with the institution’s market power (espe-
cially in news provision), its non-voluntary funding method and 
its closeness to the political process. This combination is serious-
ly problematic. The reforms proposed later in this book would 
not remove bias, but they would create a process of competition 
between institutions that were funded and owned in different 
ways, and which, therefore, had tendencies towards developing 
different forms of bias. The commercial and non-commercial 
production of broadcasting services could sit side-by-side, as 
long as they were funded on a voluntary basis. This happens in 
the newspaper industry (for example, many important blogs do 
not make money, and the Guardian and Observer are owned by 
a charitable trust). Furthermore, voluntary funding provides 
a discipline and also ensures that those who do not wish to be 
associated with or consume broadcasting services coloured by a 
particular set of views do not have to pay for them.
Privatising the BBC
This still leaves the question of what to do with the BBC. Tim 
Congdon deals with this in detail. Firstly, he reminds us that, 
though the BBC has huge market power in news provision, it is 
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fast becoming a minnow in the international broadcasting, com-
munication and entertainment world taken as a whole. Congdon 
believes that the BBC could, if it remains nationalised, become 
irrelevant. It needs to be liberated so that it can take advantage 
of recent and future technological developments. 
It is impossible to imagine how developments will change 
broadcasting. Will the television become defunct? Will the 
laptop be replaced by the television? Will both be replaced by 
portable tablets or something we cannot today envisage? How 
vertically integrated should production, communication and 
broadcasting be? To what extent should there be horizontal in-
tegration between, for example, telecommunications companies 
and broadcasters? Keeping a publicly funded broadcaster, with 
a Charter drafted by politicians, risks seeing the BBC eclipsed 
by new technology in the same way that the Royal Mail has been 
eclipsed by email. There may well be a crucial role for the BBC in 
the future, but it needs to be free to discover it and free to raise 
the capital and current revenue to bring it to realisation. Already, 
the income from subscription to television broadcasters is twice 
the income from the licence fee received by the BBC.
Tim Congdon suggests the straightforward privatisation of 
the BBC on commercial terms. It would then be free to respond 
to the challenges of the future by developing whatever commer-
cial relationships it wished with other organisations. 
Indeed, the opportunities for an independent BBC are huge. 
The BBC has a trusted brand and an audience outside the UK that 
may already be ten times the size of its audience within the UK. 
The serving of an international audience financed by a domestic 
licence fee cannot be justified. For this reason, the BBC also seeks 
commercial income for its overseas services. But its commercial 
revenues are tiny compared with, for example, the revenues of 
Time Warner. And the overseas market will grow in importance 
relative to the domestic market as English becomes even more 
widely adopted as a second language internationally, and as 
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demographic changes lead to population growth in key markets. 
In other words, there is an opportunity for the BBC to become a 
trusted, respected worldwide media organisation that is liberat-
ed to compete across a range of platforms and new technologies.
There are alternatives to Congdon’s proposals. There could 
be privatisation without overt commercialisation. For example, 
the BBC could become a members’ organisation like the National 
Trust, with the members being licence fee payers; of course, it 
could still have a commercial overseas arm. or it could be set up 
with a large trust fund and operate with a governance structure, 
rather like the Guardian.
However, such organisations have well-known problems with 
regard to both corporate governance and raising capital. Mutually 
owned (customer-owned) organisations have historically had cer-
tain advantages in the financial services industry because they can 
resolve conflicts of interest between (say) customers and businesses. 
In retailing, cooperatives have helped to reduce the market power 
of suppliers. However, despite the fact that such organisations are 
often revered on the left (and those who believe in a free economy 
could have no objection to them in principle), recent examples, such 
as the Co-operative Bank and The Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
do illustrate their problems. With their corporate governance dif-
ficulties, mutuals or similar structures are hardly likely to be fleet 
of foot and able to respond to innovation. Non-shareholder models 
of ownership especially struggle when it comes to capital raising 
(again, this would be a huge constraint on the BBC in a rapidly 
changing world of media). The Guardian seems to have been able 
to keep up with technological change in the world of ‘print’ media 
(indeed, it has proven itself to be highly innovative and engaged 
with its customer base). However, its capital needs have, to a large 
degree, as Tim Congdon notes, been served by the sale of successful 
commercial ventures that it once owned. 
At one time, the BBC was compared very favourably with 
overseas distributors and producers of television programmes, 
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and it was argued that commercial disciplines had to be absent 
to ensure that there was not a ‘dumbing down’ of programming. 
Such an argument, once used against privatisation, is no longer 
tenable. Programmes such as House of Cards, The Sopranos, The 
Wire and The Man in the High Castle are, today, some of the most 
acclaimed television programmes or series, and they arise from 
models that have nothing close to that on which the BBC is based. 
of course, anybody who has traced the development of culture in 
Britain would not be surprised to see that. Commercially viable 
plays, such as those by Shakespeare, as well as the public clas-
sical concert were innovations of the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries, respectively, which showed that culture can be com-
mercially viable, popular and free of state influence and subsidy.
So, if the BBC is privatised, what happens to Channel  4? In 
many respects, it is a bit of a puzzle why Channel  4 remains 
owned by the government. Cento Veljanovski sees a possible role 
for a non-privatised BBC, but he believes that Channel 4 should 
be privatised. It would seem difficult to justify privatising the 
BBC while leaving Channel  4 as a nationalised business. There 
has been controversy about this recently, and a case can be made 
for ensuring that Channel  4 is independent of the state while 
exploring alternative arrangements for providing its capital and 
corporate governance. For example, perhaps it could be owned 
by its subscribers or by a trust (with additional capital being pro-
vided from the sale proceeds of the BBC). 
The key issue is that broadcasting should be liberated from 
the state, and that the BBC is should not be constrained from 
maximising its impact and value as a result of its funding and 
ownership being tied to the state. 
Conclusion
It is very difficult to justify the continued existence of the televi-
sion licence, either in theory or in practice. It is an anachronism. 
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Furthermore, broadcasting is no longer a public good (if it ever 
was) – it is a club good that can be financed by subscription. If 
the licence fee does not survive, the next question is whether 
– and, if so, how – the state should finance PSB. The justifica-
tions for PSB (and, by implication, a state role in subsidising 
broadcasting) are becoming more and more tenuous. It is 
true that there may be externalities from the broadcasting of 
certain types of programmes, but these cannot be objectively 
evaluated, and they are not obviously greater than those from 
other forms of economic or cultural activity. The key to future 
policy in this area is surely to stop treating broadcasting as a 
separate activity. If a university, or a government entity such as 
the Arts Council, wishes to promote their mission through sub-
sidising broadcasts or entering partnerships with broadcasters, 
they can do that. In other words, broadcasting – which itself is 
becoming ever-more difficult to define – is just one medium by 
which other objectives can be delivered, if they are desired and 
thought worthy of public subsidy.
The state ownership and subsidisation of broadcasting is es-
pecially problematic given the subjectivity of much broadcasting 
content. News, current affairs and a whole range of other con-
tent can be biased. This is not a problem unique to the BBC: all 
organisations have inherent biases within them. However, it can 
reasonably be argued that people should be free not to subscribe 
to services that have biases of which they do not approve; this 
points in the direction of a voluntary funding model. Further-
more, it can also be argued that the state should not be involved 
on such a large scale in something as sensitive as broadcasting. 
This points in the direction of privatisation of the BBC. 
The huge potential reach of the BBC, together with its trusted 
brand and the importance of its being able to respond to the 
technological revolution all point in the direction of privati-
sation. Non-commercial or non-shareholder-owned models of 
privatisation might be possible, but they have serious limitations. 
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Alternative models could be tried with the smaller broadcaster 
Channel 4.
This proposal would liberate the BBC from the constraints that 
prevent it reaching its potential. The BBC is no longer a national 
organisation, and its focus is likely to become more international 
over time. It needs a business and ownership model more appro-
priate than the one designed the best part of 100 years ago.
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2 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING: 
OWNERSHIP, FUNDING AND PROVISION
Cento Veljanovski
No one has the right, and few the ability, to lure people into 
reading yet another analysis of PSB without a strong reason. The 
debate over PSB has raged for decades, and all that can be said, 
has been said, but it is not always clearly understood. The justifi-
cation for this chapter is to reiterate an approach that has been 
accepted as the only coherent approach to broadcasting policy 
– consumer sovereignty. The Peacock Report, published in 1986, 
endorsed one of the core principles of economics – ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ – as the overriding objective of broadcasting policy 
(Peacock Report 1986: paragraph 592):
British broadcasting should move towards a sophisticated 
market system based on consumer sovereignty. That is a system 
which recognises that viewers and listeners are the best ultimate 
judges of their own interests, which they can best satisfy if they 
have the option of purchasing the broadcasting services they 
require from as many alternative sources of supply as possible.
At the time of writing, the UK government is engaged in one 
of its periodic reviews of the BBC’s Royal Charter and the licence 
fee. At such a time, the debate becomes polarised, fractious and 
more than usually other-worldly and emotional. Nonetheless, the 
PSB concept has retained its political support from successive 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
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governments, and recent commentators and even the govern-
ment’s Green Paper (DCMS 2015: 14) on the renewal of the BBC’s 
Royal Charter perpetuate myths about the rationale and reality 
of PSB. As a result, the UK’s terrestrial TV broadcast system con-
tinues to promote PSB. This is despite the economic case for PSB 
being weak, and weakening, due in particular to technological 
change. Nonetheless, the UK Government, even before its consul-
tations have begun (DCMS 2015: 14), has concluded that: ‘Despite 
technological change, there is still a strong rationale for the BBC 
continuing to exist in the twenty-first century.’ What this ‘strong 
rationale’ is is not identified. 
The other purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to the 
unique position of the IEA in fostering the economic analysis 
of broadcasting. In the UK and Europe, economists ignored 
the subject until the late 1990s. The notable, and eventually 
influential, exception has been IEA authors. The IEA was the 
first to publish papers on the economics of broadcasting and 
specifically to espouse the market approach to radio and TV 
broadcasting (Altman et al. 1962; Roberts 1965; Caine 1968) and 
cable TV (Veljanovski and Bishop 1983). IEA authors and sup-
porters – notably, the late Sir Alan Peacock and Samuel Brit-
tan, with, among others, the author of this chapter, an adviser 
to the Peacock Committee – have played a prominent part in 
fostering an economic approach, initially through the Peacock 
Committee report (1986) and in subsequent writings for the 
IEA, and in academic and popular publications (Veljanovski 
1987a,b, 1990a,b, 2000).
Background
The concept of PSB is premised on a view that there is endemic 
market failure in the television or electronic video sectors. Left 
to itself, it is argued, the market would fail to provide the right 
balance of quantity, quality and scheduling of programming. 
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Further, it is suggested that the available programmes are 
skewed to those that are most commercially attractive.
In the UK, the justification for PSB evolved from one of ad-
ministrative convenience to a market failure qua paternalistic 
view of the role of radio and then television in society. With 
the invention of the radio, the then Government nationalised 
the British Broadcasting Company in the late 1920s in order to 
create a vertically integrated monopoly, offering national radio 
broadcasts and then, with the availability of television sets, first 
one TV channel (BBC1) in 1937, and then a second national chan-
nel (BBC2) in 1965. During the latter half of the twentieth century, 
grudging concessions were made to commercial broadcasting. A 
heavily regulated commercial radio sector and one commercial 
advertiser-supported TV channel (ITV) was permitted in 1955, 
though this had heavy PSB and regional obligations. A public-
ly owned fourth channel (Channel 4 or C4) was later created in 
1982 to complement the programming of ITV and to create an 
independent programme production sector. A fifth commercial 
broadcasting channel (Channel  5) was allowed as more spec-
trum was released (1997). 
This structure of broadcasting, and even the term broad-
casting, has been under threat for several decades now from 
two forces – liberalisation and technological change. For most 
of the last century, government regulation restricted radio 
and TV first to a monopoly, and then to a period of rationed 
or managed competition, as described above. Commercial 
radio was partially liberalised after the hard-fought battles 
during the Radio Caroline era in the 1960s showed that it 
could deliver what listeners wanted. The launch of ITV in the 
mid-1950s saw the BBC’s audience share fall from 100 per cent 
to 30 per cent, sending shockwaves throughout the BBC and 
revealing that it had lost touch with its viewers. This caused a 
rapid change in its programme schedule towards more popu-
lar entertainment.
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The second and more profound change has been technology 
and its commercial implications. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
pressure to allow cable and satellite delivery systems and content 
to grow intensified. The first breach came in the 1980s, when Sky 
TV with the cooperation of a newly privatised British Telecom 
enabled Direct to Home (DTH) satellite pay TV signals to dish an-
tennas using telecom satellites (Astra), rather than dedicated low 
capacity direct-broadcast satellites (the latter failing because of 
their low channel capacity and mismanagement). The advent of 
pay TV, the growth of cable and, more recently, the Internet and 
online video streaming services to computers, laptops, iPads and 
smartphones, coupled with developments in digital technology 
(optic fibre, compression and conditional access systems), means 
that lack of channel capacity is no longer a barrier to entry. These 
technologies are also challenging the whole idea of ‘television’ 
broadcasting as we know it, as well as the concept of a ‘channel’, 
as the proliferation of outlets, viewing patterns and formats alter 
dramatically. 
The structure of public service broadcasting
Many think that the BBC represents the whole PSB sector. That 
is not the case (see Table 1). The terrestrial broadcasting system 
is peppered with PSB constraints and objectives. According to a 
UK Government website:1
The UK has 5 public service television broadcasters. These 
broadcasters receive benefits like the licence fee (in the case 
of the BBC), guaranteed access to the spectrum (or section of 
the airwaves) they need for broadcasting, and prominence on 
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/making-it-easier-for-the-media-and 
-creative-industries-to-grow-while-protecting-the-interests-of-citizens/sup 
porting-pages/public-service-broadcasting
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TV electronic programme guides. In return they commit to pro-
viding services that give a benefit to the public, like news, local 
programming or cultural content. 
The public service television broadcasters are:
• the BBC, a public corporation, funded mainly by the 
television licence fee;
Commercial PSBs’ portfolio channels
Main 
five PSB 
channels
BBC portfolio 
channels
ITV portfolio 
channels
Channel 4 
portfolio 
channels
Channel 5 
portfolio 
channels Multichannels
BBC One BBC Three ITV+1 Channel 4+1 Channel 5+1
All other 
remaining 
channels
BBC Two BBC Four ITV2 E4 5*
ITV BBC HD ITV2+1 E4+1 5*+1
Channel 4* BBC News ITV3 More4 5 USA
Channel 5 BBC Parliament ITV3+1 More4+1 5 USA+1
CBeebies ITV4 Film4 Channel 5+24
CBBC ITV4+1 Film4+1
BBC Olympics 
channels CITV 4Music
BBC red button 
channels ITV Encore 4seven
ITV Encore+1
Channel 4 
Olympics 
channels
ITVBe
ITVBe+1
Table 1 PSB channels and channels operated by public service 
broadcasters
Channels include HD variants where applicable.
*Channel 4 data for 2009 includes S4C viewing. Following DSO Wales in 2010, Channel 4 data from 
2010 relates to viewing to Channel 4 only.
Source: Ofcom (2015a, TV Viewing Annex).
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• Channel 4, a public corporation self-funded by advertising;
• S4C, a public corporation, broadcasting in Wales and funded 
by a combination of BBC funding, government grant and 
advertising;
• Channels 3 and 5, whose licences are held by commercial 
television companies funded by advertising (currently for 
Channel 3, ITV in England and Wales, STV in Scotland and 
UTV in Northern Ireland).
These PSB organisations have expanded into the development 
of so-called (by the regulator ofcom (office of Communication)) 
PSB portfolio channels, often created to meet the commercial 
competition and take advantage of technological developments. 
This has led to concerns over the BBC’s and C4’s ‘scale and scope’ 
of operation: that is, whether they are trying to do too much, es-
pecially of a more commercial nature, in order to protect their 
market shares and political support.
Figure 1 shows the audience share (in viewing time) of the 
PSB channels and other broadcasters, including pay TV opera-
tors from 1988 to 2014.
The main channels of public service broadcasters have lost 
viewers’ share from 100 per cent in 1991 to just over 51 per cent 
in 2014. The BBC has nonetheless retained a significant market 
share. BBC1 has declined from around 36 per  cent in 1991 to 
22  per  cent in 2014. ITV has declined from 43 per  cent in 1991 
(then well above BBC1) to about 15 per cent in 2014. If BBC2 is 
added in, BBC1 and BBC2 had a collective viewer share of around 
28  per cent in 2014 compared with 15 per cent for ITV/C3, around 
5 per cent for C4 and 4 per cent for C5. In other words, the BBC 
has a viewing share significantly greater than the advertiser-sup-
ported ‘PSB’ competitors’ core channels. 
When the PSB portfolio channels are taken into account, the 
PSB channels have nearly a 72 per cent viewer share (Figure 2). 
The total BBC viewer share is 33 per  cent, and the commercial 
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PSB channels (ITV, C4 and C5), together with their respective 
portfolio channels, had a 39 per  cent viewer share. But, if the 
viewing share is carved up between commercial PSBs (ITV and 
C5) and state-owned PSB channels (BBC and C4), then, remark-
ably, the state-owned channels have a viewer share of 44 per cent 
compared with 28 per cent for the commercial PSB channels. The 
continued high viewer shares of the BBC, PSBs and state-owned 
channels in a multichannel sector require an explanation, and 
raise competition and public policy issues.
What was and is public service broadcasting?
According to the BBC’s first Director General, John Reith, the 
functions of the BBC were to ‘educate, inform and entertain’. This 
trilogy remains part of the BBC’s ‘mission statement’ today. Reith 
(1949) wrote that the responsibility of the BBC was to 
carry into the greatest number of homes everything that was 
best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour and 
achievement; and to avoid whatever was or might be hurtful.
While this contained a populist element, it was dominated by 
Reith’s paternalistic view that only the right type of program-
ming should be broadcast. Indeed, it was he who single-hand-
edly turned the BBC into a ‘programme monopoly’ that stifled 
all alternative broadcasting services, including the then grow-
ing cable relay industry in the UK (Coase 1950; Veljanovski and 
Bishop 1983).
obviously, given the licence fee funding of the BBC and the 
changing cultural and political forces in Britain, the BBC had 
to react and adapt its programming to accommodate these 
changes. 
If one picks up the story of PSB in the late 1980s at the time 
of the Peacock Report (1986), there was a vigorous defence of 
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PSB and the BBC against the possible incursion of more off-air 
channels, cable and satellite TV, and the threat to its licence 
fee funding. The BBC got off very lightly, as the attention of the 
Thatcher Government turned to ITV’s bloated working prac-
tices, its monopoly of advertising and the large profits (mon-
opoly rents) earnt by the then regional ITV franchise holders. It 
would be fair to say the Peacock Committee was misled on the 
possibility of a fifth channel (it was told one was not possible). 
It was also influenced by the evidence that the price elasticity 
of advertising was near unity, implying that there was a fixed 
advertising revenue ‘pie’ that would be fragmented if the BBC 
were forced to take advertisements (Veljanovski and Yarrow 
1985). In the end, it decided to support some version of PSB with 
its preferred recommendation of an eventual arts council of the 
air (see further below).
The core tenets of PSB have never been pinned down in a 
convincing, operational way. The concept remains shrouded in 
vagueness, special pleading and ex  post rationalisation, which 
mostly amounts to little more than the claim that PSB is what 
public service broadcasters do.
For example, in a Royal Television Society debate in Birming-
ham around the time of the Peacock Report, Michael Grade (then 
Chief Executive of Channel 4), said: 
My definition of PSB is producing a wide range of programmes 
which is free of any commercial consideration at the point of 
conception of the programme.
This was, of course, camouflage, since Channel  4 was broad-
casting an increasing diet of commercial programmes (e.g. 
Friends), repeats and programmes designed to appeal to adver-
tisers, so much so that it was effectively breaching its remit 
(Veljanovski 1994). The plain fact was and remains that the bulk 
of the programmes, and certainly those that attract most of the 
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audiences of the five PSB channels, are programmes that could 
and do easily find a place in a commercially oriented television 
system.
In 1985, the Broadcasting Research Unit published The Pub-
lic Service Idea in British Broadcasting, which enumerated eight 
principles of PSB:
1. geographic universality of reception from the four 
terrestrial channels;
2. catering for all interests and tastes;
3. catering for minorities;
4. concern for ‘national identity and community’;
5. detachment from vested interests and government;
6. one broadcasting system to be directly funded by the 
corpus of users;
7. competition in good programming rather than for 
numbers;
8. guidelines to liberate programme makers and not to 
restrict them.
These principles, even at the time, did not reflect the reality and 
trade-offs that had been made in support of PSB. For example, 
universal service – the requirement that everyone in the country 
receive the then all four channels – meant less local and regional 
programming, and less choice in the major urban areas.  
one other principle was seen as paramount – that the BBC 
should be funded by the licence fee, so that it did not compete 
with the commercial broadcasters. The stated irrelevance of 
commercial considerations (at least in terms of funding) in 
the way the BBC programmed and scheduled its services was 
seen as the hallmark of PSB. of course, today the BBC does 
not confine its funding to the licence fee, or its programmes 
to those which are purely PSB. Both conditions are violated, 
and the BBC has expanded and redesigned its services to meet 
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the competition, and embraced commercial forces where con-
venient, such as in setting its own executives’ salaries and 
in launching pay TV services. But, as will be argued below, 
the licence fee, while the ‘best of the worst’ forms of funding 
PSB, apart from pay-as-you-view, is a double-edged sword 
for the BBC that encourages it to compete with commercial 
broadcasters. 
Notwithstanding this, in the three decades since the Peacock 
Report the definition of PSB has remained elusive. As Gavyn 
Davies (1999: 9) – an economist, who subsequently served as 
chairman of the BBC from 2001 to 2004 – stated in (yet) another 
report to the government:  
Some form of market failure must lie at the heart of any con-
cept of public service broadcasting. Beyond simply using the 
catch-phrase that public service broadcasting must ‘inform, 
educate and entertain’, we must add ‘inform, educate and 
entertain in a way which the private sector, left unregulated, 
would not do’. otherwise, why not leave matters entirely to the 
private sector?
The Davies report (1999: 10) tellingly concluded: ‘We decided that 
we may not be able to offer a tight new definition of PSB, but we 
nevertheless each felt that we knew it when we saw it’.
ofcom (2004: 23), the UK communications regulator, noted:
The problem with the term ‘public service broadcasting’ is that 
it has at least four different meanings: good television; worthy 
television; television that would not exist without some form 
of public intervention; and the institutions that broadcast this 
type of television.
ofcom’s (2005: paragraph 1.11) PSB review in 2005 set out what it 
could distil as the purposes and characteristics of PSB.
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PSB purposes
• To inform ourselves and others and to increase our 
understanding of the world through news, information and 
analysis of current events and ideas.
• To stimulate our interest in and knowledge of arts, science, 
history and other topics through content that is accessible 
and can encourage informal learning.
• To reflect and strengthen our cultural identity through 
original programming at the UK, national and regional 
levels, on occasion bringing audiences together for shared 
experiences.
• To make us aware of different cultures and alternative 
viewpoints, through programmes that reflect the lives of 
other people and other communities, both within the UK 
and elsewhere.
PSB characteristics
• High quality – well funded and well produced.
• original – new UK content, rather than repeats or 
acquisitions.
• Innovative – breaking new ideas or reinventing exciting 
approaches, rather than copying old ones.
• Challenging – making viewers think.
• Engaging – remaining accessible and enjoyed by viewers.
• Widely available – if content is publicly funded, a large 
majority of citizens need to be given the chance to watch it.
These, however, are high ideals to which most programme makers 
would subscribe.
Some years later, the House of Lords’ (2009: paragraph  11) 
Communications Committee again commented on the ill- 
defined nature of PSB:
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Nevertheless the interpretation of public service broadcast-
ing as content that the market does not sufficiently provide 
is gaining increasing support. It implies a focus on defining 
the core elements of public service provision that should, as a 
matter of public policy, continue to be supported. Such elem-
ents might include, for example, national and regional news, 
current affairs programmes, the arts, children’s programming, 
programmes dealing with religion and other beliefs and UK 
content.
Where does the PSB concept stand today?
The BBC is self-governing through the BBC Trust and is account-
able to Parliament. The BBC’s Royal Charter (2007–15) defines its 
mission, purpose and values. It sets out six broad public purposes 
of the BBC:
1. sustaining citizenship and civil society;
2. promoting education and learning;
3. stimulating creativity and cultural excellence;
4. representing the UK, its nations, regions and 
communities;
5. bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK;
6. delivering to the public the benefit of emerging 
communications technologies and services.
The Communications Act 2003 (Section  265) sets out in gen-
eral terms the PSB remits of the commercial PSB channels. 
Section  265(2) defines the PSB remit for Channels 3 and 5 as 
‘the provision of a range of high quality and diverse program-
ming’. For Channel  4 (Section  265(3)), it is ‘the provision of a 
broad range of high quality and diverse programming which, 
in particular: 
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(a) demonstrates innovation, experiment and creativity in 
the form and content of programmes; 
(b) appeals to the tastes and interests of a culturally diverse 
society; 
(c) makes a significant contribution to meeting the need 
for the licensed public service channels to include pro-
grammes of an educational nature and other programmes 
of educative value; and 
(d) exhibits a distinctive character.’
All PSB channels are subject to varying degrees of oversight by 
the telecoms regulator, ofcom. Under the Communications Act, 
it is charged with producing a periodic review of whether the 
public service broadcasters (the BBC, the Welsh Authority, C4, 
ITV and the public teletext provider), taken together, are fulfill-
ing the purposes of PSB. In the case of C4 and ITV, ofcom sets 
programme quotas as part of its licensing function.
The level of external regulation has increased, although in 
some cases (ITV) the PSB obligations have decreased. In 2010, 
parliament made substantial changes to the remit and govern-
ance arrangements of C4 through the Digital Economy Act 2010 
(DEA). In particular, the DEA introduced a new remit for C4 in 
relation to its provision of media content, to be delivered via its 
portfolio channels, on-demand and Internet services as well as 
through Channel  4. The Act also introduced a separate report-
ing and governance process, under which C4 is now required to 
prepare an annual Statement of Media Content Policy (SMCP) 
on how its remit has been delivered in the last year, and will be 
delivered in the next year, across its services.
overall, the definition of PSB has developed in a rather chame-
leon-like way to fit the political economy debates of the day. PSB 
is certainly alive and well as a public policy objective, as we can 
see from the regulatory structures now in place. The current jus-
tification for PSB normally relates back to some kind of market 
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failure argument that is also used to justify other interventions. 
The concept of market failure in broadcasting therefore needs 
further analysis.
Market failure
The Davies Report (1999: Annex 8) on the future funding of the 
BBC listed a number of what it described as ‘market failures’, 
which could arguably underpin PSB, and which many saw 
and still see as endemic in the broadcasting sector, together 
with those which would arise in a digital age. These were the 
following:
Sources of market failure
• broadcasting is a public good;
• quality broadcasting is a merit good;
• consumers are not fully informed;
• broadcasting produces externalities;
• economies of scale exist in broadcasting;
• spectrum scarcity.
Will market failure persist with new broadcasting 
technology?
• over-concentration in the market/risk of private monopoly;
• economies of scale will increase;
• economies of scope will increase; 
• gateways bottlenecks may exist;  
• increased audience fragmentation;
• negative externalities may increase.
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Existing market failures
The list of existing market failures is far from convincing. Let me 
deal with these in a different order, reflecting their historical im-
portance in the evolution of PSB.
Firstly, spectrum scarcity. The original reason for a nation-
alised BBC monopoly had nothing to do with cultural values or 
inadequate programme quality and diversity. It was an adminis-
trative solution to the perceived threat of radio frequency inter-
ference or congestion – or, as it was colourfully put at the time, 
‘bedlam of the airwaves’ (Coase 1947, 1948, 1950, 1954). There was 
a growing concern that the commercial use of spectrum would 
lead to radio interference and congestion, thus reducing the 
sound quality and reception of radio services. More importantly, 
it would challenge the Post office’s monopoly of wireless teleg-
raphy. The bureaucratic solution proposed by the Post office was 
to nationalise the then British Broadcasting Company, which had 
been set up by radio manufacturers as a way to increase sales of 
their wireless sets.2 Commercial radio was prohibited. The idea 
was that, if there were a statutory monopoly service, then the 
technical interference problems could be dealt with by internal 
administrative means through government departments or 
other government bodies.
of course, airwave scarcity and congestion were not market 
failures in themselves but the direct consequence of the refusal 
to establish property rights and a market in radio spectrum 
bandwidth. As Coase (1959, 1960) showed, and as is recognised 
and accepted today, the solution is to define property rights in 
bandwidth and allow these to be enforced as one does land, phys-
ical and intellectual property rights. While this may have been a 
2 The original shareholders were British Thomson-Houston, General Electric, Marconi, 
and Metropolitan-Vickers.
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
40
bit more complicated and required some technological advances, 
it was not a market failure in itself. 
The nationalisation of the airwaves had very adverse con-
sequences in creating a programme monopoly, denying the en-
tertainment and information services that many wanted. It also 
led to the squandering of the radio spectrum on inefficient uses, 
often by government departments, state monopoly entities and 
the civil and military defence forces – spectrum was allocated 
to the wrong people/entities for the wrong purposes. The auc-
tioning of ITV/Channel 3 franchises in the late 1980s, and then 
3G mobile licences in the 1990s, together with the increasing 
acceptance that spectrum could be sold and traded, has led to 
the release of more spectrum and its reassignment to more com-
mercially valuable uses.
Notwithstanding this, today, despite the privileged position 
of the BBC and C4 in obtaining spectrum free of charge, these 
services are transmitted using a variety of platforms, including 
digital terrestrial, satellite, cable and the Internet (Figure 3). 
Digital terrestrial
Digital satellite
Digital cable
Other platforms
0.3%
33.7%
51.5%
14.4%
Figure 3 How PSB channels are delivered to viewers, 2014
Source: Ofcom (2015a, Figure 33).
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These platforms or delivery systems do not suffer from limited 
channel capacity.
Another argument deployed by Davies is that broadcasting 
is a public good. This term has a specific technical meaning in 
economics. It is a good or service where the consumption by 
one individual does not subtract or reduce the consumption 
of others, and where exclusion is not feasible. A television pro-
gramme that has a fixed cost of production, once produced, and 
broadcast can be seen by an additional viewer at zero cost, could 
be thought of as a public good. Thus, the ‘efficient’ price is zero: 
equal to the near negligible marginal costs of transmitting a tele-
vision programme to an additional viewer. Under these cost and 
pricing constraints, a commercial operator would not produce 
programmes, and, if it charged, it would lead to the ‘inefficient’ 
under-consumption of programmes. 
The use of the public goods argument in television and video 
services, especially today, is disingenuous. Indeed, it always mis-
represented the argument, because marginal cost pricing is not 
efficient, as it fails to take into account fixed production and dis-
tribution costs. It does not take an economic genius to appreciate 
that, if the price were zero, nothing would be produced. The theory, 
not the pricing, is wrong. In addition, a public good should not be 
given away free, as is often implied, but each consumer should be 
charged a price that reflects his or her marginal valuation. That 
is, there should, if possible, be a market consisting of differential 
pricing. The obstacle to this is allegedly the inability to get people 
to pay because of the absence of an encryption and payment tech-
nology. However, this technology has always existed, but it was 
abandoned to protect the BBC as early as the 1920s. More to the 
point, such payment systems exist today and are in widespread 
use, allowing pay TV to flourish. In technical terms, what might 
at one time have been a public good is now a club good – exclu-
sion is possible and payment can be enforced. Finally, video pro-
grammes are created and sold in markets; even the BBC sells its 
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programmes in markets, and, after the Hollywood studios, it is 
the biggest distributor of television programmes in the world. Like 
spectrum scarcity, the public goods argument is simply an obser-
vation deployed selectively to justify a position already reached on 
other grounds, i.e. those of  Reithian paternalism.
But, what is more to the point is that the market failure case 
disappears when a genuine market in programmes can be devel-
oped. Pay TV is that market. Add to this the fact that the whole 
concept of a channel is fast becoming redundant, as people dip 
in and out of different video media and have access to interactive 
online services, and one sees a fragmented but vibrant market 
in video and online services. This far outstrips that predicted by 
even the maddest visionary in the 1980s.
The Green Paper’s (DCMS 2015: 14) only justification for the 
BBC is that ‘high quality PSB content has generally been seen as 
a “merit good”, which would be under-provided in a free market’, 
continuing:
PSBs such as the BBC still deliver positive effects for society 
such as extending democratic knowledge through news and 
current affairs, helping extend the UK’s influence and reputa-
tion abroad, addressing needs of audiences such as minority 
language groups, and serving audiences (such as children) 
where excessive advertising would be inappropriate. These 
goods would not be provided in sufficient volume by the mar-
ket alone.
The argument that broadcasting is a merit good is paper thin. A 
merit good in economics is a vague and ill-defined concept, which 
has been largely discredited. It has been defined as a good whose 
value exceeds the valuation an individual would place upon it. 
This is presumably related to the value that a ‘fully informed’ 
consumer would place on it. It is hard to see how this concept 
differs from the externality argument, and how it has universal 
PU BL IC SE RV IC E BRoA DCA ST I NG 
43
appeal. The best argument is that potential viewers may under-
value education and informative programming, and over-value 
entertainment. However, sport has been treated until recently 
as a crucial aspect of PSB, so much so that major international 
events were ‘listed’, meaning they had to be shown on the BBC 
or ITV (Veljanovski 2000). The merit good argument sheds no 
light on who this fully informed consumer, who makes judge-
ments about the externalities or true value of a good programme, 
would be. Is it the political class or some kind of bureaucracy? 
Why are their views more valid than those who watch television? 
If the mass of consumers is incapable of judging whether a tele-
vision programme is of sufficient value, are they in a position to 
judge who should be the politicians that are making policy about 
broadcasting? Might those who are making judgements about 
merit goods not have their own prejudices (see the chapters on 
bias) that are not related to some kind of objective criteria about 
the value of a programme?
The merit goods argument suffers from another drawback. To 
many people, television is a ‘de-merit good’ that has led to the  de-
cline of reading, conversation, manners, eating habits, family life 
and so on. While the economists’ theory can extol the drawbacks 
of the market in supplying more TV, others would and do regard 
any supposed failure on this score as a good thing.
The existence of economies of scale in broadcasting is again 
not unique to broadcasting. If the suggestion is that broadcast-
ing is, as a result, a natural monopoly or duopoly, then it is wrong, 
and symptomatic of the tendency to view the PSB organisations 
in isolation from developments elsewhere in the communica-
tions sector.
The other causes of market failure are simply variations of 
those already discussed. Even if they were correct, their quanti-
tative significance has not been measured; nor do they justify the 
structure of PSB that has evolved, which inhibited competition 
and technological developments in broadcasting for decades.
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Another source of market failure not mentioned is the claim 
that direct competition between media outlets may lead to 
duplication of common denominator programming. This was 
based on the theory, which has a good economic pedigree, 
that a few free-to-air (i.e. advertiser-supported) competitive 
channels would maximise their audience share by broadcast-
ing the same type of programming. Like the ice cream sellers 
along the beach promenade described by Hotelling (1920), 
broadcasters would find that they could maximise their audi-
ence share by locating next to one another and producing the 
same mediocre programming. But the theory applied at best 
to  advertiser-supported television (Steiner 1952; Beebe 1977; 
Spence and owen 1997), and it was not applicable to a genu-
ine market in programming with a large number of providers 
or to pay TV. Furthermore, this theory evaluated television 
and broadcasting against the consumer sovereignty objective, 
something PSB advocates rejected. It also ignored the very sim-
ple fact that advertiser-supported TV had an important role to 
play, both as entertainment and to advertise industries’ wares, 
and generated massive consumers’ surplus for viewers who re-
ceived the programmes free of charge. 
It is not necessary to go into the assumptions and qualifi-
cations of the programming ‘inefficiencies’ of duopoly channel 
advertiser-supported broadcasting markets. Suffice it to say 
that, as the number of channels increases, and if the audience 
is diverse, even commercial advertiser-supported channels will 
not slavishly broadcast the same lowest-common-denominator 
programming. But, more to the point, the bête noir of supporters 
of PSB – American network television – was portrayed as a cul-
tural wasteland, which careful research showed was not the case 
(Gallagher 1989). This is evident from the popularity and produc-
tion standards of American network television programmes and 
the fact that they are now shown on British PSB and commercial 
channels.
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The paradox of PSB (see Veljanovski 1988b, 1989e) is that its past 
and present structure does not maximise programme diversity. It 
is a hybrid structure that harnesses commercial programming in 
order to effectively cross-subsidise the provision of what is deemed 
PSB. In the case of the BBC, this is done by broadcasting a large 
quantity of popular programmes bought from the US as well as 
other programming on BBC1 in order to maintain its viewer share 
and thereby justify the universal licence fee. This programming 
could easily be profitably shown on commercial television stations 
without any PSB remit. Moreover, it is obvious that if the BBC de-
voted most of its funds to programme production and scheduling 
different to that shown on commercial free-to-air services, much 
more diversity could be introduced into the terrestrial broadcast 
segment for the same licence fee revenues. As will be described 
later, such a reform is relatively easily done without too much 
structural change to the present terrestrial PSB system.
Taken as a whole, the market failures case for PSB is weak. 
one may not like what the market produces and regard the In-
ternet as crass and demeaning, but these opinions are largely a 
commentary on peoples’ tastes and often reflect an elitist atti-
tude. This is not to say that the pay TV and related markets work 
perfectly or would necessarily replicate the programming that 
would be generated and broadcast by PSB. But it is not the role 
of the market to replicate what is arbitrarily defined by the BBC 
or others commissioning PSB programmes, nor is it the function 
of the BBC and C4 to largely duplicate programming that would 
otherwise find a place on unregulated commercial video-deliv-
ery systems (Veljanovski 1999a,b, 2001).
Furthermore, what is often missing from the debate, and even 
more serious analysis, is a recognition of the inefficiencies associ-
ated with the broadcast rationing and regulation that underpin 
the UK’s PSB system. The Thatcher Government and the Peacock 
Committee were shocked by the inefficiency of ITV, and, more 
recently, the profligacy of the BBC has come to light.
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
46
Future market failures
There is also rather a weak case for the ‘future market failures’ 
that were laid out by Davies. That the new digital age will frag-
ment audiences there is no doubt, but that is hardly a market 
failure. That it will lead to the emergence of new bottlenecks 
and gateways, and that the cost conditions of transmission and 
content may allow some owners of delivery networks to gain 
first-mover advantages and large market shares is also true. But 
these are concerns now dealt with by competition law and indus-
try regulation. They are no different from those confronting the 
mining or mobile telephony sectors. 
This is not to say that some of the issues raised by the new 
media are not difficult; for a time, they will seem intractable 
as new technologies and business models move from infancy 
to maturity. At first, pay TV, the Internet, mobile Internet and 
so on were seen as the precursors of competition, and then as 
threats to competition, thus attracting regulation and controls 
as the dynamics of the market were recognised. The relevant 
issues generally relate to gateways and access to key delivery 
systems or technologies as well as, in the formative years, the 
somewhat destructive winner-takes-all competition between 
operators (such as that which existed between Sky and BSB in 
the 1990s) to gain dominance of the sector. But, these are part 
of the process of competition that is common when there is rad-
ical technical change in any commercial sector. It is a necessary 
driver of innovation and a process of discovery of consumers’ 
needs.
The reality of the development of new media has been a 
struggle against entrenched interests and the retardation of 
competing technologies and commercial services. For example, 
one of the pressure groups lobbying for control of radio in the 
1920s was the newspapers, who wanted to limit a threat to their 
news services. As commercial broadcasting and the new media 
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developed, existing media owners fought hard to block entry 
and took steps to control the media, leading to predictable con-
cerns about cross-media ownership and ‘share of voice’. These 
concerns have often been over-egged and are due largely to 
the way PSB and broadcasting regulation fostered monopoly 
and then oligopolistic media market structures that gave one 
organisation a larger ‘voice’ not justified on competitive and 
diversity grounds. 
The transformation of the communications sector due to 
technological innovation has gathered pace in the last decade. 
There has been a move from analogue to digital transmission, 
and the development of compression technology, which has 
increased channel capacity, has brought down costs, reduced 
barriers to entry and so on. Furthermore, the development and 
widespread availability of encryption technology and condi-
tional access systems enables channels and programmes to be 
scrambled so that payment can be required, thus leading to the 
growth of pay TV. While cable systems were banned to support 
BBC TV prior to the 1980s, they now proliferate with ample 
channel capacity. online services such as YouTube, Netflix and 
general video streaming, taken together with the changing 
viewing patterns and practices of the younger generation, have 
meant that the role of video entertainment and information is 
altering dramatically. It is no longer a matter of catering for a 
given demand but of developing and responding to new deliv-
ery technologies and different ways of offering video entertain-
ment. As a result, the type and range of content available from 
commercial providers has proliferated.
So, with regard to the possible future justifications for PSB 
made by Davies, these are really not justifications for PSB at all. 
Rather, they are largely an observation that changing technology 
may give rise to competition concerns, as happens in other in-
dustries when there is rapid innovation. There are already mech-
anisms to deal with these problems, and promoting the market 
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power of the incumbents in the face of competition from innova-
tion is not an appropriate way forward. 
Can a case be for public service broadcasting?
The analysis above may seem overstated. It might be argued that 
there is a range of programmes that may not survive in a compet-
itive, fully commercialised communications sector. However, this 
does not indicate market failure, and it is far from clear what such 
programmes might be. The House of Lords’ Communications Com-
mittee quoted above suggested that programmes  under-provided 
by the market might be ‘national and regional news, current af-
fairs programmes, the arts, children’s programming, programmes 
dealing with religion and other beliefs and UK content’. Most of 
these are produced and shown in large quantities by the market, 
and do not seem to me distinctively uncommercial. 
Recent research for ofcom (Enders Analysis 2014) shows that 
the fast-developing online media offers ‘hundreds if not thou-
sands of online media services that provide content which could 
be regarded as PSB content compared to the five PSBs. This con-
tent ranged from sport and leisure, actual current affairs, news. 
The gaps were in cultural affairs and religion’ (Figure 4).
Notwithstanding this, if there is a case for PSB, it needs to be 
clearly identified, and the reasons why the relevant programmes 
would not be produced and transmitted by the market need to be 
fully justified. If such programming exists, then it is important 
that it is funded and transmitted in ways that do not distort the 
whole broadcasting system or require funding that is dispro-
portionate. The cosy duopoly of the BBC and ITV/C3 prior to the 
1990s resulted in significant inefficiencies. Moreover, the present 
structure of PSB crowds out programming that would otherwise 
be produced by the commercial sector, and represents unfair 
competition with the commercial sector. Competition issues are 
discussed further in Box 1.
PU BL IC SE RV IC E BRoA DCA ST I NG 
49
Funding of PSB
Suppose for a moment that a case can be made out for some form 
of PSB. How should it be funded?
The current funding of PSB takes or has taken a variety of 
forms – the licence fee, cross-subsidisation from advertising 
within a channel (ITV) and across channels (ITV to C4) and 
direct subsidy (BBC World Service, until recently, and Gaelic 
language programmes in Scotland). In addition, the BBC, C4 and 
Figure 4 Public service broadcasting by non-public-service broadcasters
(a) Online media services by public service objective, June 2014. (b) Online media 
services by organisation type, June 2014. Source: Enders Analysis (2014).
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Box 1 Competition policy and the BBC
The BBC and other PSBs are subject to general and specific 
competition laws. They must comply with both EU and UK law 
and competition interventions administered by Ofcom as well 
as, in the case of the BBC, self-imposed fair trading rules.
State aid and the licence fee
The area of competition law most relevant to the licence fee 
debate is state aid. Over the last several decades, the compe-
tition regulators have received many complaints and under-
taken investigations alleging that the funding of PSBs across 
Europe constitutes illegal state aid. Despite the general prohi-
bition against state aid, in some circumstances government 
interventions that are necessary for a well-functioning and 
equitable economy can be exempt. Therefore, the European 
Treaty leaves room for a number of policy objectives for which 
state aid can be considered compatible. 
In the PSB sector, the Commission has tended to exempt 
the BBC from state aid rules. For example, in May 2002 the 
European Commission investigated whether the funding of 
the BBC’s digital television and radio stations was illegal state 
aid. The Commission concluded that it was not, as it gave the 
BBC ‘no real advantage’ because the ‘compensation for the 
digital channels is not disproportionate to the net costs of 
the new channels, which are performed as part of the public 
service obligations of the BBC’ (European Commission 2002). 
Similarly, in 1999 BSkyB complained to the European Commis-
sion that the public funding for the BBC’s 24-hour television 
news channel was illegal state aid. This was rejected by the 
European Commission on the ground that EU rules allowed 
such aid if it was compensation for the delivery of services 
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of general economic interest, as entrusted to member states. 
The Commission found that the financial means granted to 
the channel did not exceed its actual costs, and so were pro-
portionate to the public service.
A contrary view
However, this formulation of the state aid rules presupposes 
acceptance of the objectives of PSB and the BBC’s expan-
sion (in the case cited above), which may themselves distort 
competition. The premise of this chapter is that the activities 
of PSBs is overextended and inherently distortionary. For 
example, BBC Radio One is the most-listened-to radio station, 
and BBC News Online is the most-watched news website. 
These satisfy the state aid rules but at the same time clearly 
distort the market, as they compete with commercial broad-
casters providing the same commercial content, thereby 
crowding-out commercial broadcasters from these areas 
because the competition is too intense.
Competition in production
Regulatory and competition interventions have also been 
prominent to foster more competition in production. At 
various times, the BBC (and other PSB providers) have been 
required to increase commissioning of programmes from 
external producers. For example, as part of the last licence fee 
settlement the BBC agreed to commission up to 50 per cent of 
its programmes from such external producers. 
Competition in news provision
Two other areas where legitimate competition concerns could 
be raised are in relation to local news provision and the influ-
ence on the news agenda more generally. It has long been 
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argued by local newspapers that the BBC’s dominant position, 
financed by a compulsory licence fee, involves unfair com-
petition with local news. The BBC contests this claim. More 
recently, the local newspaper industry has claimed that BBC 
proposals to create a shared service with local newspapers to 
cover local courts and councils will represent unfair competi-
tion. This issue is complex. If the move is seen as a competitive 
threat to local newspapers, it could indeed be regarded as 
anti-competitive. On the other hand, the ‘shared service’ will 
involve the BBC providing local newspapers with some of their 
content. Given that this is financed by the licence fee, local 
newspapers would be receiving a subsidy from the licence fee 
that could be regarded as state aid under EU law.
When it comes to media ownership, there are rules that 
severely limit the ownership of television channels and news-
papers to prevent dominance of the news sector by one pro-
vider. However, there are no equivalent rules that deal with the 
dominance of the BBC in news provision. Despite the relative 
decline of the BBC in broadcasting in general, it is dominant in 
news provision. In a recent Ofcom survey, five of the top eight 
news providers were BBC sources, with BBC One way out in 
front as the number one source.1 Such market power would 
not be allowed if the BBC were a private organisation or in the 
newspaper market.
Conclusion
This is not a full analysis of competition issues. What is appar-
ent is that the competition rules, by accommodating PSB 
objectives, provide only limited controls on the BBC, and 
1 See http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/
news/2015/News_consumption_in_the_UK_2015_report.pdf
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S4C receive a subsidy, as they do not pay for spectrum. Thus, as a 
practical matter, PSB can be and is funded in different ways.
The bulk of the funds for PSB comes from the licence fee paid 
by each viewing household, which goes to the BBC. This is a hy-
pothecated tax levied on the ownership of television sets and 
other receiving devices used for live viewing of the BBC. It pro-
vided the BBC with revenue of £3.7 billion in 2014 (see Figure 5). 
This is supplemented from other activities, but largely from the 
sale of BBC programmes (£1 billion), giving the BBC Group a 
total income of around £5 billion. Indeed, BBC Worldwide is the 
largest TV programme distributor outside the large Hollywood 
studios.
The BBC’s funding has come under pressure over the last 
decade. The licence fee increases have been capped to the rate 
of inflation and have been eroded by the so-called iPlayer loop-
hole; more viewers receive the service using catch-up services, 
which do not attract a licence fee. At the same time, the govern-
ment has imposed increased responsibilities and costs on the 
BBC. In the 2010 licence fee settlement between the government 
and the BBC, the BBC agreed to fund the World Services (which 
had hitherto been funded by the Foreign office), BBC Moni-
toring, S4C, local television infrastructure and the roll-out of 
super-fast broadband through Broadband Delivery UK. Follow-
ing the 2015 Budget, the BBC will fund the free licence given to 
over 75s. This squeeze on finances is symptomatic of concerns 
over the scale and scope of the BBC, and whether the licence fee 
leave intact the structural and behavioural abuses. These 
often require additional ex  ante rules and regulation to con-
trol. The BBC should operate under the same law as applies to 
other broadcasters and news providers.
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income is being used simply to show what could otherwise be 
shown on commercial services. Notwithstanding this, the issue 
of the extent of funding of the BBC is a critical one, raised by the 
lack of support for a market failure case for the BBC outlined 
above.
While there is considerable opposition to the licence fee as a 
means of funding PSB, it has several attractions over funding from 
general taxation revenues, which is mooted in the Green Paper on 
the BBC Charter Review (DCMS 2015). This is because the licence 
fee creates a link between the viewer, the BBC and politicians. The 
viewer can indirectly exert constant pressure on the politicians 
and the BBC by complaining about the level of the licence fee and 
the programming output of the BBC. If the BBC were funded from 
general tax revenues, this link would be broken, and the pressures 
and constraints on the BBC and politicians would be severed.
However, the licence fee does have a number of unattractive 
and perverse features.
It has been described as a regressive compulsory poll tax. Its 
compulsory nature is widely disliked by viewers. Whether it is 
in fact regressive is a moot point, because its incidence has to be 
compared with the viewing patterns of those paying it, to see if 
it is disproportionately affecting low income groups who watch 
little BBC television and radio. The non-payment of the licence 
fee is a criminal offence. Indeed, almost 200,000 viewers a year 
have been prosecuted and liable to a fine up to £1,000 and a crim-
inal record. There have been 50 people jailed. This represents an 
incredible 10 per cent of all criminal prosecutions in the UK. The 
present government has announced that it will decriminalise 
non-payment of the licence fee, but there are signs that its com-
mitment to this  proposal is wavering. 
The periodic review of the licence fee is a ritualised and highly 
politicised affair, either extolling the virtues of the BBC or crit-
icising the BBC’s performance, political bias and poor internal 
governance. The compulsory nature of the licence fee means that 
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the BBC is not subject to the same economic constraints as the 
commercial broadcasters, especially the procyclical volatility of 
advertising revenues that fund ITV and C4 (see Figure 5). The 
BBC does not have to compete for revenues, and, within each 
licence fee period, has a guaranteed income, which has been ris-
ing in nominal terms compared with the decline in advertising 
revenues of the commercial broadcasters (Figure 5). This places 
it in a financially and competitively stronger position than ITV 
during cyclical downturns. This contrasts with the position of 
pay TV operators, who have increased their audience share and 
revenues significantly.
But there is a fundamental paradox at the heart of the licence 
fee in that its strong feature is it weakest. It has been noted above 
that the licence fee has the attractive feature of linking viewers 
to the BBC and politicians. They are annually reminded that they 
are paying for a ‘free’ service and can protest if they do not regard 
it as value for money. But the licence fee ‘forces’ the BBC to offer 
a broad-based service that attracts a relatively high audience/
viewing share, otherwise popular and political support for the fee 
would drain away. This, in turn, results in the BBC broadcasting 
vast quantities of programming that would have been shown by 
commercial broadcasters. It has to satisfy the viewers and listen-
ers with a broad mix of programming delivered in different ways, 
otherwise it would be marginalised as a broadcasting institution. 
This tendency to have broad appeal and meet the competition di-
lutes its PSB role. It generates an expansionist strategy, which has 
increased the scope and scale of the BBC’s activities and thereby 
blurs its contribution to PSB. While for the BBC’s management 
this makes sense – competent, ambitious managers do not want 
to oversee decline and be restrained – it undermines the case for 
the BBC. The objective of policy in relation to PSB should not be 
to ensure the survival of the BBC as it is now or its growth as a 
viable competitor to the commercial broadcasters. The BBC and 
PSB are not synonymous – the policy goal for those who support 
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PSB is the efficient provision of PSB content, and not the preser-
vation of the BBC. 
Yet the real criticism of the licence fee is that, in the current 
broadcasting environment, it is increasingly hard to justify. 
Technologies now enable the viewer to be charged for their 
programmes, and there is a variety of devices – over-the-air TV, 
cable, Internet and mobile devices – which can download and be 
used to view live video programming. 
PSB can be and is funded by advertising, as C4 and other 
advertiser-supported channels have shown. However, to permit 
the BBC to take advertising would unleash a large state-owned 
competitor on ITV and C5. This would severely reduce their ad-
vertising revenues and damage their viability, even if the BBC did 
not alter its programming. Paradoxically, advertising markets 
are peculiar in that the supply side is more or less fixed by the ad-
vertising exposures to viewers that can be generated. Thus, the 
principle effect of increased channels and advertising is simply 
to fragment the audience while leaving the aggregate volume 
of exposures constant. Indeed, channels that can supply large 
viewer share can charge relatively more than several channels 
supplying the same volume of exposures. Research for the Pea-
cock Committee (Yarrow and Veljanovski 1988) and more recent 
research confirms that the price elasticity of demand for adver-
tising is near unity, implying that the television advertising pie is 
more or less fixed.
Structural reforms
Unreformed sectors are an anachronism
The other big question is how the provision of core PSB pro-
grammes should be organised. Should it be the preserve of 
two state-owned broadcasters (the BBC and C4/S4C) and sev-
eral others with specific PSB obligations? or should core PSB 
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programming be dispersed over the broadcasting sector funded 
by an Arts Council–type organisation, with funds made avail-
able for whichever media companies bid in a competitive (more 
recently referred to as ‘contestable funding’) process? or is the 
case for PSB so weak as to permit radical structural reform and 
privatisation of PSBs without any funding mechanism or other 
intervention being used to promote PSB?
Firstly, it should be noted that the state ownership of major 
broadcasters is an anachronism in a free society. As discussed 
above, the historical reasons for this structure were dubious 
even at the time they were advanced. But, as the PSB system 
developed, it created three state-owned entities (the BBC, C4 
and S4C), which actively competed for viewers and also adver-
tising revenue (in the case of C4) with commercial broadcast-
ers. State ownership and the licence fee have generated major 
distortions together with internal governance problems at the 
BBC. There is a clear case in today’s communications environ-
ment for slimming down and privatising segments of the PBS 
system. 
There has already been significant structural reform in the 
sector. ITV and parts of the BBC have vertically disintegrated 
by closing down their programme production facilities, and 
they are required (by regulation) to buy in all or a large propor-
tion of their programmes. The terrestrial transmission systems 
once owned by the communications regulator (the then IBA 
for ITV and C4) and the BBC have been privatised and are now 
operated by a separate entity. The ITV/C3 network, which was 
operated by a number of regional franchise companies, has now 
consolidated by take overs. Based on the Peacock Report (1986) 
recommendations, the original regional ITV operators were 
selected by competitive cash bids in 1989–90, thus paying and 
establishing property rights in spectrum (although spectrum 
cannot, as it can in the US, be freely traded other than by a take-
over of ITV).
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Future reforms
The most obvious first step relates to C4. There is little justifica-
tion for a state-owned C4. The origin of C4 came from the intense 
lobbying by independent programme producers to create an 
independent programme production sector and increase pro-
gramme diversity. This rationale has now largely disappeared. 
The auction franchising process inspired by the Peacock Com-
mittee resulted in the then regional ITV franchise holders divest-
ing themselves of programme making, diminishing the case for 
the C4 model.
The coexistence of the BBC, and in particular BBC1 and C4, 
is anachronistic. BBC1 is a mass audience channel, showing a 
vast quantity of commercial programmes funded by the licence 
fee under the umbrella of PSB. C4’s programme remit is to offer 
diverse and innovative programming, catering for tastes not well 
served by the other main advertiser-supported broadcaster. In 
fact, programme diversity and innovation could be maximised 
by switching the remits of BBC1 and C4. The large bulk of PSB 
programming would then be broadcast by the BBC, and the BBC 
would withdraw from acquiring, funding and broadcasting pop-
ular commercial programming.
Such proposals, first made 25 years ago (Veljanovski 1988b, 
1989: 109–11), were heavily criticised at the time as having the 
potential to turn the BBC into a ‘cultural ghetto’. However, they 
could turn the BBC (using a similar emotive metaphor) into a 
‘cultural oasis’ focused on programmes that would not be broad-
cast in sufficient quantity in the commercial sector. This would 
pave the way for the privatisation of C4 (Veljanovski 1996).
A more radical proposal would be to privatise the BBC. While 
this has an appeal in principle, the consequence would be to un-
leash a large former state broadcaster to compete for advertising 
and subscription revenues with the existing terrestrial and com-
mercial media companies. Any such privatisation would have to 
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be accompanied by slimming down the BBC, and this would pose 
commercial and organisational challenges. A slimmed down BBC 
would not be as commercially valuable, and, hence, the sale price 
would be reduced to the government. There would also be issues 
surrounding the ownership of the BBC programme library.3 
An alternative proposal is the arts council for the air, as de-
scribed by Peacock (2004). This requires a clear operational defi-
nition of PSB and its funding, but it would harness competitive 
forces in the production and delivery of PSB programming. This 
could operate in many ways. It could, for example, provide grants 
to allow broadcasters to adapt what would otherwise be popular 
commercial programming to include a PSB aspect (for example, 
providing a broader range of music in a programme series on 
Classic FM or news in a language such as Urdu appended to news 
programmes in particular regions). The main attraction of such a 
proposal is that the funding would be available on a competitive 
basis. 
To a limited extent, a prototype model has been in operation 
for some time. My report (Veljanovski 1989) for Communa Gàidh-
lig, funded by the Highland and Islands Board, suggested that 
publicly funded Gaelic language programmes should be sourced 
through competitive tender, and bid for by the ITV contractors 
and the BBC in Scotland. This was accepted by the then Conserv-
ative government when it established the Gaelic Broadcasting 
Committee (Comataidh Craolaidh Gàidhlig) in 1991. Its purpose 
was to manage the Gaelic Broadcasting Fund of £9.5 million a 
year in order to support Gaelic language programmes set up 
under the Broadcasting Act 1990. The Committee was charged 
with funding up to 200 hours of Gaelic television programmes, 
and with enhancing and widening the range of Gaelic sound 
3 The chapter by Tim Congdon later in this book does suggest full privatisation. In-
deed, Congdon argues that the size of the BBC is one of the attractions of privatisa-
tion, as it would then be able to compete with other media giants in an environment 
in which media companies need to operate across a range of technical platforms.
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programmes, to be broadcast mainly in Scotland. In practice, 
funded programmes are broadcast by the BBC as well as ITV, 
although the former had no statutory requirement under the 
Broadcasting Acts to transmit Gaelic programmes funded by the 
Gaelic Broadcasting Committee. There were drawbacks with the 
operation of the Gaelic programming initiative – in the choice 
of programming and the fact that many were broadcast at un-
sociable hours.
There are major drawbacks with the arts council for the air 
proposal. It would interpose yet another public institution be-
tween broadcaster and viewer, charged with selecting broad-
casting content that would inevitably reflect the preferences and 
tastes of the committee responsible for allocating funds, rather 
than those of the viewers. The commercial dynamics of subsi-
dised programming may see it fund unattractive programming 
shown at inconvenient times. The role of the BBC would also re-
main unresolved. If the BBC were confined to core PSB services, 
the arts council for the air proposal may effectively sound its 
death knell. one cannot have such a body and a protected BBC 
(and C4). 
Conclusion
The market failure framework has never and does not today 
provide the solid basis for PSB, even within the narrow confines 
of the paternalistic, programming values espoused by support-
ers of PSB. The present system is highly distortive and does not 
achieve the maximum programme diversity; and the BBC is 
over-reliant on popular programmes for its political support 
and survival. Furthermore, the ownership and funding of PSB 
creates an enclave of the broadcasting sector that is largely im-
mune from commercial forces, but which adopts a commercial 
approach where it is convenient, thus posing unfair competition 
to the commercial broadcasters.
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There is also what might be called the licence fee paradox. The 
licence fee is perhaps the best way of funding the BBC, should one 
want a BBC. It creates the best link between viewer and broad-
caster (apart from pay-per-view or subscriber services). However, 
at the same time, it forces the BBC down a populist, commercial 
route in order to maintain political and popular support for the 
BBC, making it expand well beyond core PSB programming, and, 
as a consequence, undermining its raison d’être. 
But the core issue today is whether, given the pace of technolog-
ical change and changing viewing habits, two state-owned broad-
casters are compatible with a free society and viewer choice. The 
short answer must be no. The easiest policy to implement would 
be to privatise C4. A more wide-ranging and sustainable solution 
policy response must avoid reforming broadcasting in such a way 
that defines core PSB simply as things that PSBs do. There is a 
range of policy options. An arts council for the air could be a viable 
option, but not whilst there is a protected BBC. The BBC could be 
fully privatised or slimmed down. These options are explored fur-
ther in later chapters. The status quo is not an option.
References
Altman, W. et al. (1962) TV: From Monopoly to Competition – and Back? 
London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Beebe, J. (1977) Institutional structure and program choices in tele-
vision markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91(1): 15–37.
Caine, S. (1968) Paying for TV? London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Coase, R.  H. (1946) The marginal cost controversy. Economica 13(51): 
169–82.
Coase, R. H. (1947) The origin of the monopoly of broadcasting in Great 
Britain. Economica 14(55): 189–210.
Coase, R.  H. (1948) Wire broadcasting in Great Britain. Economica 
15(59): 194–220.
PU BL IC SE RV IC E BRoA DCA ST I NG 
63
Coase, R. H. (1950) British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly. London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.
Coase, R.  H. (1954) The development of the British television service. 
Land Economics 30: 207–22.
Coase, R. H. (1959) The Federal Communications Commission. Journal 
of Law and Economics 2: 1–40.
Coase, R. H. (1960) The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 3: 1–44.
Coase, R.  H. (1966) The economics of broadcasting and government 
policy. American Economic Review 56: 440–47.
Coase, R. H. (1974) The market for goods and the market for ideas. Amer-
ican Economic Review 64: 384–91. 
Davies, G. et al. (1999) The future funding of the BBC – report of the In-
dependent Review Panel. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
July, Her Majesty’s Stationery office.
DCMS (2015) BBC charter review – public consultation. Green Paper, 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. https://www.gov.uk/gov 
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445704/
BBC_Charter_Review_Consultation_WEB.pdf
Enders Analysis (2014) How online media services have fulfilled the 
public service objectives. Public Service Broadcasting Review: 
2008–13, 16 December, ofcom.
European Commission (2002) Press Release I/02/737, 22 May. 
Gallagher, R. (1989) American television: fact and fantasy. In Freedom 
in Broadcasting (ed. C. Veljanovski), Chapter 10. London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs.
House of Lords (2009) Public service broadcasting: short-term crisis, 
long-term future? Communications Committee, Session 2008–9. 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldcomuni/ 
61/6103.htm#note3
ofcom (2004) ofcom review of public service television broadcasting: 
phase 1, is television special? Consultative Document, 15 June, of-
com, London, UK.
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
64
ofcom (2005) ofcom review of public service television broadcasting: 
Phase 3, Competition for quality. Consultative Document, 8 Febru-
ary, ofcom, London, UK.
ofcom (2006) ofcom review of public service broadcasting. Consulta-
tive Document, ofcom, London, UK.
ofcom (2007) A new approach to public service content in the digital 
age: the potential role of the public service publisher. Report, ofcom, 
London, UK.
ofcom (2015a) Public service broadcasting annual report 2015. Report, 
July, ofcom, London, UK.
ofcom (2015b) The communications market report. Report, office of 
Communications, ofcom, London, UK.
ofcom (2015c) Public service broadcasting in the Internet age. State-
ment, ofcom, London, UK.
owen, B. and Wildman, S.  S. (1992) Video Economics. Massachusetts, 
US: Harvard University Press.
Peacock, A. (2004) Public Service Broadcasting without the BBC? Lon-
don: Institute of Economics Affairs.
Peacock Report (1986) Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC: 
Cmnd 9824. Her Majesty’s Stationery office.
Picard, R. G. and Siciliani, P. (eds) (2013) Is there still a place for public 
service television? Effects of the changing economics of broadcast-
ing. Report, September, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
oxford University, for the BBC Trust.
Reith, J. (1949) Into the Wind. London, UK: Hutchison.
Roberts, D. (1965) Competition in Radio. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs.
Seabright, P. and von Hagen, J. (eds) (2007) The Economic Regulation of 
Broadcasting Markets: Evolving Technology and Challenges for Policy. 
Cambridge University Press.
Spence, M. and owen, B. (1977) Television programming, monopolis-
tic competition, and welfare. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91(1): 
103–26.
PU BL IC SE RV IC E BRoA DCA ST I NG 
65
Steiner, P. (1952) Program patterns and preferences, and the workabil-
ity of competition in broadcasting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
66(2): 194–223.
Veljanovski, C. (1987a) Cable and satellite – the market for programmes. 
Discussion Paper 176, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 
UK.
Veljanovski, C. (1987b) Commercial broadcasting in the UK – over-reg-
ulation and mis-regulation. Discussion Paper  175, Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, London, UK.
Veljanovski, C. (1988a) Freedom in Broadcasting – Proposal for the Re-
form of Commercial Television in the UK. London: Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs. 
Veljanovski, C. (1988b) Let’s switch channels for a better mix. Sunday 
Times, February.
Veljanovski, C. (1989b) Time for a redefined image. Sunday Times, May.
Veljanovski, C. (1989c) The Case for a Gaelic Broadcasting Service. Inver-
ness: Highlands and Islands Development Board.
Veljanovski, C. (1989d) Public service broadcasting in a competitive era. 
Paper to BBC Board of Governors, April. 
Veljanovski, C. (ed.) (1989e) Freedom in Broadcasting. London: Institute 
of Economic Affairs.
Veljanovski, C. (1990a) Is the media like cheese? In Law and Welfare Eco-
nomics (ed. P. D. Coljee et al.). Amsterdam Free University.
Veljanovski, C. (1990b) Market driven broadcasting: not myth but real-
ity. Intermedia 18(6): 17–21.
Veljanovski, C. (1996) Privatisation of Channel  4. Report, European 
Media Forum, London, UK.
Veljanovski, C. (2000) Is sports broadcasting a public utility? Paper to 
Seminar ‘Sport and Broadcasting’, 18 october, Institute of Economic 
Affairs.
Veljanovski, C. (2001) A market-led information economy. In Culture 
and Communications – Perspectives on Broadcasting and the Infor-
mation Society. London: Independent Television Commission.
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
66
Veljanovski, C. and Bishop, W. D. (1983) Choice by Cable: The Economics 
of a New Era in Television. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Veljanovski, C. and Yarrow, G. (1985) The Effects on ITV and Other Media 
of Advertising on the BBC. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery office.
67
3 THE PROBLEM OF BIAS IN THE BBC
Ryan Bourne
Introduction
The BBC is regularly accused of bias. over the last decade, there 
has been sustained criticism of the BBC’s coverage of Britain’s 
membership of the EU.1 Republicans complain that the BBC’s 
coverage of the royal family is too deferential.2 Independence 
campaigners in Scotland believe the BBC’s referendum cov-
erage was biased towards the union.3 on the Israel–Palestine 
conflict,4 immigration,5 National Health Service (NHS) reforms6 
and American politics,7 the BBC has also been criticised. Some 
1 See extensive list of reports by News-watch: http://news-watch.co.uk/
monitoring-projects-and-reports/ 
2 See the website of Republic: https://republic.org.uk/what-we-do/news-and-updates/
bbc-accused-blocking-embarrassing-royal-stories 
3 www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/02/bbc-scottish-independence-accused 
-pro-union-bias-good-morning-scotland-gary-robertson
4 At various times, the BBC has been accused of being biased against Israel (www 
.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2193845/Why-wont-BBC-come-clean-bias-Israel 
--moral-country-deserves-support.html) and in favour of Israel (www.independent 
.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hundreds-protest-against-bbc-proisrael-bias-of-gaza 
-coverage-in-cities-across-the-uk-9609016.html). 
5 www.migrationwatchuk.org/press-article/89
6 www.newstatesman.com/blogs/broadcast/2012/10/pro-coalition-bias-bbcs 
-coverage-nhs-reforms
7 www.spectator.co.uk/features/3276176/the-bbc-cant-help-loving-obama-just-as 
-it-cant-help-encouraging-recession/
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even claim that there are systematic biases in its entertainment 
programming (Sewell 2012).
However, bias is difficult to measure, and it is, of course, a 
highly subjective issue. Judging bias requires an understanding 
of what ‘unbiased’ or ‘neutral’ might be. Furthermore, all organ-
isations have inherent biases in the way they operate or present 
issues, even if they would like to think otherwise. It would, in-
deed, be surprising if this were not true of the BBC. In this con-
text, it is worth noting that a number of prominent former and 
current BBC employees have suggested that the BBC ‘world-view’ 
exhibits a metropolitan liberal outlook with a bias towards the 
conventional wisdoms of this world-view. The presenter Andrew 
Marr, for example, has said the BBC is ‘a publicly funded urban 
organisation with an abnormally large proportion of younger 
people, of people in ethnic minorities and almost certainly of gay 
people,’ creating ‘an innate liberal bias’.8 Peter Sissons has de-
scribed a ‘“mindset” … a way of thinking firmly of the Left’.9 Rod 
Liddle, the former editor of the Today programme, has written on 
the BBC’s coverage of the euro that ‘the BBC’s bias was arrived at 
through a sort of inherent wet liberalism, rather than an actual 
plot as such’.10 More recently, Roger Mosey, a former editorial di-
rector, suggested the BBC has a ‘liberal-defensive’ bias.11 
The counter to this is sometimes that the BBC exhibits a 
deep-rooted small ‘c’ conservatism when it comes to a range of 
issues such as constitutional coverage of the royal family and 
the armed forces. But, under an institutional explanation of bias, 
an innately liberal culture coupled with apparent conservatism 
on some issues is not directly contradictory. Both are consistent 
with the view that, institutionally, the BBC might reflect a soft 
8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6764779.stm
9 www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1349506/Left-wing-bias-Its-written-BBCs 
-DNA-says-Peter-Sissons.html
10 http://biasedbbc.org/blog/2011/09/24/rod-liddle-explains-bbc-pro-euro-bias/
11 www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4476635.ece
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liberal or progressive but broadly establishment opinion. This 
hypothesis would suggest that the apparent conservatism on 
certain issues may mainly be reflective of the BBC’s historical 
role as a national public service broadcaster as well as the selec-
tion bias of those who choose to work there given this knowledge.
Unsurprisingly, the BBC itself is extremely defensive about all 
of these ‘accusations’. It seizes on reports that dismiss accusa-
tions of ‘left-of-centre’ bias and uses the fact that it gets criticised 
from left and right to robustly defend itself against charges of po-
litical or ideological favouritism. Yet, few suggest that the BBC is 
overtly and deliberately biased at all times, particularly towards 
or against a political party. It is more that an institutional world-
view sometimes appears to shape coverage, whether through 
decisions on what to cover, what to include in a story or what to 
admit. Just because figures on the left and right sometimes moan 
about the effects of this world-view does not implicitly make the 
BBC ‘neutral’.
Does bias matter?
Some acknowledge that bias of this kind might be inevitable in 
any media organisation. It is extremely difficult to provide news 
that can ‘educate and inform’ without making judgements that 
people interpret as ‘slant’. Furthermore, some (such as Matthew 
Taylor from the Royal Society of Arts) believe that commercial 
news stations might exhibit their own biases, which tend to fa-
vour certain market-based viewpoints, meaning the existence of 
the BBC provides a necessary counterweight.
This is highly doubtful. The extensive, detailed work of Tim 
Groseclose on the US media market (a more commercial land-
scape) has comprehensively shown that, while there do exist 
some media organisations, such as Fox News, which exhibit 
conservative biases, the overwhelming majority of national news 
outlets tend to lean to the left in comparison with the views of 
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the general population (Groseclose 2012). He attributes this to 
the self-selection of journalists being more likely to be ‘liberal’ (in 
the American sense of the word) in the first place.
It is certainly not argued in this chapter that the BBC is likely 
to be more biased than other media organisations. There is no 
doubt about the difficulties inherent in producing unbiased 
news. However, there are four key reasons why bias might be 
particularly important in the context of talking about the future 
of the BBC.
The first is that the BBC’s reputation for fair coverage is much 
stronger than that of other media organisations. Trust in the BBC 
is higher than in other media institutions, and it is the largest 
source of news in the UK. A poll by YouGov found that 31 per cent 
of the public believe that BBC journalists are most likely to tell 
the truth, compared with just 17 per cent for ITV news and 15 
per cent for the ‘upmarket’ press.12 Given the BBC’s reach, and the 
trust placed in it, any biases could potentially have a much more 
significant impact on altering public understanding of an issue 
than biases arising on other media platforms. 
There is evidence that media bias generally alters public opin-
ion in the US in terms of how people vote (DellaVigna and Kaplan 
2007; George and Waldfogel 2006; Gerber et al. 2009). The work 
of Knight and Chiang (2008) has also shown that the effects of 
newspaper endorsements are more effective in terms of influenc-
ing election results when they are unexpected. This implies that, 
if a news source has a reputation for bias, it is less able to change 
people’s minds. Given that the biases of other media outlets (par-
ticularly newspapers) tend to be better known and more widely 
acknowledged than those of the BBC, we would expect the BBC 
to have a much bigger impact on public opinion than other news 
sources.
12 Yougov/London Press Club on Trust: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/
cumulus_uploads/document/ea1ioktxin/Results-for-Public-Trust-In-Institutions 
-24112014-W.pdf
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Another reason why BBC bias is important is that, unlike its 
broadcast competitors and newspapers, the BBC is guaranteed its 
funds through a compulsory licence fee. Consumers are not able to 
punish the institution financially for perceived coverage bias. This 
puts it in a highly privileged position, one in which TV viewers are 
made to pay for the content, irrespective of their views on it.
In addition, the method through which the BBC is funded 
means that the organisation itself has a vested interest in the 
political process. It uses a chunk of its guaranteed revenues to 
lobby for the maintenance of the licence fee. If a government 
had a manifesto commitment to radically slash or abolish the 
BBC licence fee, the BBC’s coverage of that issue could be vitally 
important in framing that debate. This is not a mere theoretical 
point – recently, Andrew Marr interviewed BBC Director General 
Lord (Tony) Hall on just this issue.13
Finally, the BBC has a very high proportion of news content. 
There would be legitimate competition concerns even if there 
were no concerns about bias. If it is accepted that any media or-
ganisation is likely to exhibit biases, then we should be concerned 
if there is considerable market power wielded by any news organ-
isation, whether it is in the private or the public sector.
Absolute or relative bias?
Before seeking to measure bias, we first have to outline exactly 
what we mean by it. In particular, it is important to understand 
the distinction between absolute bias (defined here as a deviation 
in coverage from objective truth) and relative bias (a deviation 
from the position of another, whether that be public opinion, the 
views of politicians or some other metric). Absolute bias is diffi-
cult to assess, because many of the relevant issues will not relate 
to questions that are objective by nature.
13 www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-33215141
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However, when it comes to relative bias, it is highly unlikely 
that any institution or news source will be totally unbiased. At 
some stage, editorial decisions must be made on what to cover, 
who to invite to speak on a subject and how to present the sub-
ject. We can assess relative bias more easily than absolute bias 
(see Groseclose 2012). Whether we are comparing the BBC’s cov-
erage with that of other media outlets, or with public opinion, or 
with some subjective view of what should be covered, there are 
techniques that can be used to assess what the BBC reports, how 
it reports things and what it omits.
The rest of this chapter examines case studies in order to 
assess the relative biases of the BBC. The case studies selected 
here are, of course, also likely to be reflective of the relative bias-
es of the author. However, I believe that the examples below are 
indicative of problems of relative bias by omission, selection and 
presentation, with which fair-minded people can identify. 
Bias by omission
‘You cannot possibly think that’ issues
one potential source of bias is a failure to include an outlook, 
viewpoint or information within a story or series that might be 
objectively regarded as being important. This might be because 
it simply does not cross the editor’s mind that the viewpoint or 
perspective is possible, important or acceptable, or that the in-
formation is worthy. This is important because exclusion of a par-
ticular viewpoint or opinion on a subject might be expected to 
shift the ‘overton Window’ of what it is politically acceptable to 
say. This can happen in such a way that a viewpoint becomes en-
tirely eliminated from political discourse except at the margins.
on 19 September 2013, the BBC website ran a ‘Viewpoints’ 
piece highlighting different opinions on the new policy of tax-
payer-funded school meals for all five-to-seven year olds. The 
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government’s own pilot study found no health benefits for the 
policy and did not assess the opportunity cost of the spending. 
Yet the viewpoints promoted on the BBC website were limited to 
those who were happy with the policy, to those who hoped that 
it would be extended, through to those who were delighted with 
the policy. There was no perspective from anyone who objected 
to the policy. This was despite several major think tanks strongly 
objecting to it in the public domain: objections that were covered 
elsewhere in the media.14
It was only when the omission of this viewpoint was high-
lighted to the BBC that representatives of the Taxpayers’ Alliance 
and Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) were also asked to submit 
their thoughts.15 Had this not been the case, a reader of the story 
on the BBC website who was not well versed in the broader public 
debate on this issue would have concluded that there was unani-
mous public support for the policy. It clearly did not occur to the 
BBC, until it was pointed out, that it was possible to object to the 
policy except on the grounds that it did not go far enough.
A frequent viewer of or listener to the BBC sees many examples 
of this ‘relative bias by omission’ in terms of the non-interven-
tionist viewpoint being ignored. A recent example of this was the 
reporting of the government’s new measures to try to combat the 
gender pay gap, through imposing new requirements on large 
companies. The coverage of the story on the BBC News website 
contained neither expert economic opinion on the use of crude 
average gender pay gap figures, nor dissenting opinion on the 
effectiveness of the policies.16 This is despite economists being ex-
traordinarily sceptical about the whole ‘gender pay gap’ concept 
14 For example, both the Daily Mail and the Guardian covered the story and objec-
tions to the policy. See www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2423727/Free 
-school-meals-child-7--austerity-Britain-afford-Nick-Cleggs-600m-giveaway.html 
and www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/17/clegg-school-meals-tory-deal. 
15 www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-24142901
16 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33515629
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as a legitimate policy concern. other newspapers covering this 
story, from the Financial Times to the Daily Mail, solicited opin-
ion from a much wider range of sources.17,18 The BBC’s coverage 
thus exhibited clear ‘bias by omission’ of important viewpoints. 
A more recent example on the same issue came on Equal Pay Day 
on 9 November, when the Fawcett Society’s report asserted that 
men earn 14.2 per cent more per hour than women, which was 
reported on BBC online. This is an official statistic, comparing 
the mean pay of working full-time men with women. But, crucial-
ly, and as other office for National Statistics (oNS) data show, it 
does not control for age, occupation type, length of service, close-
ness to home of the job or interruptions in career, which means 
it is largely a meaningless comparator. None of this nuance was 
reported in the BBC article. Instead, the headline ‘Women in 
full-time jobs “work for nothing” until 2016’ implies the issue is a 
huge problem – and the only comment from another source was 
a supporting one from the Trade Union Congress (TUC).19
The next example shows that the BBC is not simply biased 
against positions that might be described as ‘free market’. In the 
case of immigration, it tends to take a line that is biased in favour 
of a more free-market position. As explained in the serialisation 
of former BBC executive Roger Mosey’s recent book, one evening 
the BBC late evening news ran a piece on immigration in a racial-
ly diverse part of Britain. The package featured one white, work-
ing-class voice, who said he was ‘perfectly happy’ about immigra-
tion in the area.  Mosey asked the reporter whether this had in 
fact been representative of public opinion from his vox pops. The 
reporter explained that the other people interviewed had been 
‘fairly rabidly racist’ and so could not be used. Thus, there was no 
17 www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3160045/David-Cameron-forces-big-firms 
-publish-gender-pay-gap.html
18 www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f1dfadc-297a-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca.html#axzz3frhJ68Zb
19 www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34764812
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voice in the package opposed to immigration to the area, despite 
widespread concern about immigration levels. The BBC itself 
has acknowledged it was ‘slow to reflect the weight of concern 
[about immigration] in the wider community’ – a conclusion of 
the BBC-endorsed ‘Prebble report’.20
Omission of EU withdrawalist voices
Whilst the above examples are interesting, one could easily claim 
that they are rarities, and that, in most cases, the BBC makes 
strenuous efforts to include all relevant perspectives. But one 
area where the BBC has come under sustained criticism is in its 
coverage of Britain’s membership of the EU. 
News-watch – a monitoring organisation that tracks flagship 
news programmes such as Radio 4’s Today programme – has 
found that voices in favour of Britain’s exit from the EU tend to 
be under-represented relative to those in favour of continued 
membership.21 In this instance, the relative bias against voices in 
favour of EU exit is exemplified by comparing their coverage with 
public opinion polling, which shows between a third and half of 
the public being in favour of EU exit at any given time.22
Fresh News-watch analysis commissioned for this chap-
ter has sought to combine all News-watch survey sample data 
on Radio 4’s Today programme between March 2004 and June 
2015.23 In the monitored sample, the Today programme included 
4,275 guest speakers on EU themes. Just 132 of these (3.2 per cent) 
20 www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/our_work/editorial_standards/impartiality/breadth 
_opinion.html
21 Since 1999, News-watch has tracked more than 6,000 hours of BBC programming and 
analysed its coverage of EU news and current affairs. A back catalogue of their ana-
lysis can be found here: http://news-watch.co.uk/monitoring-projects-and-reports/.
22 See, for example: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/02/24/eu-referendum-record-lead/ 
and YouGov’s most recent polling on the subject: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront 
.net/cumulus_uploads/document/q32gumm58k/ProspectResults_150602_EU.pdf.
23 A period of 252 weeks, 1,512 individual editions and 4,284 hours of monitoring.
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were identifiably in favour of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. 
Furthermore, 72 per cent of withdrawalist speakers were repre-
sentatives of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and over a third 
(37 per cent) of all withdrawalist contributions were from Nigel 
Farage alone. Left-leaning withdrawalist voices have accounted 
for just 0.07 per cent of all EU speakers over this period (three ap-
pearances from Labour Party supporters and one representative 
from the Socialist Labour Party). 
In comparison with public opinion, the Today programme has 
exhibited significant bias by omission in terms of excluding the 
voices of those who believe Britain should leave the EU, particu-
larly non-UKIP voices.
There are two potential explanations for this. The first is that a 
cultural world-view exists that is broadly pro-EU, and this mani-
fests itself in the omission of strongly anti-EU voices. The second 
is that the nature of the BBC’s position and funding means that 
it shapes choices on issues through the prism of the political pro-
cess, rather than public concerns.
Whatever the mechanism, News-watch has examined other 
case studies that have delivered similar results. In a January 2013 
edition of Newsnight devoted entirely to David Cameron’s an-
nouncement of the in/out referendum, one might have expected 
the debate to be balanced between those favouring ‘in’ and ‘out’. 
However, Nigel Farage was the lone overt withdrawalist on the 
show and was set against eighteen other guest speakers who fa-
voured continued membership of the EU.
With a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU sched-
uled for 23 June 2016, this relative bias by omission could be 
very important indeed. Within academic media theory, there 
is a line of reasoning that media influence on audiences is not 
immediate but occurs more through a continual process of 
repeated arguments – the ‘drip-drip-drip’ effect. However, even 
with the referendum so close, there is still evidence of this bias 
by omission today. 
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News-watch’s most recent analysis for this chapter examined 
business views of the EU referendum on the Today programme 
during the official 2015 General Election campaign. During this 
period, 25 speakers spoke about the subject, of which two gave 
a neutral response; two (both from the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI)) said that the referendum decision was a matter 
for government, but they were generally pro-EU membership; 
and two (Conservative politicians) said they were in favour of the 
referendum but wished to remain in a reformed EU. The remain-
ing nineteen speakers all saw the in/out referendum as a worry 
or a threat to business.
Certainly, this viewpoint about the impact of the referendum 
is legitimate. But polling undertaken for Business for Britain 
and YouGov has found that, in a sample of 1,000 small, medium 
and large firms, business backed the holding of a referendum by 
66 per cent to 25 per cent. It seems reasonable to assume that 
a substantial proportion of those backing the referendum were 
doing so in the belief that Britain would be better off economi-
cally outside the EU, or at least that the referendum would not 
be overly damaging for British business. Yet the overwhelming 
narrative in the selection of guests was that the referendum, 
by creating uncertainty, would be bad for business and bad for 
Britain. Audiences on the Today programme have been offered 
no perspective that might suggest that the in/out referendum 
or leaving the EU is an opportunity for Britain rather than a 
concern.
Clearly, the future of the UK’s position in the EU divides polit-
ical parties and also the business community. But in its selection 
of guests, perhaps driven by the state of the political landscape 
at the time, the Today programme has at least exhibited a clear 
relative bias by omission against a significant strand of opinion. 
Given the BBC’s funding mechanism and reputation, this could 
have an important impact as the UK prepares to vote in a referen-
dum on membership of the EU. 
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Bias by selection
A second potential source of bias is ‘bias by selection’. This 
might entail particular issues or viewpoints being more fre-
quently covered, or certain guests or organisations being more 
likely to be selected. This strand of bias can occur even if a par-
ticular journalist does not have a deliberate and overt ideolog-
ical perspective; they might merely perceive certain stories or 
viewpoints to be more important or credible due to their own 
outlook, or because the BBC’s role and world-view encourages 
their coverage.
For example, in the past year there have been many more 
TV and radio shows dedicated to the subject of inequality on 
the BBC than, for example, the promotion of economic growth 
or reducing the deficit. This is despite all three issues being 
ranked as approximately equally important in surveys of the 
British public.24 It is also despite the fact that inequality has 
been falling on most conventional measures in recent years. 
Within some of these inequality shows, there was a clear bias 
in the selection of guests. Jacques Peretti’s The Super-Rich and 
Us series, aired on BBC2, was clearly biased in the selection of 
guest contributors towards those who considered income and 
wealth inequality to be an extremely important and worrying 
topic.
Trying to find evidence of bias by selection in any systemat-
ic way, though, is incredibly difficult, given the breadth of BBC 
content. one must restrict analysis to a given narrow range 
of content to get meaningful results. The author accepts that 
there might be bias by selection in his own selection. How-
ever, the evidence below suggests that there is a strong case to 
answer.
24 http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/this-is-what-the-british-public-actually 
-care-about--xy-_voEa9l
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Selection of think tanks 
The CPS recently published work on the use of think tanks on 
the BBC website between 1 June 2010 and 31 May 2013. Using the 
Guardian and Telegraph newspapers as ‘anchors’ for the left and 
right, regression analysis found that the BBC News website’s se-
lection of think tanks was much more statistically sensitive to the 
appearance of that think tank in the Guardian, implying a rela-
tive bias towards left-leaning content or, at the very least, content 
more similar to the Guardian than the Telegraph (Latham 2013).
The CPS methodology was criticised on two grounds when 
it was released. Firstly, Chris Cook pointed out that journalists 
often used quotes or analysis from think tanks of different per-
spectives in their newspaper stories, so that the context of cita-
tions matters. Secondly, it was claimed that the Guardian is more 
interested in stories surrounding public services than the Tele-
graph. one might expect the BBC, a public service broadcaster, to 
also be more likely to cover such stories.
It has been suggested that rather than using newspapers as 
‘anchors’ to test whether the BBC’s online coverage leans to the left 
or right, it would be better to use citations of think tanks in Han-
sard’s record of Parliament. It is suggested that right-leaning think 
tanks would be more likely to be cited by Conservative MPs and 
left-leaning think tanks would be more likely to be cited by Labour 
MPs (a methodology developed by Tim Groseclose in the US). The 
assumption here is that politicians are more likely to cite think 
tanks that broadly share their ideological world-view. There is ob-
viously a problem with this approach in that the divides between 
parties are not as clear as the divides between think tanks, and 
the positioning of parties is also different from that of think tanks. 
of course, it is possible that a member of a party might cite think 
tanks with views that oppose their own in order to make a point 
in a debate that his or her opponents’ views are criticised by think 
tanks that would be expected to be friendly to his or her party.
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The author selected fourteen multidisciplinary think tanks 
from across the political spectrum that have had 20 or more 
Parliamentary citations (Lords and the Commons) amongst 
Conservative and Labour politicians between the 2010 and 2015 
elections. The think tanks are ranked from the most left wing 
by this metric in Figure 6. In fact, the results generally accord 
with intuition regarding which think tanks we would expect to 
be the most left-leaning, with the possible exception of the New 
Economics Foundation.
As can be seen in Table 2, there is no evidence of correlation 
between the tendency for the BBC to select left-leaning think 
tanks as left-leaning is defined above.25 This suggests that either 
25 This searching was undertaken using the website TheyWorkForYou.com. All indi-
vidual citations were counted, irrespective of whether they came from the same 
speaker or the same debate. Likewise, citations in written questions were counted 
too, except in instances where the think tank citation appears in Parliamentary 
questions repeated to many different Secretaries of State and ministers. 
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Figure 6 Number of citations by Labour politicians as a proportion of 
citations by Labour and Conservative politicians
Source: author’s calculations from data from TheyWorkForYou.com 
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the BBC exhibits no relative biases in its selection of think tanks, 
or that any biases that do occur are contextual. Nevertheless, the 
data seem to suggest no systematic ‘bias by selection’ here.
Table 2 Think-tank citations by politicians and the BBC News website
 Think tank
Labour 
mentions
Conservative 
mentions
Relative Labour 
mentions
BBC 
mentions
Work Foundation  21   3 0.88  55
Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 161  39 0.81 110
Social Market Foundation  21   8 0.72  18
Respublica  17   7 0.71  16
Demos  46  20 0.70  85
IPPR 106  49 0.68 104
Fabian Society  14   7 0.67  37
New Economics Foundation  19  10 0.66  39
Civitas  14  11 0.56  40
IEA  19  24 0.44 104
Policy Exchange  34  47 0.42 139
Centre for Social Justice  62 103 0.38  82
Centre for Policy Studies 16  32 0.33  33
Adam Smith Institute   6  14 0.30  37
Correlation between relative Labour 
mentions and BBC mentions –0.1
Source: politician citations from TheyWorkForYou.com. BBC News website mentions using targeted 
Google search
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one possibility, though, is that there might still be relative 
bias in selection in terms of the types of stories in which different 
think tanks are cited. The research also reviewed all of the 410 
BBC media hits that the IEA received in a twelve-month period 
between July 2014 and June 2015, from appearances on broadcast 
through to mentions on the BBC website. 
It is notable that, out of those 410 mentions, the IEA was not 
asked to comment or was quoted once on immigration by the 
BBC, despite the clear classical liberal position of IEA authors 
and senior staff on this topic. We were also quoted on poverty 
only once, despite having published two major research papers 
by Dr Kristian Niemietz in recent years, which have been widely 
discussed in the print media and highly regarded by think tanks 
of all shades of opinion.
How can a free-market think tank get so much coverage on 
welfare but not on poverty (on which we have done far more ex-
tensive work)? And how can it be that a classical liberal organisa-
tion has received no coverage on immigration in a twelve-month 
period, despite its prominence as an issue?
one potential explanation is that the editorial teams of many 
BBC programmes have clear priors about the world-view associ-
ated with the staff of a free-market think tank, predicated along 
some left–right dichotomy. Since ‘free-market’ economics is 
associated in the UK more with the ‘right’ of the political spec-
trum than the ‘left’, many journalists project other perceived 
‘right’ opinions onto free-market think tanks. For example, there 
is a range of opinion that assumes that the ‘right’ does not care 
about the poor, which might explain why we rarely get asked to 
discuss poverty. It is also perceived that right-leaning people 
are opposed to immigration. over the past few years, there have 
been several occasions when the IEA communications team has 
received calls from BBC journalists who have assumed that an 
IEA spokesperson will be opposed to free movement of people 
within the EU. 
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It should be noted that such inherent biases will also apply to 
certain think tanks on the left, though perhaps more on social 
issues than on economic issues. It might be assumed, for ex-
ample, that a left-leaning organisation will have socially liberal 
views on the role of the state in relation to sexual matters, or will 
be in favour of Britain remaining in the EU. 
Thought for the Day
one area where a BBC show has editorial control over the selec-
tion of guests is on the Radio 4 Today programme slot Thought for 
the Day. Thought for the Day is broadcast each morning (Monday 
to Saturday) at around 7.50 a.m. and entails a scripted mono-
logue of around three minutes in length from an invited speaker. 
The slot aims to deliver ‘reflections from a faith perspective on 
issues and people in the news’. The theme is selected by the in-
vited commentator and compiled under the auspices of the Man-
chester-based BBC Religion and Ethics department, separate 
from Today’s editorial team. 
Research undertaken by News-watch surveyed all editions 
of Thought for the Day available within the BBC online archive 
to assess how issues related to economics and business are dis-
cussed. This allows us to make an assessment of whether there 
is evidence of some form of anti-capitalist or anti-market bias by 
selection for the slot.
our overall sample was 976 separate editions. of these, 167 
(17 per cent) included discussion of economics, business, finance 
and matters of public policy necessitating economic policy 
judgements.
This sample was then coded according to whether the speaker 
offered a positive, negative or neutral/factual/mixed perspective 
on market-based and capitalist activity within the issue under 
discussion. The coding frame was set such that positive opinions 
incorporated those extolling the virtues of business activity or 
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capitalists, the importance of economic growth and economic 
freedom and the improvements in living standards seen under 
capitalism. Negative opinions included those that denounced 
market-based activities, highlighted negative examples of 
business activity, questioned the morality of capitalism and/or 
demanded significant interventions or controls on voluntary 
activity and exchange. All other contributions fell under the neu-
tral, factual or mixed heading.
An important point to highlight with the negative opinions is 
that these often contained denouncement of genuinely corrupt 
activities – not things that those believing in a free economy 
would seek to defend. They are counted as negative here, though, 
because the continued highlighting of negative stories in rela-
tion to business is seldom balanced with positive stories (such 
as private companies delivering high-quality education in the 
developing world, for example). The selection of stories therefore 
contributes to a climate in which business and market-based ac-
tivity is heavily associated with cronyism and corruption.
The results of this analysis are striking. of the 167 edi-
tions analysed, 109 (65 per  cent) expressed a negative opinion; 
45 (27  per  cent) were neutral, factual or mixed, and only 13 
(8 per cent) gave any sort of positive perspective on the theme. As 
such, negative commentary outweighed positive commentary by 
a factor of more than eight to one.26
In the relatively small number of editions that could be re-
garded as positive towards pro-market or capitalist positions, it 
was noted that businesses could achieve good outcomes, that 
businessmen were capable of acts of giving, insight and philan-
thropy and that such efforts could be valuable to communities. 
But these were vastly outweighed by what might be described as 
a plethora of anti-market or anti-capitalist opinions.
26 The full results of this exercise, along with key quotes from each edition and com-
mentary as to why particular coding decisions were made, are available from the 
author. 
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• Several contributors denounced multinational corporations 
and the plutocrats who now selfishly own so much of the 
world’s wealth.
• The vulnerabilities of the poor were highlighted as if 
capitalism caused poverty, but the role of capitalism in 
alleviating poverty was barely mentioned.
• Cuts to government spending in areas such as welfare and 
health were focused on regularly, but without corresponding 
attention being given to problems such as dependency or the 
strains placed on provision due to an ageing population.
• Economic growth – the driver of improved living standards 
– was opposed and downplayed, whilst several contributors 
attacked the straw man idea that politicians seek to 
maximise GDP.27
• Free-market ideology was attacked – with crude 
denouncements of neoliberalism, Ayn Rand and the idea 
of ‘trickle down’ economics – even though there is no real 
evidence of any prominent free-market economist ever 
advocating the latter.28
• The issue of tax avoidance was discussed in moral terms, 
implying it was inherently moral for corporations to pay 
more tax than was legally due. No contributor suggested 
politicians had the power to change tax law.
• In several instances, capitalist activities were said to lead 
to ‘exploitation’. The existence of sweat shops was lamented, 
without ever discussing the likely negative impact the 
non-existence of these industries would have in developing 
countries.29
27 www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/Selfishness,%20Greed%20
and%20Capitalism.pdf, p. 37.
28 www.iea.org.uk/blog/forget-trickle-down-in-a-free-market-the-rich-don 
%E2%80%99t-gain-at-the-poor%E2%80%99s-expense
29 www.iea.org.uk/blog/sweat-shops-and-the-need-for-libertarian-moral-outrage
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• Inequality was regularly held up as being self-evidently a 
huge problem, with highly contentious figures from oxfam 
and others cited. At no point was it pointed out that global 
inequality was falling.30
• The financial crash and illegal activities of banks and 
financial entities were regularly discussed, but nothing 
was said about the role of government policies, including 
regulatory and monetary failure, in contributing to these 
outcomes.
• Markets and business were said to be eroding moral values. 
Investors in art (from the ‘jet set and hedge funds’), for 
example, were concerned only in the value of the paintings 
and had no sense of aesthetics. Anti-consumerism and a 
dislike of advertising pervaded several contributions.
• Scandals in certain sectors and businesses – G4S, Libor, UBS, 
Findus Foods, etc. – were used to justify wholesale reforms to 
business policy.
• New technologies such as Bitcoin and smartphones were 
denounced, with rare exposition of the benefits of these new 
technologies to people’s lives.
• Speakers frequently advocated the need for ambitious action 
to combat climate change. Strikingly, whilst the human cost 
of climate change was mentioned, there was no discussion of 
the cost to the global poor of mitigation policies.
While one might expect religious leaders to focus on certain 
topics – such as the conditions of the poor, inequality, business 
morality and the common good – this need not necessitate 
such stringent anti-market views as seen from the large sample 
examined. There is a clear bias in selection here against opin-
ions that hold business, capitalism and economic activity not 
30 http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/01/beware-oxfams-dodgy 
-statistics-on-wealth-inequality/
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centrally planned by governments in a positive light. Thought 
for the Day, in its discussion of economic issues at least, over-
whelmingly represents a world-view that, at best, is sceptical 
of capitalism and voluntary market-based exchange, and, at 
worst, disdains it. 
Bias by presentation
Perhaps the most difficult form of relative bias to measure is ‘bias 
by presentation’. This entails examining the context around how 
stories and participants are presented as well as how opinions 
are introduced – and whether this means the audience is nudged 
towards believing that one subjective viewpoint is right or more 
credible.
Value judgements
An obvious example is the use of value judgements in presenting 
a story. one that immediately springs to mind is the way that 
BBC journalist Norman Smith covered the 2014 Autumn State-
ment, reporting that the oBR had forecast that spending levels as 
a proportion of GDP would likely fall to levels last seen in the late 
1930s. Rather than just outlining this fact, the presentation of the 
story by Smith entailed substantial value judgements about what 
this would mean (my emphasis in italics):
when you sit down and read the office for Budget Responsibility 
report it reads like a book of doom. It is utterly terrifying, suggest-
ing that spending will have to be hacked back to the levels of the 
1930s as a proportion of GDP. That is an extraordinary concept, 
you’re back to the land of Road to Wigan Pier.31
31 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/11272814/PM-attacks-BBC 
-over-Wigan-Pier-cuts-coverage.html
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The oBR figures have since been strongly criticised as being 
misleading in terms of historical comparisons.32 For example, 
real GDP (and therefore spending) is much higher; the figures 
used different measures of GDP, which makes an enormous dif-
ference in the comparisons; and there were vastly different sums 
spent on defence and debt interest in the 1930s (and by implica-
tion the residual on items such as health and education). 
But, even if the figures had been directly comparable, would 
state spending at 35 per cent of GDP be so ‘terrifying’? Is it really 
terrifying for the state in the UK to spend the same proportion of 
national income as the state in other developed countries, such 
as Australia, Switzerland and South Korea? Making this com-
parison led to weeks of media coverage with this claim being 
repeated.
Sometimes descriptions are more systematically mislead-
ing. For example, in recent years there has been a proliferation 
of stories about tax avoidance, often involving large compa-
nies such as Amazon, Starbucks and Google. Yet in 24 of the 
78 stories on the BBC website between 2012 and 2015 that 
mentioned ‘Amazon’ and ‘tax avoidance’, corporation tax paid 
by companies was misleadingly compared with sales revenues 
– which has nothing to do with the tax base for corporation tax 
that is profit.33 As it happens, these cases are all much more 
complicated in other ways, but the comparison of corporation 
tax paid with sales is meaningless and clearly designed to in-
fluence the reputations of those companies and views on tax 
avoidance.34
32 www.iea.org.uk/blog/is-george-osborne-really-returning-us-to-a-1930s-govern 
ment-accurate-comparisons-suggest-a-defi
33 Author’s calculation from Google search of BBC website between 2012 and 2015 for 
‘Amazon’ and ‘tax avoidance’.
34 This was an example first raised by my colleague, Philip Booth: www.iea.org.uk/
blog/bbc-corporation-tax-horror-story. 
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Health warnings
Perhaps the most egregious example of this relative bias by pres-
entation came back in March 2012, when the subject of minimum 
alcohol pricing was under discussion. BBC2’s Newsnight had organ-
ised a debate to take place on the subject between Eric Joyce (an 
MP opposed to the proposal) and Sarah Wollaston MP (who was 
in favour), chaired by Emily Maitlis.35 Wollaston was introduced 
as ‘a GP and a Tory MP, not to mention a member of the Commons’ 
Health Select Committee’. The introduction for her opponent was: 
‘Eric Joyce, an MP against minimum pricing, was forced to quit the 
Labour Party after a drunken punch-up in the House of Commons 
bar. Tonight he’s under curfew in his Edinburgh home.’ The way 
that this was introduced clearly would leave viewers uninitiated 
in the subject to simply assume that Wollaston had a monopoly on 
credibility to talk about the issue, even though both MPs were on 
the show to assess the economic and political implications of the 
policy, as well as the health effects.
Though not as overt as this, it is common for BBC coverage to 
attach ‘health warnings’ to participants in debates. In the con-
text of a discussion, unbalanced introductions act to undermine 
the credibility of one of the speakers, or enhance the credibility 
of the other. 
Academic economists have noted how a common form of 
media bias involves putting ‘an ideological label on conservative 
and libertarian organisations and interviewees, but not on liberal 
and leftist groups’ (Boaz 2010). This sort of ‘bias by presentation’ 
is commonplace on the BBC. 
Building on CPS research (Latham 2013), the treatment of 
fifteen multidisciplinary think tanks on the BBC news website 
was analysed between the general elections in 2010 and 2015. All 
35 See http://velvetgloveironfist.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/entirely-matter-for-you 
.html for details.
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articles containing the names of the think tanks were examined 
to ascertain whether health warnings had been used to describe 
the organisations.36 ‘Health warnings’ here, as with Latham’s 
analysis, include: (a) a statement of the ideological or political 
position of the think tank, (b) an expression of the think tank’s 
prior position on an issue or (c) mention of an affiliation of any 
political actor to the think tank. The results are presented in 
Table 3.
As can be seen, think tanks perceived to be conservative or free 
market are much more likely to be ascribed a health warning. The 
four main think tanks that advocate for free-market policies are 
given ideological warning labels including ‘free market’, ‘centre–
right’ and ‘right-wing’ often: the IEA 22.1 per cent of the time, the 
CPS 30.3 per cent of the time, Policy Exchange 41.7 per cent of the 
time and the Adam Smith Institute 59.5 per cent of the time. The 
communitarian conservative Respublica is given an ideological 
warning label 50 per cent of the time. 
In contrast, left-leaning think tanks are given these labels far 
less often. The New Economics Foundation is probably the most 
left-leaning policy think tank in the country, and its output lies 
further from mainstream opinion than any other.37 Yet the only 
health warnings it has been ascribed are, in effect, compliments 
– it was described as a ‘sustainability think tank’ and a ‘member 
of the Tescopoly alliance’. Demos and the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR), despite having clear ideological left-lean-
ing positions, are introduced as such much less often than their 
equivalents at Policy Exchange or the Centre for Policy Studies.
36 The think tanks used were: the Work Foundation, the New Economics Foundation, 
the Social Market Foundation, Demos, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Civitas, 
the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), the IEA, the CPS, the Centre for So-
cial Justice, Policy Exchange, the Fabian Society, Respublica and the Adam Smith 
Institute. 
37 Its policy recommendations, for example, have recently included simply reducing 
the length of the working week: www.neweconomics.org/blog/entry/reduce-the 
-working-week-to-30-hours. 
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Health warnings such as ‘centre-left’ or ‘centre-right’ are used 
to inform the readers that a think tank or organisation might be 
seeking to shift public opinion in a particular direction. There-
fore, we might expect that think tanks with close associations or 
formal relationships with political parties would be more likely 
to be assigned ideological warning labels. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that the Fabian Society receives health warnings a very large pro-
portion of the time, since it is actually affiliated with the Labour 
Party. Likewise, the Centre for Policy Studies has strong political 
associations with the Conservative Party. There is a greyer area 
as far as the Centre for Social Justice and Policy Exchange are 
concerned. They are independent of the Conservative Party, but 
there is no question that there is regular exchange of personnel 
and ideas between those groups and the government. The situ-
ation is very similar to that which existed between the IPPR and 
the Labour Party. However, the IPPR was given health warnings 
on about one-sixth of appearances, the Centre for Social Justice 
on about one-third and Policy Exchange on over 40 per cent of 
the occasions on which they appeared.
This, therefore, seems like a clear relative bias. The BBC News 
website is much more likely to use ideological or political labels 
when introducing right-of-centre or free-market opinion. It 
could be that because they think left-leaning think tanks are 
more credible, do better research or – most likely – because these 
think tanks are closer to their own world-view, they do not even 
notice the relative positions of these think tanks.
Sometimes, the BBC uses positive adjectives to describe think 
tanks, such as ‘independent’: the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
is often given this label. As the final two columns of Table 3 show, 
sometimes other think tanks are given this label too. That this 
adjective is so rarely used makes it a powerful, positive signal 
that the viewpoint should be taken seriously and is untainted by 
political biases. 
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Table 3 Think-tank mentions and health warnings on the BBC website 
in the previous Parliament
Think tank
BBC 
mentions
% of 
mentions 
with 
health 
warnings Health warnings
% of 
mentions 
with 
positive 
adjectives
Positive 
adjectives
Work 
Foundation 55 0.0   3.6
‘a not-for-
profit 
body’, ‘an 
independent 
body’
New 
Economics 
Foundation
39 5.1
‘member of 
Tescopoly Alliance’, 
‘sustainability think 
tank’
7.7 ‘independent think tank’
Social 
Market 
Foundation
18 5.6 ‘left-of-centre think tank’ 0.0  
Demos 85 11.8
‘left-leaning think 
tank’, ‘political think 
tank’, ‘centre-left 
think tank’, ‘left-
wing think tank’, 
‘left-leaning think 
tank’, ‘centre-
left research 
organisation’
7.1
‘independent’, 
‘independent 
political 
researchers’, 
‘cross-party 
think tank’
Joseph 
Rowntree 
Foundation
110 13.6
‘anti-poverty think 
tank’, ‘social policy 
charity’, ‘social 
justice charity’, 
‘researched 
poverty’, ‘anti-
poverty charity’, 
‘social chairty’, 
‘social policy 
research chairty’, 
‘social equality 
pressure group’
 0.0  
Civitas 40 15.0
‘right-leaning’, ‘think-
tank interested in 
limited government 
and personal 
freedom’
10.0 ‘independent think tank’
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Continued
Think tank
BBC 
mentions
% of 
mentions 
with 
health 
warnings Health warnings
% of 
mentions 
with 
positive 
adjectives
Positive 
adjectives
IPPR 104 16.3
‘centre-left think tank’, 
‘a left-of-centre think 
tank’, ‘left-leaning’
 0.0  
IEA 104 22.1
‘right-wing think tank’, 
‘free-market think 
tank’, ‘arguably the 
most vocal think tank 
opposed to HS2’, 
‘right-leaning think 
tank’, ‘centre-right’
 0.0  
CPS 33 30.3
‘founded by Margaret 
Thatcher’, ‘right-wing’, 
‘free-market’, ‘former 
Conservative party 
chairman’, ‘pro-free 
market’, ‘centre-right’
 0.0  
Centre 
for Social 
Justice
82 32.9
‘set up by the 
Conservative MP Iain 
Duncan Smith’, ‘right-
leaning think tank’, 
‘Conservative-leaning 
think tank’, ‘right-wing 
think tank’, ‘a think 
tank which helped 
shape the Tories’ 
manifesto’
6.1 ‘independent’
Policy 
Exchange 139 41.7
‘centre-right think 
tank’, ‘right-wing 
think tank’, ‘right-
leaning think tank’, 
‘Conservative 
think tank’, ‘think 
tank on the right’, 
‘right-of-centre’, 
‘centre-right research 
organisation’, 
‘government backed 
think tank’ ‘petri 
dish of ideas for 
the Conservative 
leadership’, ‘pro-free 
market’, ‘political 
think tank’
0.0  
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This adjective, however, simply raises the question, ‘independ-
ent of what?’ The IFS has received funding from the Joseph Rown-
tree Foundation, which has, in turn, been described as a ‘pressure 
group’ by the BBC. The author does not for a moment question 
the academic integrity or very scholarly nature of the work of the 
IFS. However, this example shows the subjectivity that perhaps 
lies behind the adjective ‘independent’. All of the think tanks 
in Table 3 (with the exception of the Labour- affiliated Fabian 
Continued
Think tank
BBC 
mentions
% of 
mentions 
with 
health 
warnings Health warnings
% of 
mentions 
with 
positive 
adjectives
Positive 
adjectives
Fabian 
Society 37 45.9
‘left-of-centre’, 
‘Labour-supporting’, 
‘left-wing’, ‘affiliated 
to the Labour party’, 
‘socialist’, ‘centre-
left’, ‘left-leaning’, 
‘Labour-leaning’
0.0  
Respublica 16 50.0
‘centre-right think 
tank’, ‘concept of 
“Red Tory”’, ‘Mr 
Cameron’s favourite’, 
‘right-leaning’, 
‘centre-right’
0.0  
Adam 
Smith 
Institute
37 59.5
‘free market think 
tank’, ‘pro-free 
market think 
tank’, ‘free market 
economics think 
tank’, ‘right-wing 
think tank’, ‘known 
for its work on 
privatisation’, 
‘argues for smaller 
government and 
lower taxes’, ‘a 
favourite of Margaret 
Thatcher’
2.7 ‘independent’
Source: author’s targeted Google search of BBC News website
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Society) are ‘independent’ of political parties, operating sepa-
rately from them. But few are ever labelled ‘independent’. What 
makes the IFS more independent than, say, Respublica? It would 
be worth the BBC clarifying in writing exactly what they mean 
when they use the ‘independent’ label.
Interruptions
Another way in which bias can manifest itself is through inter-
views and how they are conducted – for example, the degree of 
hostility of the interviewer. It is likely that interviewers are more 
instinctively hostile to those whose views they disagree with or 
find alien, meaning that a broad sociological bias can lead to 
some interviewees being treated differently if they fall outside a 
particular world-view.
News-watch analysis of the EU debate has in the past found 
that eurosceptic voices are interrupted, for example, far more 
often than pro-European politicians.38 More recently, in a case 
study example, News-watch showed two interviews in its Winter 
2013 Survey, highlighting how pro-European and eurosceptic 
voices were treated differently in similar length interviews with 
the same interviewer. on 18 November 2013, Paul Sykes, a UKIP 
donor, was interviewed by Evan Davis on the Today programme. 
The conversation switched between them 60 times (approximate-
ly eleven times per minute). In contrast, Davis interviewing Karel 
De Gucht, a European Trade Commissioner, saw the conversation 
switch just ten times (twice per minute). This is shown in Fig-
ure 7. The word count for the De Gucht interview was also much 
slower, suggesting that, as well as facing fewer interruptions, 
the Commissioner was able to make his point in a more relaxed 
or measured way. of course, a single case study does not make 
38 http://news-watch.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Today-Programme 
-Survey-Summer-20061.pdf
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the point unequivocally. There might be other occasions when 
the eurosceptic interviewee had a relatively free ride. However, 
as noted above, earlier research suggests that this case study is 
representative of a general problem. 
Conclusion
Bias is difficult to measure systematically. The BBC has been ac-
cused of being biased towards liberal establishment opinion in 
the past, and there is evidence across a range of case studies con-
sistent with this sort of sociological and institutional explanation. 
Biases by omission, selection and presentation (assessed 
through examination of the context of stories) are the three 
main ways in which biases manifest themselves. This un-
der-representation of certain viewpoints and slant in selection 
and presentation is unlikely to be deliberate and decreed from 
on high; it is more reflective of the underlying beliefs of the 
BBC journalists, and the structures within which they operate 
– arising in ways that the journalists themselves might not even 
consider biased.
The question remains: what are the policy responses? It is not 
argued that other sources of news and comment are not biased. 
Commercial news sources, sources financed by charitable trusts 
and other forms of voluntary news and comment provision (for 
example, blogs) also have biases. There is no evidence that such 
sources tend to have a disproportionate pro-free-market or even 
pro-commerce bias, though some do. In the UK, there is a range 
of views expressed in the print media, in blogs and in broadcast 
media and the arts, which are funded from a variety of sources. A 
range of media, some of which present objective facts and others 
that offer news and comment from a variety of perspectives is 
healthy. 
However, the position of the BBC is problematic for several 
reasons. 
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The BBC has a huge share of the news and comment market, 
the size of which would lead to serious competition concerns if the 
BBC were a private organisation; in other words, it receives privi-
leged treatment in this respect.39 The BBC is the biggest provider of 
39 The BBC has a privileged position in the proper sense of the word – there are special 
rules (or exemptions from rules) that do not apply to other organisations.
Figure 7 EU interview comparisons
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news on every platform on which it has a presence. Approximately 
75 per  cent of television news watched in the UK is provided by 
the BBC, and measures of market power for radio news are around 
the same. The BBC has somewhat less – though still considerable – 
market power in online news (see ofcom 2014). 
Furthermore, it should not be possible for an organisation 
to exercise such market power in an area as subjective as news 
provision when those who fund the organisation have no choice 
in the matter. In addition, the fact that the BBC is trusted means 
that its bias is more influential. As has been noted, the BBC 
also has an interest in the political process and is happy to use 
 licence-payer funds to promote its cause. 
Privatisation would not lead to or guarantee the elimination 
of relative biases from coverage; the work of Tim Groseclose on 
the US shows this is extraordinarily unlikely. However, privatisa-
tion could lead to change over time and a more sceptical viewing 
public. Most importantly of all, however, privatisation gives the 
right of exit to those who do not wish to listen to the programmes 
broadcast by the BBC. If the normal competition rules applied 
to the BBC, there would also be a greater plurality of positions. 
Broadcasters with different biases could compete. 
Despite the case made in this chapter, there is no doubt that 
the BBC has a reputation – generally well deserved – for high 
quality and broad news coverage, for which it is respected. A pri-
vatised BBC would bear a considerable commercial cost if this 
reputation were impaired; thus, there would be an incentive to 
maintain it. This is especially true if we consider the worldwide 
reputation of the BBC and the ability it would have as a private 
entity to expand its broadcasting reach outside the UK.
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4 WHY IS THE BBC BIASED?
Stephen Davies
Is the BBC biased to the left?
Complaints that the output of the BBC is biased towards a par-
ticular perspective or against identifiable positions and views are 
longstanding, with much argument from figures such as Norman 
Tebbit to that effect in the 1980s. Interestingly, such arguments 
come from many parts of the political palette, with owen Jones 
recently arguing the exact mirror image of the case made years 
ago by Tebbit (Jones 2014). Most of the work that has been done 
on bias in the media has looked at a bias in a particular politi-
cal direction, with most studies focusing on the US. These use 
various methodologies to argue that electronic and other media 
have a pronounced bias towards the liberal side of US politics in a 
way that makes the output of the media markedly out of line with 
the views of a large part, or even the majority, of the population 
(Groseclose 2012). There have been studies of political bias of this 
kind in the UK as well, and some of the other chapters in this 
collection make a similar case.
Why, though, should the BBC display a bias or tilt of this kind, 
if indeed it does so? There are many explanations that amount to 
conspiracy theories of one kind or another, but these all fall foul 
of the basic problem of being untestable and assuming a degree 
of coordination and conscious intention that simply is not re-
vealed by any serious investigation. Moreover, whereas in the US 
most of the studies show the media in that country as having a 
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clear tilt to the liberal rather than the conservative side, the stud-
ies done in the UK are as likely to argue that the BBC has a bias 
to the right as one to the left (Latham 2013; Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 
2012). Not surprisingly, BBC insiders and supporters take this as 
evidence that the BBC is actually broadly neutral or impartial. If 
it is annoying left and right in equal measure, surely it must be 
broadly on the right lines?
However, things are not that straightforward, and the BBC 
does indeed have a clear bias. This, however, is not a matter of a 
leaning towards one side or the other of the political spectrum, 
much less a favouring of one party over another. Instead, the BBC 
has a bias in favour of what is a clear position, but one that is 
going to displease many on both the left and the right (though for 
different reasons, of course). It is also important to realise that 
this bias is as much a matter of sympathy for a certain type or 
style of argument as towards any kind of explicit content; but the 
favouring of that kind of argument will inevitably lead to some 
positions and views being given greater prominence and others 
less. It is also important to realise that having a position that 
upsets in different ways both left and right does not mean that 
it is therefore ‘centrist’ or ‘moderate’. Rather, it is a view of the 
world that is distinctive and, because of the BBC’s reach, very in-
fluential in public discourse. However, it is not simply a product 
of splitting the difference or ‘triangulation’.
Institutional bias and the BBC
The crucial point is that the bias of the BBC is an institutional or 
systemic bias. That is, it derives from the nature of the institution, 
its basic procedures and the composition of its staff, rather than 
from overt policy or political views, however strongly held. To 
some extent, it derives from the nature of television as a medium 
and is therefore shared with other broadcasters everywhere. 
But it also derives primarily from a number of factors that are 
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peculiar to the BBC. Some of these can be changed by reform 
or managerial decisions, but others cannot, unless the BBC be-
comes a fundamentally different kind of institution from the one 
that it now is. 
The concept of institutional bias is one that comes originally 
from organisational theory: in other words, from management 
studies (for an economist’s use of the concept in a wider context, 
see Eterovic 2011). Much of the work is actually concerned with 
the various undesirable results this can have in business, such 
as bullying or poor service delivery. Institutional bias is the way 
that a process or institution always tends to produce a certain 
pattern of outcome in a given area, despite there being no con-
scious or deliberate intention to do so. In fact, there may even be 
a conscious effort to not produce the biased outcome. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Communication defines the phenomenon as (Chan-
dler and Munday 2011):
a tendency for the procedures and practices of particular insti-
tutions to operate in ways which result in certain social groups 
being advantaged or favoured and others being disadvantaged 
or devalued. This need not be the result of any conscious preju-
dice or discrimination but rather of the majority simply follow-
ing existing rules or norms.
As the entry goes on to state, the commonest use of the con-
cept is to explain structural disadvantages faced by ethnic or 
religious groups or a particular sex (which can be men as often 
as women). Here, we can use the notion to explain why certain 
kinds of ideological persuasion and also certain identifiable 
social groups will face disadvantage in terms of their views and 
circumstances being slighted, ignored or even misrepresented 
by the BBC. Interestingly, this analysis has some similarities 
with the so-called propaganda model of US media developed by 
Chomsky and Herman, although in this case it does not generate 
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the policy conclusions that they draw (Chomsky and Herman 
2002).
The argument is that, as the kind of institution it is now, the 
BBC has an institutional bias towards a certain kind of pro-
gramme content and presentation, regardless of the views of its 
staff. The procedures and structures of the BBC lead to a certain 
way of thinking that permeates current affairs and also much 
of the cultural and artistic output of the organisation. There is 
a predominant outlook and content that can be described in 
various ways. Sympathetic observers might use terms such as 
‘sensible’, ‘middle of the road’, ‘respectable’, ‘centrist’ or ‘mod-
erate’. Less friendly accounts might use terms such as ‘elitist’, 
‘metropolitan’, ‘managerialist’ or ‘conventional’. What we have 
is a passionate commitment to a received wisdom, rather than 
a tilt to the left or right in any commonly understood sense of 
those terms. But whose received wisdom, and how does this 
arise?
Shared values of BBC staff
The initial factor is the very narrow and restricted background of 
BBC staff, both of presenters and producers. The proportion who 
are privately educated (and, by extension, upper-middle class) is 
several times the national average (Milburn 2014). Generally, they 
come from professional backgrounds rather than commerce or 
business, much less from working-class households. Much of the 
critical comment on the narrow base from which the BBC draws 
its senior staff emphasises the lack of ethnic or gender diversity; 
but, while there is undoubtedly something to this, it is swamped 
by the social origins phenomenon. The women and ethnic mi-
norities who do work for the BBC in roles such as producer, pre-
senter and senior manager are also likely to come from the same 
kind of educational and social background as their white, male 
colleagues.
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What this naturally leads to is a common shared set of beliefs 
and attitudes, deriving from common or shared experience. In 
a very real sense, the conventional wisdom referred to earlier is 
the shared outlook of a specific social group or formation. The 
problem, of course, is that, in the absence of challenges or dissent 
from people from a different background, all kinds of beliefs re-
main unquestioned, with the status of ‘obvious truth’ or ‘common 
sense’ attached to them. These kinds of unexamined assumptions 
exist at the level of general principles rather than particular issues. 
Examples might be that it is always good to help the less fortunate, 
or that most social problems should be understood as having 
structural causes rather than being explicable through individual 
agency and action, or that business activity is a zero-sum game. 
Moreover, once a particular set of attitudes becomes widely shared 
within any organisation, it tends to attract people who share them, 
and so the situation becomes self-perpetuating and reinforcing. As 
managers in companies all over the world have discovered, chang-
ing the culture of an organisation once it has become established 
is extremely difficult (Denning 2011).
Given both the shared social background of so many staff 
and the common economic interests that they have by virtue 
of working for an organisation with the specific status and pos-
ition of the BBC, there is actually a case for seeing the shared 
outlook and attitudes as an ideology in the strict sense of the 
word. In other words, BBC employees form a structured way of 
perceiving the world that appears to be neutral and objective 
to those who have it, but which in fact incorporates various 
self-interested presumptions and helps to justify them. In this 
case, the ideology in question is that of the professional and 
managerial class, which places a high value on expertise and 
the ability of qualified people to both understand and direct 
complex social processes. This comes with the corollary that 
undesirable social phenomena are ‘problems’ that can be re-
solved, given the correct insight and actions (Harold Perkin 
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(1990), who identified this particular set of beliefs, preferred 
to use the term ‘class ideal’, which conveys the same idea but 
without the baggage of the term ideology).
Public service role and institutional bias
However, this kind of sociological explanation is not enough and 
makes the problem appear less intractable than it actually is. The 
implication is that, with enough change in recruitment at the 
level of senior management, a cultural revolution in assumptions 
and attitudes might be brought about. In reality, the nature of 
the BBC since its foundation in terms of its structures and fund-
ing and mission mean that anyone working there will be led to 
advance a particular way of thinking, even if inadvertently and 
against their desires.
The first and basic problem is the very concept of a public ser-
vice broadcaster. This assumes that, left to itself, a purely private 
television and radio broadcaster will not produce certain kinds 
of service that are thought to be essential or highly valuable (by a 
cultural elite at least). This can be presented as a ‘market failure’, 
but the underlying presumption is more than that. It is that, in 
the absence of a broadcaster with a non-market-driven funding 
base, there will not be enough popular demand for programmes 
of the ‘requisite quality’. In particular, there will not be enough 
high-quality news and current affairs, because neither the view-
ing public nor private actors such as investors and advertisers 
want them enough or have an incentive to provide them. In other 
words, there is a structural failure of public taste and sentiment 
and of private provision. This means that an idea of elevating the 
public consciousness and guiding it, rather than reflecting and 
articulating it and perhaps helping it to develop, is central to the 
mission and purpose of the BBC. Despite what is often said, this 
remains the case, even if the idea of what it means to elevate has 
changed since Reith’s day.
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one solution to this supposed problem, adopted in many 
countries, is to have the government ultimately decide what kind 
of elevating programming a state-funded broadcaster should 
put out. For good and obvious reasons, this option was not taken, 
and instead the model of the licence fee was used. There is still, 
though, the underlying idea of an educative and enlightening 
mission, and the content of that has to come from somewhere. By 
default, it comes from what we may call the media class, which 
in turn is a part of the professional and managerial class. So, the 
BBC becomes in itself the institution that gives an imprimatur to 
certain kinds of ideas, beliefs and views. The whole production 
and presentation process will be subtly shaped by the belief that 
what is being done is not simply the delivery of a product but an 
educational act. 
It is important to note that this is the case regardless of 
whether the motivation is broadly conservative or subversive. 
In the first case, the elevating process is that of articulating and 
sharing established knowledge and wisdom; in the second, it is 
to debunk and criticise that wisdom or the beliefs of a part of the 
public. In both cases, however, the intention is to improve and 
elevate the understanding of viewers and listeners by revealing 
what is believed to be objective truth in the first case and ex-
posing what can objectively be described as error in the second. 
What is almost never subject to criticism is the internal received 
wisdom of the institution.
At the same time, the internal culture is not unchanging. 
What is clear from studies is that it lags behind changes of belief 
about certain matters in the worlds of politics and culture more 
generally. This redounds against both left and right at different 
times. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s, the BBC was still supportive 
of the ideas of the post-war consensus, while today it still adheres 
to the ideas of the Blair years and, in many ways, the Thatcher and 
Major period. This enrages both conservatives of a certain kind 
and many leftists. As a conservative institution that adheres to a 
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conventional wisdom, the BBC is typically slightly behind wider 
developments rather than leading them.
The problem of state funding
This is exacerbated by another structural feature of the BBC, 
which is the way its income source periodically puts it in a highly 
vulnerable position. Each time the licence fee comes up for re-
newal, the inevitable and institutionalised incentive is to tack 
towards the concerns of the government of the day. The political 
class in turn (or at least that part of it that is currently enjoying 
the emoluments of power) will take this opportunity to push the 
BBC in a direction that they find more pleasing. The result is a 
regular focus on issues that concern the political class rather 
than on, or to the exclusion of, issues that agitate many of the 
public, but which the politicians are broadly agreed upon. The 
result, again, is to consolidate a received wisdom: in this case, 
whatever political consensus there may be around certain issues. 
This effect is especially powerful when the political consensus 
coincides with the internal outlook of the organisation. Sur-
prisingly, given the discussion around this topic, the BBC would 
enjoy much more independence if it were to move to a subscrip-
tion-based funding model.
The result is that, while there will be debate and discussion 
around issues on which the political class is divided (but shaped 
and limited by the kinds of unexamined assumptions mentioned 
earlier), there will be either no discussion of issues on which there 
is a consensus, or the view will be overwhelmingly one-sided. 
Two examples of this are immigration, where, until very recently, 
a whole range of views were either dismissed or not given atten-
tion, and foreign and defence policy. Here, sceptical and critical 
views of those policy areas from both the radical left and dissi-
dent right are again either ignored or presented, not so subtly, as 
extreme and, therefore, not worth consideration.
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The BBC, ‘conventional wisdom’ and the problem of 
nuanced views
This, in turn, raises another structural feature of the BBC that, in 
practice, leads to its output presenting a particular kind of conven-
tional wisdom. This is the whole idea that in its news and current 
affairs coverage (but also in its business and financial reporting) it 
should aim for balance or neutrality in areas where there are clear 
debates. The obvious trap set by this approach is that of treating 
ludicrous or marginal ideas on the same footing as well-established 
and respectable ones. This is indeed a problem in the US, satirised 
in the spoof headline ‘Shape of the world: views differ’. However, the 
BBC has definitely avoided that kind of blunder. Thinking about it, 
however, reveals the more profound problems raised by the whole 
idea of neutrality or impartiality in current affairs broadcasting. 
one difficulty is that of deciding which views count as marginal 
and which ones count as mainstream – sometimes this is clear, 
but often it is not. Even more troubling is the challenge of having a 
schema by which you can put different perspectives in a position 
relative to each other – if you cannot do this, then the whole idea of 
neutrality becomes moot. 
This particular problem is made worse by an inherent feature 
of television as a medium (less so radio), which is that it has great 
difficulty dealing with debates in anything other than a binary 
opposition between two opposed sets of views. Multiple or over-
lapping views and positions, which is what we find in the real 
world, are very hard to physically present in a visual mode.1 The 
1 An example of this occurred when the editor was regularly invited to participate 
in BBC programmes following the Primark building collapse in Bangladesh. The 
IEA was frequently contacted to put forward in debate the view that companies 
had no moral or economic responsibilities towards their workers, and that this pos-
ition was in the long-run best interests of the workers. The line that companies had 
certain moral responsibilities, but that there should not be government regulation 
in this area (in fact, there was already regulation, as it happens), was too nuanced. 
Assuming that the BBC found commentators, they would have been presented as 
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solution to the problem of knowing how to locate different views 
relative to each other, and therefore of how to strike a balance be-
tween them, is probably insoluble. The naïve view is that this can 
be done in two ways, either by splitting the difference between 
two views or by adopting a neutral standpoint that judges the 
competing positions from the outside.
Neither of these will work. The first produces an intellectual 
position that is usually incoherent and feeble. It will also lead 
to the position being pulled in one ‘direction’ or another on the 
arbitrary binary scale as the overton Window shifts. The second 
has a basic philosophical problem: the supposed neutral or inde-
pendent position cannot be an empty one; it has to be a substan-
tive position of its own, because otherwise there is no basis on 
which to locate the competing views relative to each other. What 
happens in reality is the formation of a particular position, which 
will by default be the conventional wisdom at the time of either 
the internal culture or the political consensus, or both. That this 
is not a morally neutral position is shown by the language used 
to describe this revealed wisdom or centre of gravity: terms such 
as ‘moderate’ or ‘respectable’, as compared with ‘extreme’, ‘unre-
spectable’ or even (worst of all) ‘populist’. A moment of thought 
will show the difficulty with this. Is it good to be ‘moderately’ ra-
ther than ‘extremely’ correct? Is the fact that an idea is accepted 
and widely shared proof of its validity? The answer appears to be 
yes when the ideas are held by some kinds of people, but not when 
they are held by others.
There are two further features that contribute to the institu-
tional bias in favour of a kind of conventional wisdom, both of 
which were always present but have become more pronounced 
recently. The first is the deliberate severing of the BBC as a na-
tional institution from particular political or social groups or 
one side believing in government regulation and moral restraint, and the other side 
believing in free markets, the absence of regulation and that companies and indi-
viduals have no moral obligations.
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localities. Again, this means that, in reality, the organisation will 
come to establish procedures that privilege the perspective of a 
certain locality and group, which in this case is the metropolitan 
professional middle class (Scotland and Northern Ireland are a 
qualified exception to this). Another is the dependency of the 
BBC on news releases and information given to them by govern-
ment and large organisations. This was always the case, but it has 
become much more marked with the advent of the 24-hour news 
cycle. The interesting reality, though, is that it has not affected 
commercial broadcasters in the same way. The reason, again, is 
the different incentives created by different funding models, and 
the different relationship with the state and the political class.
Conclusion
The reality is that the BBC does indeed have a bias, but this is 
not as simple as a bias to one side or the other of a one-dimen-
sional political spectrum (indeed, it is thinking of political views 
in this way that is part of the problem). Rather, the composition 
of the BBC’s staff and its internal culture, when combined with 
certain structural features of the BBC as an institution, mean 
that the processes of commissioning, production, delivery and 
presentation will always tend to produce an output with a par-
ticular kind of quality. There is a commitment to and focus on 
a received or conventional wisdom that is not the settled view 
of the population as a whole (to the very small extent that such 
a thing ever exists); it is not even the view of a real and definite 
‘establishment’, but rather a way of thinking about politics, soci-
ety and the world that is the inevitable result of the constraints 
imposed by the nature and mission of the BBC. It is also partly 
produced by the world-view of the kind of person who chooses 
to work at the BBC, combined with the consensual views of the 
political class, which has come to have an ever-closer connection 
to all the mass media.
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This means that certain views are marginalised and either 
misrepresented or even ignored. It is not a straightforward 
matter of either left or right views being treated in this way. 
Rather, all views that are not in the conventional wisdom 
are slighted, even if they are widely held among the public. 
Examples from the right would be support for radical reform 
of the welfare system or the NHS; from the left, it could be the 
popularity of public ownership of utilities. In the extreme case 
of foreign policy and defence, there is actually very little scope 
for departure from a narrow range of positions – the sound 
and fury of arguments over details should not obscure this. 
Certain views are clearly represented as being uninformed or 
exotic, such as scepticism about man-made climate change, 
hostility to immigration or doubts about the benefits of formal 
education. Sometimes this judgement may be true, but to sim-
ply ignore and disregard a view is actually counterproductive 
if your aim is to inform.
In addition, there is an intensification of the structural ten-
dency of the modern media to see political and intellectual divi-
sions in binary terms. This leads to many perspectives being sim-
ply ignored or misrepresented. In the last 30 years, for example, 
it has become part of the conventional BBC view that opposition 
to the EU is definitively located on the right. This means that the 
continuing and at one time prominent socialist critique of the 
EU is simply not represented. on the other side, opposition to 
immigration is thought to be associated with other views con-
ventionally placed on the right, so that left-wing opposition to la-
bour migration is airbrushed out, despite being common among 
many Labour voters. At the same time, the strong support of 
most free-market advocates for freer immigration is ignored and 
glossed over. In other words, the very existence of certain kinds 
of combinations of views is simply ruled out, and they are not 
even considered, despite being perfectly coherent intellectually 
and widely held.
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Changes in personnel and management will have some effect. 
However, as long as the BBC continues as a broadcaster with a 
peculiar status as a national institution, with a non-voluntary 
funding model, an explicit dedication to a particular conception 
of PSB and a statutory requirement to show balance, there will 
always be a bias in the very nature of the institution and its pro-
cesses that, when combined with its staff profile, will produce a 
passionate commitment to a specific kind of style and world-view. 
This will be one that is seen by its adherents as simply obvious 
common sense, while a whole range of other positions do not find 
full expression and are neither articulated nor challenged.
As has been noted – in this chapter and the previous one – 
other forms of institutional framework will bring other biases. 
Given the fact that different institutions have different forms of 
bias, perhaps the best approach is to allow a process of competi-
tion to develop. This could involve the commercial and non-com-
mercial production of broadcasting services, as long as they were 
funded on a voluntary basis. It is not the bias of the BBC that 
is the problem as such. The problem is the bias combined with 
the institution’s market power (especially in news provision), its 
non-voluntary funding method and its closeness to the political 
process.
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5 PRIVATISING THE BBC1
Tim Congdon
Setting the scene
Time and technology wait for no organisation, no matter how re-
vered. The next few months will see continuing lively public dis-
cussion over the future of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
with the current Royal Charter due to run out at the end of 2016. 
The early talk was of an extension of the licence fee for a further 
decade to 2026, as well as of possible reductions in its value and 
certainly of freezing it in real terms. According to an ICM poll in 
the Sunday Telegraph on 3 November 2013, 70 per cent of voters 
believed that the licence fee should be abolished or cut. Another 
poll in July 2014, commissioned by the Whitehouse Consultancy 
of media analysts, found that 51 per cent of the public would sup-
port the idea of abolishing the licence fee and making the BBC 
fund itself (Ross 2014). on this basis, the British public was pre-
pared for radical change in their nation’s broadcasting. 
The latest news (as of March 2016) is that no radical change 
is to be expected for at least another decade. Newspapers report 
that a deal has been done between George osborne, the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer, and Lord Hall, the BBC’s Director General. 
In the next licensing round, the BBC will have the bear the cost 
1 This chapter is summarised from the ebook Privatise the BBC (2014), published 
by Standpoint, London, UK; it also uses material from articles published by the 
author in Standpoint. The IEA is grateful to Standpoint for permission to adapt and 
republish.
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of free TV licences for those over 75 years old. (Previously, the 
government had fully compensated the BBC for the lost revenue.) 
The implied dent to the BBC’s revenues, expected to reach £745 
million in 2020/21, is substantial. It would amount to perhaps a 
fifth of the licence fee income it would otherwise have expected. 
Nevertheless, under the terms of the osborne–Hall deal, the li-
cence fee is to continue, at least for the decade to 2026. Indeed, 
the government is apparently concerned with protecting the ‘tax 
base’ on which the licence fee is levied, while its value is to rise 
with inflation. Significantly, it wants people who watch recorded 
programmes on the BBC’s iPlayer to become liable for the licence 
fee, in contrast to the present situation in which the licence fee is 
payable only for the viewing of live productions.2 However, other 
reports have it that the review process for the Royal Charter is 
continuing, with many aspects of the BBC’s future funding and 
remit still undecided.3
Lord Patten, the former chairman of the BBC Trust (which 
has been scrapped), described the osborne–Hall deal as ‘quick 
and dirty’, and ‘awful’. Does the osborne–Hall deal in fact define 
the government’s ultimate position? If so, a fair verdict would be 
that the government has decided to ignore the case for a big and 
serious debate about the position of public sector broadcasting 
in a modern liberal democracy such as Britain. Arguably, a major 
opportunity would have been lost. In February 2014, Nick Ross, 
the former presenter of the BBC Crimewatch programme, warned 
that support for the BBC could ‘fall off a cliff’ if it did not prepare 
to ditch the licence fee. He claimed, paradoxically, that he was 
urging change because he treasured the BBC and wanted to se-
cure its long-run future.4
2 Nick Higham, ‘What will happen if BBC funds free licences?’ 5 July 2015. ‘News’ sec-
tion on www.bbc.co.uk.
3 Alexi Mostrous, ‘Embattled BBC faces curbs on website and reality shows.’ Times, 
13 July 2015.
4 Nicholas Hellen, ‘Star tells BBC to axe licence fee.’ Sunday Times, 2 February 2014.
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Ahead of the 2015 general election, no political party showed 
any inclination for root-and-branch reform. Most politicians 
involved in the drab and often bad-tempered debate about the 
structure of broadcasting tended to take for granted both the 
survival of the licence fee in some form and the BBC’s status as 
a nationalised organisation. Prime Minister David Cameron is 
reported to have said that, while the BBC ‘should be independ-
ent of government’, it ‘should not be privatised’ (Scadding 2014: 
294). It is worth noting also that proposals to privatise Channel 4, 
apparently supported by Conservative ministers in the 2010–15 
coalition, were blocked by Vince Cable, their Liberal Democrat 
colleague, who was Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills. Now that the Conservatives are in power and uncon-
strained by the Liberal Democrats, the privatisation of Channel 4 
is again said to be under review. 
The discussion in this chapter predates the osborne–Hall deal 
and is developed almost as if it had not been done.5 The main 
points are that the licence fee is now obsolete as well as unpopular, 
and that the ending of the licence fee would necessitate radical 
upheaval, both for the BBC and the structure of British broadcast-
ing. With the licence fee scrapped and no alternative system of 
state funding put in its place, the BBC could not have remained 
in public ownership. The recommendation here is that it should 
then have been privatised, so that it could compete more freely 
with the global media giants that are now emerging. Without the 
licence fee, the BBC could flourish in the long run only with the 
revenue sources and management autonomy found in the large 
private sector media businesses of today. over the decade from 
2016, the osborne–Hall deal appears to preclude a major upheaval 
of the sort recommended in these pages. However, the argument 
remains relevant over the longer term. (It is noteworthy that many 
5 I presented the arguments that the licence fee should be scrapped and the BBC pri-
vatised in an article in the December 2013 issue of Standpoint magazine, ‘Scrap the 
licence fee and privatise the BBC’.
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of the media reports on the perhaps disjointed official response to 
the current licence review hint at its eventual abolition.6)
The argument splits into two parts. one is concerned with 
the licence fee and the other with privatisation. Despite this sep-
aration, the two parts are logically related. In theory, licence fee 
money could be ladled out to a number of private, profit-seeking 
media companies ‘on merit’ by a committee of the great and the 
good, rather like the Arts Council. But, in practice, that would 
almost certainly result in huge and unacceptable controversy. 
Complaints would come both from international competitors, 
angered by the subsidies given to purely British entities, and from 
British-owned or British-managed companies rejected or snubbed 
by the committee. Meanwhile, not even in theory, let alone in any 
vaguely plausible real-world context, could the BBC be privatised 
if its dominant source of income were a state subsidy. The two pro-
posals being made here are to be seen as inseparable twins. 
The case for ending the licence fee
The case for ending the licence fee is presented by other authors 
in this book, and only aspects of it are developed in this chapter. 
In summary, the case has two main strands. Firstly, the advance 
of technology has destroyed the original and valid justification 
for the licence fee when it was introduced in 1946. Secondly, the 
method of collection is not just expensive and inefficient but has 
also become harmful in its wider effects. 
Spectrum scarcity once made TV the classic ‘public good’
In the early days of television in the 1940s, technology imposed 
tight constraints. The transmission of programmes ‘over the air’ 
6 This is true, for example, of the Alexi Mostrous story in the Times on 13 July 2015, 
which mentioned an imminent green paper that would ‘open the door for the even-
tual replacement of the licence fee, possibly after 2026’.
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from land-based masts and towers was limited by a shortage of 
spectrum. only one channel was readily feasible. Further, if pro-
grammes were broadcast free to air from the masts, any house-
hold with a TV set could watch. Pay-per-view and subscription 
for a particular channel were impossible. 
Although payment could have been by advertising, the post-
war Attlee government was hostile towards capitalism, consum-
erism and marketing jingles. The extent of the contemporary 
hostility to advertising is illustrated by The Economic System in 
a Socialist State by Robert Hall (1937). The author of this book 
believed that a society could be designed in which ‘competitive 
advertising’ could be abolished and only informative advertis-
ing would remain. He further thought that ‘for this purpose a 
department of propaganda would be sufficient’. To later gener-
ations, who have read George orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm, 
Hall’s views may sound sinister, even outlandish. But he was not 
a maverick. on the contrary, he was appointed chief economic 
adviser to the British government in 1947 and stayed in that pos-
ition until 1961, later becoming Lord Roberthall. 
With payment by advertising proscribed, any broadcasting 
organisation depended on the state for funding. of course, a state 
broadcaster could have been financed from taxation, but there 
were fears that a politically motivated administration might 
withhold money from a broadcaster critical of government ac-
tions. The BBC had therefore to be funded by a mechanism that 
enabled it to resist political pressure. The introduction in 1946 of 
the BBC licence fee for television was almost inevitable, given the 
political and technological setting. (It should be noted that a BBC 
licence fee for radio had set the precedent since 1926. The radio 
licence fee survived until 1973, when it was scrapped because the 
collection cost exceeded the amount raised.7)
7 The problem of paying for the BBC’s radio output is a nuisance for the analysis in 
this essay, as was pointed out by Anthony Fry in a letter in the January/February 
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Rigorous intellectual support was soon to emerge. Paul 
 Samuel son (1954), the Nobel Prize–winning American econo-
mist, advanced the concept of  ‘public goods’ or ‘collective con-
sumption goods’ in a classic paper, which demonstrated that 
such goods had to be financed by a government levy of some kind 
and could not be left to the market. A public good was distinctive 
in being ‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rivalrous’, meaning that indi-
viduals could not be effectively excluded from use of the good, 
and that use by one individual would not reduce its availability 
to others. Television fitted this model at the time. 
In the decade or so from 1945, the BBC had extraordinary 
prestige, not least because of its reporting during World War II. 
Moreover, with the UK still accounting for over 5 per  cent of 
world output, this state-owned monopoly was a vast broadcast-
ing business by international standards. The BBC may not have 
been part of the British constitution, but it was undoubtedly a 
technological leader and a ‘national champion’. 
However, its special status was already being undermined. 
Spectrum scarcity – the original basis for monopoly – was 
being overcome by technical advances. In 1954, the Con-
servative government under Winston Churchill passed the 
Television Act, which allowed independent broadcasting fi-
nanced by advertising to compete with the BBC. For the next 
20 years, British broadcasting was a highly regulated duopoly 
of the BBC and the  profit-hungry (and indeed very profitable) 
‘independent’ television companies. Advertising continued to 
be demonised by left-wing commentators, and as long as ad-
vertising was the only other way to finance broadcasting, the 
licence fee was safe. 
2014 issue of Standpoint, in response to the author’s essay on the BBC in the Decem-
ber 2013 issue. If BBC radio is regarded as somehow sacrosanct and to be preserved 
for all time without a market-based funding mechanism (i.e. without advertising), 
a subvention from the government’s tax revenue may be unavoidable.
I N Fo C US: T H E CA SE FoR PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC
120
Satellite-based broadcasting: a disruptive technology 
By the 1980s, satellites with programme transmitting capability 
could be launched into space, promising a new world of satel-
lite-based broadcasting. At first, two businesses were envisaged: 
Sky Television and British Satellite Broadcasting. (Sky Tele-
vision, which had been created in 1978, was bought by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation in 1983; see Horsman (1997: xi).) 
As both companies faced years of losses, they merged in 1990 to 
form BSkyB and make their plans more viable. The hope of the 
investors behind BSkyB was that viewers would pay for TV chan-
nels by subscription, usually on a monthly basis. Payment could 
now be related to the reception of a particular media output, 
with non-payers receiving nothing. That ended the problem of 
non-excludability that had been so important in the case for the 
licence fee 40 years earlier. 
Murdoch and his associates had embarked on an ambitious 
long-term gamble, even if it was one that secured strong back-
ing from the UK’s big institutional investors. Ironically, BSkyB’s 
investors became involved in this forward-looking and risky ven-
ture just as left-of-centre economists started to criticise the City 
of London for the alleged ‘short-termism’ of its time horizons and 
the supposed caution of its decision-taking.8
BSkyB initially made losses but, for the last decade, BSkyB 
has operated in the black, with annual profits reaching over 
£1 billion for the first time in 2011. As Figure 8 and Table 4 show, 
Murdoch and his backers brought about a huge change in how 
television was financed, produced and experienced by viewers. 
In November 2014 BSkyB acquired Sky Italia and a majority 
stake in Sky Deutschland, and the whole business is now known 
simply as Sky.
8 The usual reference here is to Hutton (1996).
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Is the BBC still dominant?
Rob Wilson, Conservative MP for Reading East, has used the 
word ‘dominance’ to characterise the BBC’s position in news and 
current affairs broadcasting. Many analysts continue to see the 
BBC as dominant with an entrenched, almost unassailable pos-
ition on the UK media scene. Perhaps even more attention grab-
bing than Wilson’s observation was a statement by Harriet Har-
man, as the Shadow Deputy Prime Minister, at the oxford Media 
Convention in 2013, that, ‘The sheer scale of the BBC – the world’s 
biggest broadcasting organisation – means that it is able to be, 
and is, a massive centre of gravity for our creative industries.’ 
The actual position is far more even-handed and complex, 
and far less comforting for the BBC’s cheerleaders. The BBC is 
certainly not the world’s biggest broadcasting organisation. As 
the growing unpopularity of the licence fee has constrained the 
Figure 8 The financing of British television today (£ billion revenues)
Public funding for TV is less than the total licence fee, as this also pays for BBC radio 
and other services. Source: Ofcom (2015)
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BBC’s revenues, TV advertising spend is now about the same 
size as the total money collected by the licence fee, and well 
above the portion of this money devoted to television. But the 
truly spectacular development of the last few years is that both 
total advertising spend and the licence fee money have been sur-
passed by BSkyB/Sky’s subscription revenue. As BSkyB/Sky also 
picks up advertising revenue on its channels, its annual income 
is well above that of the BBC. In their last complete years – to 31 
March 2015 for the BBC, and to 30 June 2015 for BSkyB/Sky – the 
BBC’s income was £4.8 billion, of which £3.7 billion came from 
the licence fee, while BSkyB/Sky’s was £9.9 billion. About 20 per 
cent of Sky’s income came from its new European acquisitions, 
leaving its UK revenues – of which over 80 per cent came from 
Table 4 UK television industry metrics
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total TV industry revenue (£ billion) 11.1 11.8 12.4 12.5 12.8 13.2
Proportion of revenue generated by 
public funds (%)  23  22  21  21  20  21
Proportion of revenue generated by 
advertising (%)  28  30  29  28  29  29
Proportion of revenue generated by 
subscriptions (%)  42  43  44  44  46  45
Spend on originated output by five 
main networks (£ billion) 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6
Digital TV take-up (% all households)  88  92  94  96  95  93
Percentage of DTV homes with pay 
satellite or cable  53  56  51  51  52  51
Minutes spent watching TV per day 
(per person aged 4+) 225 242 242 241 232 220
% share of the main five channels in 
all homes  58  56  54  52  51  51
Number of channels broadcasting in 
the UK 490 510 515 529 527 536
Source: Ofcom (2015)
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subscriptions – at £7.8 billion. BSkyB/Sky has therefore overtaken 
the BBC in terms of market presence, and the BBC has ceased to 
be dominant, even in Britain itself (see Figure 9). The BBC does 
have an international arm, BBC Worldwide Ltd, with an avowed-
ly commercial remit, but its sales are small compared with Time 
Warner, CBS, the Hearst Corporation, Murdoch’s US-based firms 
including 21st Century Fox and Google. BBC Worldwide’s rev-
enues fell in the year to June 2015, even though the global media 
market continued to expand.
So, British broadcasting today is utterly different from the 
situation in 1946, when the licence fee began and the BBC en-
joyed both massive global prestige and a monopoly position in 
its home market. on the face of it, three forms of payment are 
jostling with each other in the UK television market, namely the 
semi-tax licence fee money exclusively for the BBC, and advertis-
ing spend and subscription revenues for the other two types of 
participant. No participant is paramount, but in simple money 
terms Sky is now clearly in the lead. Just after World War II, UK 
Figure 9 Is the BBC already an underdog?
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broadcasting epitomised the Samuelson concept of a public good. 
For a long time, it was a regulated duopoly; for some years now, it 
has been a confusing oligopoly, with a mix of public and private 
ownership. Even if technology could somehow be stabilised for 
all time, the original case for the licence fee would have to be 
reformulated. The private sector businesses, led by Sky and ITV 
(much the largest of the remaining ‘independent’ companies), 
have carved out strong market positions. But they have done so 
only after taking great commercial risks and defying the blatant 
government subsidy given to the original state-owned industry 
leader. 
But technology cannot be stabilised for all time. on the con-
trary, new payment structures and transmission arrangements 
are being conceived every few months. Such is the degree of flux 
at present that no one can give reliable long-term forecasts of 
the relative importance of different transmission and payment 
mechanisms. Sky, ITV and every other shareholder-owned media 
organisation in Britain faces intense competition, not only from 
other such organisations with a known commitment to a par-
ticular technology, but also from new organisations with dis-
tinctive and unexpected technologies. Transmission by means of 
cable has been available for a long time. But the most exciting of 
the new technologies is Internet or online broadcasting, and the 
most menacing of the new competitors are the telephone compa-
nies, which own the transmission capability (the copper wires or 
mobile frequencies), and Internet search engines such as Google. 
Internet broadcasting: another disruptive technology 
Telecommunications (telco) companies have a major inbuilt 
advantage with Internet broadcasting. Because they own the 
equipment that transmits Internet material, including streamed 
programming, they know the identities of the people and com-
panies who benefit from that equipment. It is a relatively simple 
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matter for them to add TV programming to the telephone pack-
age and to charge for the extra services. Plainly, when British 
Telecom, or indeed any telecommunications business, charges 
telephone users a subscription fee for broadcast material on top 
of the phone bill, it enters the subscription television business. 
It does so with no need to launch satellites or to lay extra cable 
underground. on 11 November 2013, British Telecom announced 
that it had bought the rights to screen 350 top football matches, 
in order that its telephone customers would watch them. The 
threat to BSkyB’s business model was so obvious and disruptive 
that its share price fell almost 10 per cent within minutes of the 
announcement. Initially, British Telecom’s return from its sports 
broadcasting came from a mixture of advertising revenue and 
a higher retention rate of its broadband customers. But now it 
would attack BSkyB/Sky’s subscription model directly. A big 
competitive battle had started.
Not that BSkyB/Sky can have been surprised by British Tel-
ecom’s invasion of its turf. For some years, it has wanted to per-
suade its TV subscription customers to choose BSkyB/Sky for 
telephone services as well. Both BSkyB/Sky and British Telecom 
are seeking to market not just broadcasting options but the so-
called triple play of television, broadband and telephony. 
However, a key point must be noticed. The Internet now has 
other, quite well-established ways of charging ‘viewers’. All pro-
viders of content via the Internet, and not just British Telecom 
or another telco, can restrict access to their material by using 
widely available software. They can then allow viewing of the 
material only to people who pay. The Internet therefore becomes 
the vehicle not so much for broadcasting as for ‘narrowcasting’, 
understood as the channelling of specialised content to a well- 
defined and limited market. Technology is advancing so quickly 
that the narrowcast material no longer has to be pre- recorded; 
it can be live and sent out in real time. So, the big broadcasters 
are competing not only among themselves but also with a range 
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of Internet-based rivals (bloggers selling advertising space, porn 
websites charging subscriptions, antique price comparison web-
sites financed by auctioneers, hobby association websites with 
access included in a membership fee, classic film or music web-
sites with a pay-per-download system and so on). 
In short, ‘broadcasting’ may ultimately cease to exist as a 
distinct and definable category subject to specific and targeted 
regulation. Performances of all sorts are conveyed to customers 
by an assortment of technologies and financed by a number of 
payment arrangements. Nowadays, broadcasting as such is in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish from interpersonal communi-
cation in general, and television and radio programmes are no 
longer a public good in the Samuelson sense. The original case for 
the licence fee is dead. 
The BBC in the digital era
What are the implications of these unleashed market forces for 
the BBC? There have been proposals for some kind of digital en-
hancement to the licence fee to take account of the wide range 
of devices that can receive content.9 However, this has become 
ridiculous for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the miniaturisation associated with the digital revolu-
tion has made it possible to receive broadcasts over small devices, 
such as smartphones and tablets. Incredibly, the Blair govern-
ment decided in the 2004 Communications Regulations that the 
licence fee should be imposed on households with computers 
that might be construed as televisions. Strictly speaking, the 
legal position today is that any device receiving a moving image 
in real time (in other words, which is not being transmitted as a 
9 The most important of these was made in a 1999 committee, chaired by Gavyn 
Davies, on the BBC’s financing in the digital era. The author debated the issues with 
Davies in an article, ‘Does “new media” make the licence fee redundant?’, in the 
April 2000 issue of Prospect magazine.
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recorded version) must pay the licence fee. But no one has advo-
cated that the licence fee be extended to smartphones and tab-
lets, because officialdom would then have to check the reception 
ability of everyone’s mobile phone and indeed landline connec-
tion. The notion of including phones in the licence fee ‘tax base’ is 
clearly untenable. 
The BBC has itself acknowledged that the owners of devices 
using the iPlayer do not at present have to pay the licence fee, but 
the osborne–Hall deal appears to imply that the BBC wants to en-
force licence fee payment on recorded as well as live content. The 
iPlayer exemption was indeed the thin end of a wedge, and it was 
potentially a massive wedge that had been opened up. Surveys of 
viewing habits show that young people in particular watch BBC 
programmes on iPlayer on a ‘time-shifted’ basis. As a result, they 
have access to BBC content, but are not legally obliged to pay the 
licence fee. The larger message is that the distinctions between 
phones, computers and televisions have collapsed, and the no-
tion of a definable tax base for the licence fee has broken down. 
Secondly, broadcasting is being globalised. In the 1950s, 
old-fashioned transmission from masts and towers was specific to 
a particular locality; nowadays, satellites can be positioned for any 
country, and the Internet is in principle wholly international. In 
the new circumstances, broadcasts transmitted from one nation 
can be received in many nations, smudging the borders of the spe-
cific jurisdictions in which a tax or fee can be collected. Further, 
media giants targeting the global market are now emerging, and 
the concept of cross-border ‘trade’ in broadcasting has become a 
reality. In a world of this kind, broadcasting will increasingly be 
subject to the prohibitions on state subsidy found in the World 
Trade organization’s rules, and that means prohibitions on such 
relics of national broadcasting as the BBC licence fee. 
These solvents of the licence fee arrangements exacerbate a 
long-term pre-existing problem. There is widespread evasion 
of payment of the licence fee. The UK has a law that says the 
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non-payment of fines for licence fee evasion is a criminal offence, 
and – as long as that law is on the statute book – it must be en-
forced. However, it is costly to enforce, and a disproportionately 
large amount of magistrates’ time is spent on licence fee cases. 
As a result of the controversy surrounding this, non-payment 
of fines for licence fee evasion now seems certain to be decrim-
inalised in the next renewal of the BBC Charter.10 The eventual 
result will be more non-payment and an erosion of BBC revenue. 
The BBC may react by trying to restrict access to its broadcasts 
by adopting the encryption technologies that have long enabled 
BSkyB to exclude non-payers from watching its output. If so, the 
BBC payment arrangements would, of course, be evolving in a 
market direction. As access would depend to an  ever-greater 
extent on the encryption of content, the BBC would be moving 
towards a subscription model of payment!
Indeed, even a direct grant from government would generate 
significant cost savings. The cost of collecting taxes is much less 
than the cost of collecting the licence fee. Congdon (2014) sug-
gests that treating PSB as part of public expenditure would lead 
to significant savings, perhaps as much as £200 million a year.
Common defences of state funding of broadcasting
National culture
It is often argued that private sector media companies are inter-
ested in profit, not in ‘national culture’, and certainly not in elite 
and highbrow culture. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument 
that the promotion of national culture, particularly in its high-
est forms, is of great benefit to society at large. It then follows 
that only a public sector broadcaster, or perhaps a private sector 
10 Alisdair Glennie, ‘MPs lift threat of jail for licence fee dodgers: BBC stripped of 
powers to bring criminal prosecutions after agreement by three main parties.’ 
Daily Mail, 25 March 2014.
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broadcaster in receipt of state subsidy, can override the profit 
motive and give weight to aesthetic, spiritual or cultural value in 
its programming decisions. 
The weakness of this kind of argument is that it is paternal-
ist. Its validity depends on the premise that an elite knows more 
about what is good for other people than those people do them-
selves. The risk is that paternalism turns into the suppression of 
choice and the denial of free expression. This is perhaps typified 
by the attitude of the first Director General of the BBC, John Reith, 
who stated in the early days of radio that ‘few listeners know what 
they want, and very few want what they need’ (Reith 1924: 34). 
The notion of national culture is controversial, particularly 
in today’s world of increasing multiculturalism and relativism 
of belief. If it is accepted that a nation has a distinctive culture, 
and that the defence of this culture is valid and important, a case 
might be made that a set of institutions is needed to conduct that 
defence.11 When the BBC had a monopoly of the airwaves, there 
may have been some logic in seeing it in Reithian terms as one of 
those institutions. But opinion has shifted. The Peacock Report 
(1986) on the BBC upheld the principle of ‘consumer sovereignty’ 
and implicitly repudiated the Reithian legacy. 
Meanwhile, appeals to the desirability of ‘UK content’, as if 
British creative input were in some way particularly deserving, 
are hollow. A test of the desirability of content already exists, and 
that is the test provided by the market. If the existence of the BBC 
causes British television to be ‘the best in the world’, as is some-
times said, then BBC Worldwide – which can sell BBC output on 
a profit-seeking basis across the globe – ought to be an immense 
success and a spectacularly profitable business. It is nothing of 
the sort. Yes, it has great content to sell to broadcasters in other 
countries and makes a profit. But, no, it is not to be put on a 
11 For clarity, the author does believe that nations have distinctive ‘cultures’, and 
their defence is valid and important. Some of Roger Scruton’s books (2007, 2014) are 
strong and challenging in this area.
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pedestal as if it had far more high-quality content than any of 
its competitors. In truth, BBC Worldwide has struggled against 
much larger American rivals, such as HBo (Home Box office Inc.), 
a subsidiary of Time Warner.12 
Impartiality13
Another argument for state funding again reflects the BBC’s past 
and indeed Britain’s former position as the founder nation in the 
largest empire the world has ever seen. News and current affairs 
broadcasting is always likely to be biased to some degree, reflect-
ing the political beliefs of programme sponsors and makers, and 
their nationality, ideology, religion and so on. Britain’s historical 
achievements gave it a reputation for ‘fair play’ and as a defender 
of the ‘level playing field’. The immediate post-1945 generation, 
in many countries and not just in Britain itself, saw the BBC as 
the champion of impartiality in a fractured and uncertain world. 
By contrast, profit-maximising commercial enterprises had no 
interest in maintaining impartiality in news and current affairs. 
A general argument for state funding was implied: the private 
sector paid no attention to the socially desirable objective of un-
biased news reporting, and a broadcaster with state subsidy was 
required to fill the gap.14
12 The BBC does have an American arm. The BBC has negotiated a deal with a US cable 
TV network, AMC Networks, with AMC perhaps taking an equity stake in BBC 
America. (See ‘Honourable deal can drive BBC’s income from America.’ Times, 1 Au-
gust 2014.) AMC Networks was floated on Nasdaq in 2011 and, at the time of writing, 
had a market capitalisation of over $4 billion. It is a big business by UK standards, 
but it is small in the context of the American media market. (Time Warner’s market 
capitalisation was over $75 billion at the same time.)
13 Editor’s note: This issue is covered in other chapters in this book and is therefore 
only covered in brief here.
14 It is worth noting here that Churchill and Reith did not like each other. As Churchill 
was kept off air during the period he was warning about Nazi appeasement, con-
cerns about bias at the BBC are not new. See Nick Robinson in an article in the Daily 
Telegraph on 4 october 2012, based on his then new book (Robinson 2012).
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The need-for-impartiality rationale for state intervention may 
have had some plausibility in the first or perhaps even the second 
post-war generation. However, the complacency of post-war Brit-
ish society has been disturbed by such issues as immigration, the 
unity of the UK itself (with the 2014 Scottish referendum on in-
dependence) and the role of Islam in a constitutionally Christian 
society. The BBC has had difficulty positioning itself in a nation 
much less relaxed with itself than in the 1950s. As David Elstein 
noted in evidence to a House of Commons committee in January 
2014, ‘for probably 20 or 30 years the BBC have just been too nerv-
ous to deal with the subject [of immigration] directly’.15 
Not only are some topics at risk of being ignored by the BBC, 
but accusations of bias are increasingly being levelled against its 
programming of contentious issues.
The usual criticism of BBC bias is not that it takes a well-de-
fined Anglophile or Anglocentric line (in defence of the British 
nation, its sovereignty, religion and so on), but that it panders to 
political correctness. Even long-term BBC journalists have com-
plained that its news coverage lacks bite and direction because of 
subservience to political correctness. Peter Sissons was a news-
caster poached in 1989 from the independent television sector 
to front BBC programmes. To quote from his memoir When One 
Door Closes (Sissons 2011: 321), 
Bias is too blunt a word to describe the subtleties of the culture 
at TV Centre … The better word for what pervades the BBC is 
mindset … [A]t the core of the BBC, in its very DNA, is a mind-
set, a way of thinking, and an approach to ordering journalistic 
priorities, that is firmly of the left but not defined in any con-
ventional political way. By far the most popular and widely read 
newspapers at the BBC are the Guardian and the Independent, 
15 oral evidence on ‘The Future of the BBC’, given to the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee of the House of Commons on 14 January 2014, HC 949 (London: Station-
ery office), p. 6. See also Ed West (2013).
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and the numbers of these newspapers bought by the BBC seems 
to outnumber all the other newspapers that it provides.
In short, the BBC has ceased to be as open-minded, sceptical and 
neutral in its news and current affairs coverage as both its Royal 
Charter and its past reputation require. To recommend state 
subsidy for the promotion of impartiality assumes that the organ-
isation receiving the subsidy is impartial. As the BBC has become 
vulnerable to bias, it is no longer a fitting recipient of the money. 
Moreover, recent academic research suggests that the best means 
of maintaining diversity in news and public affairs commentary, 
and so of letting people make up their own minds in a healthy lib-
eral and democratic political culture, is competition in supply.16
Final remarks on the licence fee
The argument can now be pulled together. Licence fee money 
finances less than a quarter of the UK’s television output; it is 
less important than advertising revenue and much smaller than 
the subscriptions collected by Sky. In the digital era, and par-
ticularly now that iPhones and Android devices have become 
commonplace, the licence fee no longer has a readily defined tax 
base and is increasingly impractical to collect. (This is true, des-
pite the proposal in the osborne–Hall deal to make BBC iPlayer 
viewers subject to the licence fee.) Moreover, in the run-up to its 
financing review the BBC is being criticised by many politicians 
for bias of one kind or another, and the licence fee does not com-
mand the popular support that it once did. Claims that ‘British 
broadcasting is the best in the world’ or that ‘we must protect the 
BBC’s impartiality’ belong to a different era and do not withstand 
serious critical scrutiny. 
16 The usual reference here is to Professor Matthew Gentzkow of the University of Chi-
cago. See, for example, Gentzgow and Shapiro (2006, 2008).
PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC 
133
The case for the privatisation of the BBC
Let us suppose that the licence fee is scrapped in due course, even 
if the latest indications are that this could be fifteen years away. 
Let us also assume that the demise of state funding of the BBC is 
accepted as necessary, to establish a level playing field between 
competitors in UK media. What, then, is to become of the BBC?
At present the licence fee represents about 70 per cent of the 
BBC’s total income. Unless the BBC is to contract dramatically, 
that money will have to be replaced by a combination of sub-
scription money, advertising revenue and other income-gener-
ating sources. obviously, a transitional period in which the BBC 
receives a government grant is to be expected. Also obviously, 
that government grant would be unfair on Sky, ITV and other 
broadcasting businesses if it were to persist for any length of 
time. In the long run, all of the UK’s broadcasting businesses as 
well as – let us not forget – all of its up-and-coming narrowcast-
ing businesses must compete on the same terms. A state subsidy 
should not be paid to only one organisation. 
Problems within the public sector 
Could the BBC remain in public ownership? Could it be a publicly 
owned entity, subject to market pressures and required to gen-
erate a decent return on capital, and still somehow operate with 
the remit of a ‘public service broadcaster’? In theory, that could 
be envisaged. The UK had several nationalised industries in the 
post-war period, and somehow they operated, produced goods 
and services, sold them, prepared reports and accounts and so 
on. But, over time, considerable disillusionment took hold. The 
1979–97 Conservative governments privatised and deregulated 
most of them and also broke up the monopolies. It speaks vol-
umes that the 1997–2010 Labour government did not reverse the 
privatisations. 
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Consider some of the problems of a BBC operating in the 
marketplace but remaining in the government’s hands. Its na-
tionalised status would make it answerable to the government 
of the day in a financial sense and to Parliament in more general 
terms. Its management would not have the same freedoms – to 
buy and sell other businesses, to hire and fire staff, to expand 
or contract in foreign jurisdictions – as its commercial rivals. 
As a nationalised industry, with an implicit state guarantee on 
its debts, the BBC would seem to have an advantage over its 
privately owned competitors in fundraising. on the face of it, 
it could pay a lower interest rate on its borrowings. In reality, 
one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of nationalisation in the 
30 years to 1979 was that the industries had to obtain approval 
for capital expenditure decisions from the Treasury, leading to 
mistakes of both under-investment (in the case of the railway 
network) and over-investment (in nuclear power, where the 
true costs of decommissioning power stations only became ap-
parent at privatisation). In the twenty-first century, any media 
business has to be able to take capital spending decisions 
quickly, flexibly and with clear management accountability. If 
it were publicly owned and answerable to the Treasury, it could 
not do that.
Tessa Jowell, the Labour politician, has proposed that the BBC 
should become a mutual company, like the Co-op.17 The cooper-
ative ideal may be viable in sectors with easily understood and 
standardised methods of production, such as food retailing and 
life insurance. But the media world is very different, with its stars 
and prima donnas, ratings wars and multiple delivery platforms, 
17 To quote Ms Jowell, ‘It is the public and the licence fee payers who should be in 
the driving seat. So the argument would be the BBC should indeed be owned by 
its licence fee payers. The BBC should become the country’s biggest mutual.’ The 
BBC Trust should be retained and its job would be to act as ‘the cheerleader for the 
licence fee payer’. www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24613224 (accessed 25 January 
25 2016). Jowell’s idea was endorsed by David Miliband, one of the contenders for 
the Labour Party leadership in 2010.
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and unpredictable shifts in taste and technology. No example of 
a successful, mutually owned modern media business can be of-
fered.18 In any case, the Co-op’s own recent travails should warn 
against too much daydreaming about the virtues of employee or 
customer ownership. The wider message cannot be escaped. In 
an industry such as television broadcasting, the notion of a state-
owned business dependent on private revenue sources is almost 
as ludicrous as the licence fee is fast becoming. once the licence 
fee has gone, and once any alternative system of government 
subsidisation is rejected as unfair to its commercial rivals, the 
privatisation of the BBC must follow.
The international dimension: maximising brand value 
For the time being, the conclusions just drawn – that the licence 
fee is finished and that the BBC must be privatised – are not part 
of the established policy consensus. However, the main lines of 
the analysis are so straightforward that they must be familiar 
to the key decision-takers in ofcom, the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport, and the BBC itself. In a speech in the BBC Radio 
Theatre on 8 october 2013, the current director-general, Lord 
Hall, highlighted the corporation’s move into the tablet era by 
praising the BBC’s iPlayer, which was to be ‘reinvented’ in 2014 
and made ‘more bespoke’, so that it would become ‘the best in the 
world’. The BBC’s news audience, then put at 250 million people, 
was to be doubled to 500 million by 2022. Hall applauded ‘the 
UK’s amazing array of arts and science institutions’ and said 
that it would be the BBC’s job ‘to reach new audiences across 
the globe’ for these institutions. The BBC was even apparently 
to move into corporate finance, as in future it would offer ‘risk 
18 The Scott Trust, with its ownership of the Guardian Media Group, comes to mind. 
Both its national newspapers, the Guardian and the Observer, are losing money, and 
they depend for their continued existence on a fund built up from the sale of more 
commercially focused businesses.
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capital to the UK’s creative industries’. In an earlier and also 
striking announcement at the end of August 2013, Hall had eu-
logised Google and California’s Silicon Valley for their speed of 
decision-taking.
All of this may be excellent as interesting kite-flying, except 
that it cannot be reconciled with the BBC in receipt of a state 
subsidy and hamstrung by Royal Charter commitments as a 
public service broadcaster.19 Most fundamentally, any loudly pro-
claimed ambition to be the ‘best in the world’ must be of inter-
est, and perhaps concern, to unsubsidised broadcasters in other 
countries. The UK has a population of 63 million, but Hall’s ambi-
tion is for the BBC’s news audience to be 500 million, and for it to 
project the UK’s ‘arts and science institutions’ to ‘new audiences 
across the globe’. Yet the British government cannot pass laws 
to require licence fee payment from such an international audi-
ence, nor should the government subsidise such activities from 
taxation. Certainly the BBC should not use licence fee money to 
broadcast to the 99 per cent of the world’s population that does 
not pay the licence fee. If the BBC wishes to expand services in 
this way, it will have to do so as a commercial entity.
In practice, once the licence fee has gone, the BBC would need 
the financial independence and management flexibility found in 
the private sector if it were to be a meaningful competitor. In-
deed, an argument can be made that the BBC’s long-run com-
mercial opportunity is massive. The halo over the BBC may have 
diminished in brightness and clarity since the heyday of the late 
1940s and 1950s, but the BBC brand remains unique. It may be 
hyperbole to say that the BBC is the top broadcasting brand in 
the English-speaking world, but it must still be true that the BBC 
19 The author would also like to put on record his dismay that the Lord Hall of the 
october 2013 best-is-yet-to-come barnstorming and kite-flying is the same Lord 
Hall who agreed, in July 2015, to a shabby deal to cut BBC resources by a fifth in 
order to defend the indefensible licence fee.
PR I VAT I SI NG T H E BBC 
137
is a top broadcasting brand in that world.20 According to Andrew 
Scadding, head of public affairs for the BBC since 2003, a Popu-
lus survey of fourteen countries in october 2013 rated ‘BBC one 
highest on quality out of 66 major TV channels’, while BBC Two 
was in third place. Indeed, in his view, internationally ‘the BBC’s 
reputation is undiminished and [it] is a great ambassador for 
Britain abroad’ (Scadding 2014: 295). The ending of the licence fee 
and the privatisation of the BBC would permit the BBC to com-
pete, freely and aggressively, with other global media businesses. 
The value of the brand could be maximised. 
Serving international markets: the benefits of economies 
of scale
The long-run business opportunity outside the UK must be far 
greater than that within the UK. Three points are to be empha-
sised in this context. Firstly, the UK’s share of world output is 
falling. As people in other nations copy existing production tech-
nologies found in the UK and other relatively wealthy nations, the 
UK is likely to slide down the league tables of income per head. If 
the BBC’s audience is restricted to the UK, its share of the global 
media market must diminish. It needs to look outside the UK if it 
is to achieve the growth that its brand makes possible.
Secondly, although Britain is no longer a great and powerful 
nation, its historical contribution to the rise of modern global 
civilisation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was 
disproportionate to its size. The notion of the ‘Anglosphere’ is 
sometimes advanced to include nations in which English is the 
national language and many aspects of the legal and cultural in-
heritance are shared. There is a wider concept of the Anglosphere 
that also encompasses nations in which the national language 
20 of course, the BBC also has brand strength outside the English-speaking world, but 
that is harder to exploit.
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is not English, but in which English is the language of business, 
finance and high culture. This wider concept includes most 
of Africa and much of Asia, as well the Anglosphere narrowly 
understood.
Critically, the nations of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangla-
desh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka) belong to the wider Anglosphere. 
In these nations and Africa, population growth continues at well 
above the world-average rate. As a result, in the late twenty-first 
century, English will be either the first language or the main sec-
ond language (and indeed the language of the professional elite) 
in countries with more than half of the world’s population. The 
UK’s own population will be a mere 1 per cent of these countries 
in total.
The BBC’s head of public affairs boasts of the BBC’s ‘undimin-
ished reputation’ around the world. Excellent, but, if so, should 
the BBC confine its programming in the next few decades to 
UK-focused news, soap operas, quiz shows and the like? If we 
look ahead to the early twenty-second century, the global market 
opportunity for high-quality English-language-based broadcast-
ing outside the UK could be 100 times that in the UK. As Sir Peter 
Bazalgette, the current chairman of the Arts Council and a for-
mer television producer, has said, ‘the government is discovering 
that there’s this thing called the creative sector, growing twice as 
fast as the economy in general and increasing employment much 
faster than that. It exports and also burnishes the reputation (or 
“brand” in marketing speak) of Britain around the world.’21
Thirdly, films, videos and audio recordings are characterised 
by increasing returns to scale.22 In the extreme, an extra viewer 
21 Peter Bazalgette, ‘Ideas for sale.’ ‘Exporting for Growth’ supplement to the Specta-
tor, 12 July 2014.
22 See Gavyn Davies (2004) for an excellent statement of the argument that the broad-
casting market is characterised by market failure, with an emphasis on p. 22 on the 
effect of increasing returns to scale on market structure. The theme has remained 
in Davies’ contributions to the debate on UK broadcasting, including his evidence 
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over the Internet can see another programme at virtually zero 
resource cost and a negligible addition to the phone bill, but the 
broadcaster can charge on a pay-per-view or subscription basis, 
and perhaps introduce paid-for advertising content on the screen. 
The cost to the viewer (of the pay-per-view) may be as little as $5 
per hour, but for the broadcaster both that $5 and perhaps $1 of 
advertising revenue are virtually pure profit. 
Global audiences of a billion are now feasible in technologi-
cal terms. Meanwhile, the political and demographic trends of 
today imply that English will undoubtedly be the language of 
most programmes with such audiences. obviously, with each 
viewer in that billion responsible for, say, $6-an-hour profit for 
the media business transmitting the programme, the business 
achieves a profit of $6 billion in one hour. That is roughly equal 
to the BBC’s annual licence fee income at present. If the last few 
sentences sound like fantasy, it should be pointed out that the 
strategists at the often reviled ‘Murdoch empire’ are already 
thinking in these terms.23 As noted above, in the autumn of 
2014, BSkyB acquired 100 per cent of Sky Italia and 57.4 per cent 
of Sky Deutschland from 21st Century Fox. The explicit aim 
was to sell substantially the same content to a larger market. 
In other words, the objective was to take advantage of the in-
creasing returns to scale found in the media industry. Here, it 
was being promoted in the European setting, but over time the 
relevant market context will be global. 
to parliamentary committees. For a technical counter-argument, with much the 
same themes as the current publication, see Armstrong (2005). Davies continues to 
argue for an increase in the licence fee in real terms, although his position is now an 
outlier in the public debate. See the report in the Daily Telegraph on 23 January 2013, 
‘Licence fee “may need to rise” says former chairman Gavyn Davies’.
23 In oral evidence to the House of Commons’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
on 11 February 2014, Greg Dyke, chairman of the BBC Board of Governors from 
2001 to 2004, described ‘the Murdoch organisation’ as ‘our long-term enemies … or 
certainly opponents of the BBC’. For another example, see Peter Jay, ‘Good riddance 
to Murdoch: one of the two things I loathe most,’ in the August 2011 issue of the 
London-based Prospect magazine.
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Perhaps even more emphatic an example of the larger argu-
ment is provided by the astonishing commercial success of 
Google, which collects advertising revenues as a by-product of 
its search engine capability. These revenues, which are global 
in source, are now similar in one month to the BBC’s licence fee 
revenue in a year. The concept of Google would have been science 
fiction when the BBC licence fee was first introduced.
A possible alternative approach: a smaller BBC? 
An alternative approach involves a commitment to PSB, as if this 
were a desirable end in its own right, but with a smaller BBC. 
Suppose that all the reasons for abolishing the licence fee 
and the state financing of one broadcasting organisation, and 
indeed for abolishing the state financing of broadcasting in its 
entirety, are set out. Suppose that they are found convincing. The 
enthusiasts for PSB are put in a quandary. In their view, public 
sector broadcasting is a good thing. But it is not an absolute good, 
while the BBC’s increasing political unpopularity and the evils 
of the licence fee mean that something has to change. What are 
the enthusiasts for PSB to believe in and advocate? one response 
is to compromise and plead that ‘the time is not ripe’. Instead 
of abolishing the licence fee and ending state subsidy, the sup-
porter of public sector broadcasting might suggest that the 
value of the licence fee should be kept constant in real terms or 
reduced only slightly. Furthermore, the BBC should cease trying 
to be both a producer of popular programmes and a champion 
of higher things such as ‘culture’. The implied recommendation 
is pragmatic: it should drop a certain amount of the popular 
programming and stick to ‘what it is best at’. In other words, a 
smaller BBC would be a better BBC. Policymakers should trim 
and compromise; they should avoid radical upheaval. 
A reduction in the BBC licence fee, combined with some 
shedding of its popular programming ambitions, may well be 
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the outcome of the current review of the BBC’s role. (This does 
indeed seem to be the intended import of the osborne–Hall deal, 
although it is not clear that the osborne–Hall deal is the govern-
ment’s final verdict.) Radical change (licence fee abolition and 
privatisation), with the aim of promoting a big global-market 
BBC in the decades to come, will be rejected. Instead, decent and 
well-intentioned supposedly ‘pro-BBC’ people will recommend 
that the licence fee and the BBC should stay much as they are 
today, but they should be a little bit smaller and more modest.
They will recommend a smaller BBC, even though the impact 
of a fall in licence fee revenue on staff morale and programme 
quality would be problematic at best. Ambitious and talented 
people will not want to pursue careers in an organisation that is 
condemned, apparently by those who wish it well, to never-end-
ing relative decline. The best and brightest in British broadcast-
ing will instead choose to work in the revenue and profit-seeking 
private sector, in companies such as Sky and ITV, and in the In-
ternet start-ups that are now proliferating. 
Britain has much to gain in the twenty-first century from hav-
ing a big BBC that establishes a strong position in the burgeoning 
world market for media products. No management guru has ap-
plauded compromise and equivocation as the best ways of reach-
ing decisions, but that is invariably how UK official committees 
proceed. on this basis, a smaller BBC would be a worse BBC. 
As we have seen, on becoming the director-general of the 
BBC in April 2013, Tony Hall said that ‘the BBC’s best years are 
yet to come’. A few months later, in the set-piece speech quoted 
earlier, he urged the merits of the BBC’s iPlayer and declared that 
it should aim to be ‘the best in the world’. Hall’s message in April 
2013 was that he wanted the BBC to look forward to growth and 
prosperity, and to be a global competitor. He favoured a big and 
expanding BBC, not a small and contracting one.
But Hall has also said that he supports PSB and, implicitly, 
the licence fee or state subsidy of some form. Yet, the BBC can 
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participate in global markets as a meaningful competitor only 
if it is privately owned and profit maximising. It cannot be pri-
vately owned and profit maximising, and it cannot be big and 
expanding, if it is subject by an overriding legislative constraint 
to provide PSB to the licence fee payers, or to the taxpayers, of 
one small nation. Hall has proclaimed that the BBC must be ‘the 
best in the world’, just as it was in the late 1940s and 1950s. But 
is the money for the reinvented and bespoke iPlayer, and for the 
half-billion-strong global news audience, to come from adver-
tising, from subscription, from pay-per-view or from another 
new and magical source so far wholly unknown to analysts of 
the broadcasting sector? Is it not obvious that the BBC cannot 
be both a significant player in global broadcasting and a state-
owned organisation benefiting from public subsidy? 
Global ambitions cannot be financed by licence fee money. 
Furthermore, the BBC cannot simultaneously receive a state sub-
sidy heading towards £4 billion and direct hundreds of millions 
of ‘risk capital’ towards creative-industry entrepreneurs. Either 
the BBC is a profit-seeking, privately owned, risk-taking and 
slim-line enterprise, or it is a state-subsidised, state-owned, pub-
licly accountable and rather bureaucratic behemoth. It cannot 
be both. At present, it is state-subsidised, state-owned, publicly 
accountable and rather bureaucratic. 
The regulatory ecology of modern broadcasting is not yet 
settled. That is particularly true of broadcasting that cross-
es borders and caters for the global marketplace rather than 
a large number of separate national markets. But the next 
twenty or so years are likely to see international agreement on 
the terms of cross-border competition as well as the legal and 
regulatory structures that will enable it. Global media giants, 
including Google and the world’s largest telephone companies, 
are already working out the strategies in which they can pros-
per as the changes unfold. A small BBC, a BBC fixated on the 
UK’s own limited market and constrained by public service 
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commitments of one sort or another, cannot be a meaningful 
long-run competitor in world broadcasting. ofcom has esti-
mated that, globally, subscription revenues are now running 
at six times the value of public funding for broadcasting and 
continue to grow strongly while public funding remains static 
(see Figure 10). The implied message is straightforward: organ-
isations dependent on public funding will stagnate and suffer 
relative decline. In an interview with the Telegraph on 19 March 
2016, Tony Hall defended the BBC’s role in drama (‘in the BBC’s 
lifeblood’), but admitted that the BBC cannot hope to match 
the spending of an organisation like Netflix, which plans to 
spend $5 billion (£3.5 billion) on original commissions in 2016. 
In Hall’s words, ‘We can’t win against a Netflix or an Amazon, 
because their budgets are so much bigger…We have to think 
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differently. We have to think like Drake’s ships [against the 
Spanish Armada]. We’ve got to think lighter, simpler.’
It was established earlier that the BBC does not nowadays 
dominate broadcasting in Britain, and it certainly does not 
dominate broadcasting internationally. once privatised and 
without artificial state support, the BBC would be a challenged 
organisation. It might need to seek cash to improve its content 
and strengthen its technology.24 It might even eventually want 
to merge with a large telco, such as British Telecom or Vodafone, 
or perhaps even a telco with non-British ownership and manage-
ment. British broadcasting can flourish only if it is also open to 
foreign participation and competition.
Unless it is privatised soon and given the freedoms to compete, 
the big global media companies will outmanoeuvre and outgun 
the BBC. As a lumbering bureaucracy in public ownership and 
dependent on state subsidy, the BBC will go the same way in the 
twenty-first century as British Leyland and British Shipbuilders 
did in the twentieth.
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